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Power
Abstract
When do states decentralize judicial power to ethnic and religious minority groups? This dissertation
presents a theory to explain why states are willing to undertake significant transfers of power by lending
their support to ascriptive, group-based law. It begins with a literature review of scholarship in
comparative politics and public law, both of which argue, for different reasons, that because the judiciary
is vital to the state’s coercive apparatus, property rights regime, and governing functions, we should not
expect states to decentralize judicial power. Yet over half of the world’s states choose to officially engage
with legal pluralism by delegating power to group-based law; so the remainder of this work builds a theory
to explain under what conditions states devolve or share judicial power with ethnic or religious minority
groups, and what accounts for the variation in state approaches to judicial decentralization. To do this, it
uses process tracing methods and an institutional choice approach. It offers a test of this theory through
three full case studies and three shadow cases: Lebanon, Egypt, and Tanzania (full cases); and the United
Kingdom, France, and Malawi (shadow cases). The data that it draws upon consists of 21 months of
fieldwork in all 6 countries in which the author conducted approximately 450 interviews, as well as local
newspapers, archives, and secondary source materials. Using this data, the dissertation creates a
typology that maps the concept of judicial decentralization according to two characteristics: the unity or
plurality of the national court structure and the state’s legal doctrine, with a resulting six types of judicial
decentralization. Through a study of one case of each type, it finds that judicial decentralization is in
significant measure the outcome of bargaining between state leaders and minority group elites, in which
the capacities of the state’s leaders and the capacities of group elites, both shaped by multiple factors,
are decisive in determining the degree of decentralization. It concludes with a summary of findings,
sample court cases from each case study country, and suggestions as to possible avenues for further
research.
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ABSTRACT

STATES AND GROUP RIGHTS: LEGAL PLURALISM AND THE
DECENTRALIZATION OF JUDICIAL POWER
Emma Hayward
When do states decentralize judicial power to ethnic and religious minority groups? This dissertation
presents a theory to explain why states are willing to undertake significant transfers of power by lending
their support to ascriptive, group-based law. It begins with a literature review of scholarship in comparative
politics and public law, both of which argue, for different reasons, that because the judiciary is vital to the
state’s coercive apparatus, property rights regime, and governing functions, we should not expect states to
decentralize judicial power. Yet over half of the world’s states choose to officially engage with legal
pluralism by delegating power to group-based law; so the remainder of this work builds a theory to explain
under what conditions states devolve or share judicial power with ethnic or religious minority groups, and
what accounts for the variation in state approaches to judicial decentralization. To do this, it uses process
tracing methods and an institutional choice approach. It offers a test of this theory through three full case
studies and three shadow cases: Lebanon, Egypt, and Tanzania (full cases); and the United Kingdom,
France, and Malawi (shadow cases). The data that it draws upon consists of 21 months of fieldwork in all 6
countries in which the author conducted approximately 450 interviews, as well as local newspapers,
archives, and secondary source materials. Using this data, the dissertation creates a typology that maps the
concept of judicial decentralization according to two characteristics: the unity or plurality of the national
court structure and the state’s legal doctrine, with a resulting six types of judicial decentralization. Through
a study of one case of each type, it finds that judicial decentralization is in significant measure the outcome
of bargaining between state leaders and minority group elites, in which the capacities of the state’s leaders
and the capacities of group elites, both shaped by multiple factors, are decisive in determining the degree of
decentralization. It concludes with a summary of findings, sample court cases from each case study
country, and suggestions as to possible avenues for further research.
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1
Chapter One: Methodology, Theory, and Causal Argument

Introduction

When do states decentralize judicial power, creating a particular form of legal
pluralism? Why do they sometimes permit ethnic and religious groups to live under their
own laws in their own communities? In many states, people belonging to different
groups—usually divided along ethnic or religious lines—live under separate sets of laws.
In Malaysia, for example, the state maintains two sets of official courts: one for Muslims
and one for non-Muslims.1 While the state operates parallel judicial systems in Malaysia,
in many other places, it instead allows minority groups to manage their own courts or
legal procedures. Religious groups in Lebanon are given complete autonomy over
personal status law, which governs marriage, divorce, custody, guardianship, and
inheritance. For a long time, Lebanon’s 19 official religions had exclusive jurisdiction;
only in 2013 did the Lebanese government pass a law creating an option for civil
marriage offered by the state. In many other places, the relationship between minority
group law and the state is more fluid and less official. In Malawi, for instance, tribal
customary courts were abolished with the introduction of multi-party democracy, but in
practice they continue to adjudicate the majority of the country’s disputes with the tacit
acknowledgement of most politicians.2

1

Yvonne Tew, “The Malaysian Court System: A Tale of Two Courts.” 19 Commonwealth Jud. J. 3-7
Franz von Benda Beckmann, F., Legal Pluralism in Malawi: History from 1858-1970 and Emerging
Issues, Kachere Series 2007.
2
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In most states, judicial diversity is the norm. The end of colonialism forced newly
independent governments to navigate a judicial terrain characterized by strong legal
pluralism. Immigration sometimes has the effect of creating enclaves of like-minded
citizens who find that they prefer not to fully abandon the legal edicts of their place of
origin (England’s sharia councils are one such example). In the last half-century, treaties
and global conventions such as International Labor Organization no. 169, which
recognizes group rights explicitly, have legitimized the demands of minority groups that
want state recognition for their norms and legal practices.3 Accordingly, most states find
themselves having to decide how much judicial autonomy they both can and want to
afford those minority groups that demand it. That governments seriously entertain
thoughts of sharing judicial power, and that many of them choose to do so, flies in the
face of traditional narratives of the state possessing a legitimate monopoly on the use of
coercion. Existing theories of the state lead us to expect that states should seek to
monopolize their coercive power and oppose devolutions of authority where state
functions are delegated to sometimes-oppositional minority groups.
How, then, can we explain the fact that states delegate judicial power to minority
groups? Is it that the states that do so are experimenting with new ways to manage ethnic
conflict, or have the civil societies in these states gained sufficient strength to
successfully make such demands? Or is this trend the by-product of democratization and
the recognition of group rights? Neither regime type nor level of economic development,
or even prior history of decentralization is able to fully explain this phenomenon. Yet the
answers to these questions are crucial for developing a better understanding of how states
3

International Labour Organization (ILO), Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169, 27 June
1989, C169, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ddb6d514.html [accessed 19 March 2018].
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are renegotiating their ties to ethnic and religious communities, whether immigrant or
indigenous, and to extending our theoretical knowledge of comparative law beyond
formal constitutionalism. This study thus aims to answer two separate questions: what
causes states to devolve or share judicial power in the first place? And among those who
devolve judicial authority, what accounts for the variation in state approaches to judicial
decentralization?
Few political scientists have addressed the more general topic of legal pluralism,
much less judicial decentralization, directly, although it sits at the intersection of a
number of fields that have been of longstanding interest to the discipline. Research on
legal pluralism has implications for ethnic conflict studies because, like
consociationalism or federalism, each of which can be associated with legal pluralism, it
offers minority groups a possible compromise between the preservation of identity and
inclusion in the larger state. It is also of interest to scholars of state-society relations
because the assumption of judicial functions by societal groups suggests a possible
rethinking of the boundaries between the state and society.4 Perhaps more importantly,
legal pluralism offers rich material to the field of democratization (and particularly dedemocratization) because it has become popular in recent democracies such as South
Africa and Bolivia as a way of recognizing group rights. Current research raises
concerns, however, that the traditional authorities who are entrusted with adjudication
responsibilities via judicial decentralization use their position to entrench their power and

4

Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third
World, Princeton University Press (1988); Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist
Approaches and Their Critics.” The American Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (1991): 77.
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create authoritarian enclaves in otherwise constitutionally democratic states.5
Additionally, the study of legal pluralism has implications for the rule of law literature
because judicial decentralization creates tensions between the often-cited need for
equality under the law (for example, Dicey 1915) and the practical reality that forcibly
eliminating minority group adjudication forums often creates waves of violence and
crime.6
I propose that judicial decentralization can best be seen as the outcome of a
process of bargaining and contestation in which the relative capacities of minority group
elites in comparison to state leaders’ capacities determines the resulting institutional
configuration. Capacity is further defined and discussed below. Six distinct patterns result
from this process, ranging from the full devolution of judicial authority in a particular
domain to incorporation of group law into state courts to a ban on anything other than
state law. This study explores one case of each type. By uncovering the prevalence of
judicial decentralization, this project challenges the norm of unified central judiciaries. It
articulates the circumstances under which states give up a portion of their judicial power
in contested processes that, in unmaking part of the state, often permit it to extend its
power in other ways.

Literature Review

5

Aninka Claassens and Ben Cousins, Land, Power, and Custom: Controversies Generated by South
Africa’s Communal Land Rights Act, 1st ed. Ohio University Press (2009).
6
See, for example, Tanzania in the mid 1980s in Leila Chirayath, Caroline Sage, C, and Michael
Woolcock, “Customary Law and Policy Reform: Engaging with the Plurality of Justice Systems,” World
Bank: Washington, DC (2005).
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The study of judicially diverse states has long been the focus of the literature on
legal pluralism. Legal pluralism was of particular interest to the academic community at
the height of the critical legal studies movement in the 1970s and early 1980s, when legal
sociologists and anthropologists determined, primarily through the study of individual
cases, that beyond the domain of state law exists a vast and rich world of secondary,
group-based legal systems that are as much or more binding on their constituents than
state law. Most early studies of legal pluralism focused on places such as South Africa,
Ghana, Indonesia, and other developing (and often post-colonial) states.7 The majority of
data collected on legal pluralism at the time came from groups such as the Third World
Legal Studies Association and the Commission on Folk Law and Legal Pluralism, whose
names reflect their underlying and long-unchallenged assumption that legal pluralism was
a cultural phenomenon that belonged distinctly to developing countries.8 It was studied
primarily in places where customary law was predominant—typically, scholars found
legal pluralism in the contrast between “unofficial” customary law systems and the
“official” civil or common law legal systems that were established by and left over from
colonial regimes.9 Moving away from tribal or customary law and toward a single, stateadministered judicial system was often seen as not only desirable, but as a necessary
condition in the process of modernization and state development.
Early correctives to this somewhat stark conception of legal pluralism came with
a shift in focus to industrialized and “modernized” states. Chiba published an account of
legal pluralism in Japan during and after the Meiji restoration, which he argues resulted
7

Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” Law & Society Review 22 (1988): 869.
Masaji Chiba, Legal Pluralism: Toward a General Theory through Japanese Legal Culture, Tokai
University Press (1989), see first chapter.
9
John Griffiths, “What is Legal Pluralism?” Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 24 (1986): 155.
8
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from a process of clash and accommodation between old and new legal systems.10 Until
recently, then, the legal pluralism literature focused on states where an old and a new, or
an “indigenous” and an “imposed” system coexisted—in essence, states where two
separate sources or types of law were brought together, and where legal pluralism has
been the unintentional result of an inability to merge the two systems or for one system to
completely replace the other. There has been much less research on states where legal
diversity exists in an intentional framework, such as federal states or states that grant
subgroups judicial autonomy in certain areas of the law. Accordingly, the outcome of
interest for this study is judicial decentralization, a form of legal pluralism involving the
transfer of judicial power to particularistic legal communities, usually ethnic or religious
minority groups. Legal pluralism in many of its forms can exist with or without state
recognition or interference; judicial decentralization is the result of institutional choice.
Most political science literature emphasizes the importance of state sovereignty,
indicating that even small amounts of judicial decentralization should be a rare
phenomenon. Even in the scholarship on state building, where one might expect to find
more contingent assessments of the state’s capacity for full sovereignty, variations of
Weber’s claim that a state possesses a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force
within a given territory” are standard.11 In the introduction to Rule and Revenue, Levi
notes “The object of state regulations changes with time and place. However, all states
attempt to monopolize the concentrated means of violence within a given territory. All
implement and enforce property rights and other formal rules.”12 This definition,
according to her, makes it possible to discern whether or not a state exists in a given
10

Chiba, 71.
Max Weber, Politics As a Vocation, Indianapolis: Hackett Pub Co, 2004.
12
Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue, University of California Press, 1989, 1.
11
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territorial space. Tilly, who dispenses with the idea that the state’s coercive force must be
legitimate, defines states as “Relatively centralized, differentiated organizations, the
officials of which more or less successfully claim control over the chief concentrated
means of violence within a population inhabiting a large, contiguous territory.”13 Because
judiciaries are an integral part of the state’s coercive apparatus, giving that power away
or sharing it would imply a partial unmaking of the state. Although the state-society
literature engages with the mutually constitutive relationship between the state and its
constituent societal groups, it has only preliminarily considered judicial power.
Two bodies of literature in public law and comparative politics present a strong
theoretical and empirical explanation of why we expect that states avoid devolving
judicial power. In the public law literature, Shapiro, Becker, and Ginsburg and Moustafa
argue that states make use of courts to bolster the central authority and legitimacy of the
regime.14 The three studies separately contend that alongside their dispute resolution
function, courts also have social control and regime strengthening functions. Becker
notes, “There seems little doubt that…governments can use the establishment of a court
procedure and system to excellent advantage in fulfilling their desires for centralization
or merely amalgamation of local power.”15 He argues that courts derive this ability to
“induce political loyalty” from their “actual practice of impartiality and objectivity” as
dispute resolvers.16 Shapiro agrees that courts can produce loyalty through impartiality,

13

Tilly in Peter Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985, 170.
14
Martin M Shapiro, Courts, a Comparative and Political Analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
(1981); Theodore L Becker, Comparative Judicial Politics, University Press of America (1987); Tom
Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa, Rule By Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, 1 ed.,
Cambridge (2008).
15
Becker, 371.
16
Ibid.
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but contends that wider power is derived from the norm-shaping role that state courts
exercise when they use state laws to resolve private and public disputes.17
Both Becker and Shapiro use the example of medieval English courts shortly after
the Norman invasion to illustrate the part that courts play in regime centralization.
According to Becker, the crown, concerned about the wide-ranging powers of the barons
and unable to establish authority via military conquest, opted to establish a court system,
which, in order to “compete successfully with the lords’ private courts…had to offer
benefits their competitors did not, and even better, could not offer.”18 The royal courts
gained popularity for their perceived neutrality and logical procedures (at least in
comparison with the local lords’ courts). The barons came to understand that they, too,
could benefit from using these courts.19 Thus for Becker, centralization occurred via the
individual choice, market-based mechanism of forum shopping. Shapiro tells much the
same story but credits the success of courts as centralizers to additional factors. He
contends that the structure of the royal courts was specifically designed to augment
central authority. Rather than designate local deputies to judge disputes for the king, the
Norman court set up the “eyre” system, under which the king sent an administrative
official to hold court in the towns on brief tours through the countryside, after which he
would report back to the royal court.20 Thus, judicial officials never had the opportunity
to build local loyalty, and in addition, they served as a reporting mechanism to inform the
king about local infringements of the law.

17

Shapiro 1981, 18-26.
Becker, 366.
19
Ibid.
20
Shapiro notes “They were not local subordinates of a central judicial authority tied to it by lines of
hierarchical control, that is, appeals procedures. Instead, they were literally pieces of a central judiciary on
temporary trips through the countryside” 72-73.
18
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Winning litigants away from local lords’ courts built direct ties between
individual citizens and the regime. These ties gave the royal court the ability to provide a
much-needed service (adjudication) directly to the people, cutting out the barons
altogether. In addition, every time the king’s circulating official judged a dispute, he used
the same set of norms and laws to do so. This law, for the first time, “developed as a
uniform, national law, partially written and partly resident in the minds of a few hundred
easily consulted lawyers in the capital, and directly backed by the authority of the
crown.”21 Replacing local norms and practices with royal law meant that every instance
of adjudication served to reinforce royal law and to further educate locals about its
provisions. Shapiro generalizes this point beyond the English example: “a scattered
population living largely by customary and local law may be governed more efficiently
by central authorities if a unified body of law is introduced.”22 Indeed, in all states “a
major function of courts…is to assist in holding the countryside” because “judging, like
administering, may be principally designed to hold and exploit the countryside for the
central regime.”23
For these reasons, we should expect state authorities to avoid judicial
decentralization. If courts are effective in centralizing power, then used in a similar way
by local officials, they could also effectively decentralize or fragment political authority.
If sub-state entities have the potential to develop dispute resolution mechanisms with all
of the requisite criteria, then, as Shapiro argues, “for roughly the same reasons, courts
may appeal to those who wish to resist, revolt against or maintain their independence

21

Shapiro, 79-80.
Ibid., 23.
23
Ibid., 24.
22
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from central regimes.”24 Indeed, Shapiro cites Vietnam as a case where the Cao Dai,
rebels against the French occupation and the central regime of Southern Vietnam, created
a separate court system that drew litigants away from official state courts and bolstered
support for the rebels.25 According to this logic, we should expect dissident groups to
create their own courts, both to gain the ability to administer their own laws and norms
and to increase support for the group’s institutions.
The literature on the rule of law also offers both a theoretical and empirical
challenge to judicial decentralization. Most rule of law theories argue that citizens should
be treated equally under the law, with the implication that everyone should be governed
by the same sets of laws. Although there are usually legal exceptions for minors, those
deemed mentally incompetent, and some other categories of people, today grounds for
exception in most normative theories do not fall along ascriptive lines such as religion or
race. Theories of the rule of law also view the state as legally monistic, claiming that for
states to exercise authority over their citizens in a legitimate manner, certain requirements
must be met such as holding the rulers accountable under the same set of rules that
govern their citizens and treating all citizens equally under the law.26 Until recently, most
rule of law consultants working in developing states advised legal centralization.27
The state building literature in comparative politics also indicates that we should
expect states to avoid delegating coercive power, particularly if it involves property rights
or punishing crimes. Scott, in Seeing Like a State, argues that states developed property
24

Ibid., 24.
Ibid.
26
Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, Macmillan (1897); Lon L
Fuller, The Morality of Law: Revised Edition, Yale University Press (1969.) Dicey and Fuller’s theories
were developed partially in response to older theories of law (such as legal positivism, e.g. Austin 1885) to
complicate the argument that the source of the law is its most important legitimizing characteristic.
27
Kleinfield in Thomas Carothers, Ed, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2006).
25
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law codes to simplify tax collection. States could not levy taxes on land unless there was
an individual associated with the land who could pay the tax.28 State officials thus set out
to destroy customary land tenure, which often allowed for rotating, temporary, and
communal ownership. They replaced it with “modern” property law, which specified
individual ownership.29 Scott notes “the very concept of a modern state presupposes a
simplified and uniform property regime that is legible and hence manipulable from the
center.”30 Additionally, as states have become the primary agents of property rights
enforcement, they have gained an effective coercive tool in the form of threats to
property (fines, fees, loss of land, etc.). We should thus expect states to resist devolving
these capacities to local authorities—particularly local authorities not under the direct
control of the state.
For Huntington, in Political Order in Changing Societies, a major source of
political institutionalization lies in state autonomy from society. Institutionalization, for
Huntington, is the best way to ensure that political institutions survive the process of
modernization, which they must do if the polity is to avoid social upheaval and political
violence.31 State autonomy involves developing institutions that pursue the interests of
the state rather than those of families, clans, or other sub-state groups.32 This applies to
the judiciary, in particular, which is “independent to the extent that it adheres to distinctly
judicial norms and to the extent that its perspectives and behavior are independent of
those of other political institutions and social groupings.”33 A legal system that has
28

James C Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed,
Yale University Press (1999), 33.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid., 35.
31
Samuel P Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven (1968), 53-55.
32
Ibid., 20.
33
Ibid.
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separate courts for different groups would necessarily contravene this principle and
thereby hinder institutionalization.
In Boundaries and Belonging, Migdal explains that one of the primary functions
of a state is to maintain its boundaries, both as physical borders and the more general
conception of the state, against sub and supra-state challenges to them.34 He argues that
boundaries are preserved through checkpoints such as borders, identity cards, and other
means of separating entities within the state from those outside of it, and through mental
maps, which “incorporate elements of the meaning people attach to spatial
configurations, the loyalties they hold, the emotions and passions that groupings evoke,
and their cognitive ideas about how the world is constructed.”35 When the mental maps
held by subgroups within the state are incongruent with the physical boundaries of the
state, people have to decide “which boundaries, principles, and practices to submit to and
which to violate (with all the attendant consequences).”36 Migdal emphasizes that the
decision to contest boundaries often involves challenging state law. He writes:

But in fact, the contestation of boundaries can be much more subtle and less
immediately obvious. One way to think about these less obvious, but still insidious
challenges to state boundaries is through a central institution of the state, the law.
For states, probably nothing constitutes them more than law, the rules of conduct
that prescribe proper behavior for its members and the control implied by the
enforcement of the codes. Not only does the law set out the ways of doing things, it
also projects an essential part of the image of the state, as when it denotes the whole
body of rules, institutions (such as courts) associated with them, and their affective
component (as in “respect for the law”). People are classified by whether they stay
within state laws (law-abiding) or step outside them (lawbreakers). State law, then,

34

Joel S. Migdal, Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and
Local Practices., Cambridge University Press (2008), see introductory chapter.
35
Ibid., 6-7.
36
Ibid., 23.
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both prescribes behavior within the boundaries of the state and symbolically
demarks those boundaries by signifying the realm and limits of the state’s law.37
Thus, law is a constitutive and central element of the state such that “when others put
forward an alternative code to state law—let’s say, that of a street gang—they contest not
only the code itself but the realm and its limits suggested by the law.”38 When the group
is not a street gang but a group of immigrants, or co-religionists, or indigenous
inhabitants, the challenge is correspondingly stronger.
For several scholars, there is something inherent in the nature of the modern state
that requires it to demand unquestioned sovereignty within its borders. In “State, Power,
and Citizenship in the Middle East,” Butenschon notes “The state commands
monopolistic control over coercive means within its jurisdiction. No other authority
structure in society—be it based in the family, religious leadership, or tribal
organization—can legitimately demand loyalty from one of its members in a way that
contradicts his or her obligations toward the state.”39 Migdal, in characterizing the state’s
relationship to society, argues “what has distinguished the modern state from most other
large-scale political organizations in history, such as empires, has been its insinuation
into the core identities of its subjects…they aim to shape people’s entire moral orders…a
transformative state simply cannot let any struggle over domination within its official
boundaries go uncontested; state leaders want the state to matter most, enough to die
for.”40 Thus, there is also a normative dimension to a state’s relationship with its
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subgroups—although the complexities of state bureaucracy generally compel a certain
amount of delegation to local officials, a state will not accept challenges to its
sovereignty.
There are clearly many compelling reasons for states to avoid judicial
decentralization. Although local officials may administer state finances or run the local
branches of state programs, there is a qualitative difference between these types of
decentralization and judicial decentralization, because only the latter involves sharing or
devolving coercive power. Even federal states, which are the most likely to accord
substantial law-making and enforcement power to their federated sub-regions, often
forestall unlimited local judicial discretion by mandating that local laws and practices be
in accordance with a federal constitution. Nevertheless, at least half of the world’s states
pursue some form of judicial decentralization. How can we explain why do they do so,
and what accounts for different patterns of judicial decentralization?

Conceptualization of Judicial Decentralization

One of the challenges in studying judicial decentralization (or legal pluralism, in
general) is that it is difficult to define the concept in an easily quantifiable manner. Even
with a definition that permits coding, it is challenging to measure in practice. Nor do
proxy variables manage to capture the concept accurately. What does it mean, really, for
a state to decentralize judicial power? In some places, it involves an effort to codify
group law for use in state courts by state judges. In others, it means turning a blind eye
when groups choose to ignore the law on the books and solve community disputes
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according to local standards of justice. Discovering the extent of judicial decentralization
requires both familiarity with a country’s laws and observation of its courts in practice—
most especially those in areas where conflicting, local norms appear to predominate.
Until there is a better picture of the scope of legal pluralism world wide, quantitative
analysis is limited in its ability to explain the phenomenon.
The overall methodology adopted here is thus qualitative. I rely on the
comparative method in the form of paired cases, examined through process tracing.
Before theorizing about the causes of judicial decentralization, we need to both define the
term and map the full extent of the concept. The former gains specific content from the
latter, so I will begin with a conceptual typology that demarcates the different forms of
judicial decentralization. Collier, LaPorte, and Seawright distinguish between typologies
that serve a conceptual or descriptive purpose and those whose function is mainly
explanatory.41 Conceptual typologies, appropriately developed and applied, “explicate the
meaning of a concept by mapping out its dimensions.”42 By contrast, explanatory
typologies, according to Elman, are “multidimensional conceptual classifications based
on an explicitly based theory.”43
Collier et al define explanatory typologies as those in which “cell types are the
outcomes to be explained and the rows and columns are the explanatory variables.”44
Explanatory typologies most often serve as a visual representation of the author’s causal
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argument, usually depicted as a two-by-two cell matrix whose contents are the product of
certain combinations of variables. According to Elman, descriptive typologies answer the
question “What constitutes this type?” while explanatory typologies answer the question
“If my theory is correct, what do I expect to see?”45 Elman argues that explanatory
typologies must be based on a preexisting theory, which may be derived through the
inductive method of observation, or the deductive method of formal models, although
they are more appropriately suited to the latter. 46 Deductive reasoning, where variables
yield types without prior reference to empirical observations, runs the risk of creating
empty cells in a matrix.47 Comparing the typological reasoning used by Elman as
opposed to that of Collier et al, one could argue that researchers who employ inductive
reasoning begin with conceptual typologies and work toward explanatory ones, whereas
deductive researchers begin with explanatory typologies and, based on them, generate
conceptual ones.
Comparativists also rely on typologies in the process of case selection.48 Often,
these typologies are preexisting. For researchers interested in developing new theories, or
theories only peripherally based on preexisting work, both kinds of typologies are
needed. This is particularly true of areas of the discipline that have been under theorized
or weakly theorized in the past. For example, although authoritarianism had been the
subject of previous study, Linz’s typology of different kinds of autocratic regimes
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brought clarity to the study of non-democracies and a wave of research based on his work
followed.49 Catherine Boone’s Political Topographies of the African State is a good
example of the use of both kinds of typology to develop a new theory. It begins with a
conceptual typology that delineates four variations of rulers’ institutional choices in
Africa.50 Using the categories from this typology, she introduces three variables that are
causally linked to the four institutional outcomes.51 Together, the two typologies map the
domain of her theory and introduce variables and outcomes that she explores through
case studies of each type.52
This study follows the analytic two-step of pairing conceptual and explanatory
typologies in building a theory to explain judicial decentralization. First, it is necessary to
create a theoretically oriented conceptual typology that maps the complete domain of the
concept both for analytic clarity and to ensure that the resulting theory does not omit
crucial types. Three typologies of legal pluralism already exist, but they are unsuitable for
present purposes for several reasons. Sezgin, Forsyth, and Malik all categorize legal
pluralism, although Sezgin’s study is restricted to family law and Malik’s is limited to
49
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analysis of the United Kingdom.53 Forsyth’s typology is based on original fieldwork and
an extensive review of the literature and presents the most wide-ranging framework of
the phenomenon. She includes seven ways in which states choose to address legal
pluralism including repression of non-state legal orders, tacit acceptance, active
encouragement despite an official ban, and four types of government recognition of other
legal orders.54 By mapping her types of legal pluralism along a single variable, degree of
autonomy, Forsyth cannot distinguish between different sites of government policy, such
as the difference between incorporating codified versions of group law into state courts
versus delegating judicial power directly to group officials.
Accordingly, I propose a new conceptual typology of judicial decentralization
mapped along two axes: the first concerns the structure of the national courts, and the
second concerns the state’s legal doctrines. These dimensions are chosen because
together, they describe the form and content of the judiciary. The structure of the national
courts refers to whether or not the state permits the existence of multiple judicial forums
with separate legal rules and procedures. We should expect, and indeed find, that most
states attempt to preserve a unitary court system. This is true because a plural court
structure is a larger delegation of power than merely incorporating separate legal codes or
assessors into state courts. However, not every attempt to maintain a unified judiciary
succeeds, so there are three sub-types within the larger category of a unified judiciary
(see table below). Unitary national court systems are those in which the state successfully
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maintains a single national court system. Failed Unitary states are those whose policy
preference is legal centralization, but for any one of a number of reasons, cannot attain
full unity. Most states in this category intentionally adopt limited structural pluralism
because they are unable to succeed with unification. Those that do so in combination with
a unified legal doctrine mostly choose, however, to only tacitly accept the presence of
non-state legal forums, whereas those with a plural legal doctrine usually explicitly
permit a limited plural legal structure (see below for full definitions of both types). Plural
court structures occur when the government acknowledges the existence of, and either
recognizes or chooses to work with, one or more legal forums controlled by non-state
agents.
The variable of the state’s legal doctrine refers to whether or not the state’s legal
doctrine encompasses a single source or multiple sources of law.55 In unitary doctrinal
systems, the state has a single, clearly defined legal doctrine and is not willing to admit
any other legal codes or doctrines into state courts. In doctrinally plural states, the state
engages with multiple legal codes or doctrines. Sometimes these separate laws are
litigated in state courts by state judges, and sometimes in separate, group-based forums
by group judges.
Like all ideal types, those used here involve necessary simplification. Regimes
often use multiple strategies simultaneously. For example, Tanzania’s government
incorporates the codified customary laws of many of its patrilineal tribes into state law,
and judges are supposed to use this law when adjudicating disputes that fall under the
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jurisdiction of customary law. In reality, however, most of Tanzania’s judicial
decentralization is exercised at the level of its separate Ward Tribunals and ten-cell
arbitration forums, run by local elders, and the assessors (also local elders) whose opinion
is binding upon primary court judges. The delegation of judicial authority to community
elders without legal training is both Tanzania’s most significant devolution of judicial
power, and also the site of the greatest volume of adjudication, so it is fair to categorize
Tanzania’s judicial decentralization as primarily sited outside of its state courts despite
the addition of tribal law to Tanzania’s legal code. Similar caveats apply to each of the
following types, but, following a tradition of ideal types in political science stretching
back to Weber, the analytic clarity achieved by creating types outweighs the risks of
oversimplification.

Table 1
Conceptual Typology of Judicial Decentralization
Structure of the National Courts
Unitary

Failed Unitary

Unified

Full Centralization
(France)

Tacit Devolution**
(Malawi)
(UK—Common law)

Diverse

Partial Incorporation
(Egypt)

Partial Decentralization
(Tanzania)

Legal

Plural

Doctrine
Full Decentralization
(Lebanon)

**Common Law Devolution: A small category of states in the Unified/Failed Unitary
category warrants special attention (and a separate name). Some liberal, common law
states choose to devolve certain amounts of judicial power for political purposes, such as
integration, the protection of diversity, etc. These states form a category titled “Common
Law Devolution.” See below Table 2 for a description of each type.
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All of these categories represent some degree of judicial decentralization with the
exception of the full centralization type. A partial incorporation state, such as Egypt,
incorporates the legal codes of minority groups into state law, allowing modification only
through judges or parliamentary acts, whereas in a partial decentralization state such as
Tanzania, the state creates structures that allow local elites more of a say in judicial
matters. See below, following Figure 2, for a full description of each type. Before moving
to causal analysis, however, it is useful to provide one further schema detailing the
relationship between the above types. The conceptual typology maps the domain of
judicial decentralization but does not fully indicate which types involve a greater transfer
of judicial power. Although a typology that uses degree alone is not as useful as one that
can more fully explicate each type, placing each type in order from the least to most
amount of decentralization creates a useful visual and another dimension of comparison.
The risk of doing so is that judicial power can be measured in a number of different ways,
especially vis-à-vis questions of decentralization.56 Has more decentralization taken place
when the regime openly transfers judicial power through legislation, or when it officially
bans non-state adjudication but deliberately turns a blind eye toward the operation of a
complete parallel justice system? Perhaps surprisingly, the latter usually involves more
actual autonomy for non-state agents who wield local-level judicial authority. Because
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the outcome of interest is judicial (de)centralization, it is tempting to view “official”,
legislation-based transfers of power as involving more decentralization, but the decision
to tacitly accept an officially banned form of adjudication, as long as the rules are
understood by the actors involved, does constitute a larger, if more precarious, transfer of
power. Accordingly, the metric adopted here is one of effective rather than de jure power.
From this standpoint, a ranking from least to most judicial decentralization is as follows:

Figure 1
A Ranking of the Types of Judicial Decentralization

Full
Centralization

Common Law
Incorporation

Partial
Incorporation

Partial
Decentralization

Tacit Devolution

Full
Decentralization

A description of each type of legal pluralism follows below.

Full Decentralization:
Full decentralization involves the complete delegation of judicial authority to a
group such that it enjoys full autonomy over legal substance and procedure in a defined
area. It is characterized by a plural judicial structure that incorporates multiple legal
forums and a plural legal doctrine that recognizes more than one source of law. Although
this is somewhat rare, it occurs most frequently in Latin American states such as Bolivia
that are attempting to honor their commitment to ILO 169 and certain Middle Eastern
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states, such as Lebanon, where family law is delegated to religious groups to the
exclusion of the state. The most important feature of these states is that within the domain
of law in which group courts have exclusive jurisdiction, there is no possible appeal to
state courts. That said, states do not necessarily decentralize judicial power across the full
legal realm; no state currently permits the existence of a complete parallel justice system
that to which it lends its coercive power. However, full delegation in a domain such as
family law, land law, and the like is a serious devolution of judicial power. States of this
type include Lebanon, Bolivia, and Israel.

Tacit Devolution:
Like partial decentralization, tacit devolution is one of the broadest and most
populated types. In this category, states maintain a unified judiciary that does not
incorporate elements of minority group law, and they do not officially recognize groupbased legal forums either. At the same time, the state chooses to ignore the existence of
one or more sets of minority group judicial institutions that often provide the majority of
judicial recourse at the local level. The state’s legal doctrine is unitary; its national courts
recognize no source of law other than state law. The state maintains a unitary court
system, but at the same time, it “delegates” the adjudication of disputes according to
other legal systems to structures that it does not officially acknowledge. Crucially, the act
of delegation is deliberately unofficial; although no acts or laws acknowledge it, every
judicial and government officials are aware of the situation. As Forsyth argues “In the
vast majority of countries in the world where there is both a weak state and a non-state
justice system of some sort, there is no formal recognition given to a non-state justice
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system, but the state turns a ‘blind eye’ to the fact that the non-state justice system
processes the vast majority of disputes, and state actors often unofficially encourage
reliance on the non-state justice system.”57
In most cases of this type, lack of resources is a compelling reason for states to
unofficially permit parallel justice systems to handle most adjudication. However, in
many places that are just as under-resourced, the state has managed to either incorporate
tribal courts into the state judiciary or build sufficient numbers of courts to close down
rival systems. Lack of resources is therefore not the primary reason for this policy.
Instead, rural elites may possess the power to corral votes for candidates, or to delay or
implement development projects, or other, similar types of authority that make urban
rulers reluctant to curtail rural elite power in any kind of way that would lead them to
oppose the ruling coalition. Lack of official recognition gives these states very little
means of regulating parallel justice systems, and, as a consequence, these other tribunals
are mostly left to establish their own laws and procedures. Examples of this type include
Malawi, Ghana, Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, and Lesotho.

Partial Decentralization:
This category is perhaps the most broad and encompasses a larger number of
cases than either of the previous two types. Partial decentralization includes a wide range
of measures that give minority communities the right to adjudicate certain types of
disputes without seeking recourse in state courts. It also gives them control over the
content of their laws, as opposed to the static codes that characterize partial
incorporation. The state consciously adopts a plural legal doctrine, and although it
57
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maintains a unitary national court system, it uses two separate mechanisms to make space
for its plural doctrine: assimilating group law into the national courts through the use of
assessors, and delegating petty instances to forums operated by village elders that sit just
below the bottom rung of the judiciary. In this category, it is usual for the state to
preserve exclusive jurisdiction in criminal law matters of a non-petty nature and civil law
cases that involve above a certain value of money. The state also retains control of at
least parts of the appeals process, so that a case that begins in a non-state forum can
always be appealed in state courts.
Beyond these measures of control, the state can decentralize judicial power in one
or more ways, for instance by creating a layer of village or neighborhood-level
adjudication forums operated by local lay officials where most, if not all judicial
questions begin. These forums are usually not required to conform to standards of state
law and instead are meant to achieve reconciliation or, in more serious cases, preliminary
fact-finding before cases are passed along to state courts. States pursuing partial
decentralization can also incorporate assessors into state courts, possibly giving them an
important role in the evidentiary phase of the proceedings or even the ability to overrule
the magistrate.58 The state can also designate a particular area of the law, often land law
or family law, as being under the jurisdiction of local, community-run courts, with
jurisdiction covering a higher monetary value than would be permitted in neighborhood
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forums. In Tanzania, for example, until 2002 all land cases up to the value of three
million shillings were required to be submitted first to locally-run Ward Tribunals, whose
staff were not magistrates.59 In essence, partial judicial decentralization involves the
delegation of certain, delimited judicial powers to non-state actors in a way that gives
them flexibility regarding the contents of the law, but that preserves the state’s right to a
final say through the appeals structure. The extent of decentralization varies from one
case to the next, as does the amount of effective judicial power that is transferred. In
many places, a dearth of state courts at the village level make local arbitration forums the
first and last recourse for the majority of disputes that arise, petty or otherwise, and the
option to appeal is rarely exercised. Examples of this type include Tanzania, Kyrgyzstan,
Samoa, Botswana, and South Africa, among others.

Partial Incorporation:
States in this category have a unitary judicial system in which only state judges
may adjudicate disputes. It differs from the next category, however, in that its judicial
system incorporates multiple sets of legal codes that apply to different sectors of the
population, usually according to ascriptive characteristics such as religious affiliation or
ethnicity. It thus combines a unitary national court system with a plural legal doctrine. In
these cases, state judges adjudicate all disputes and, in most places, they do so without
regard to the identity of the litigants, i.e. in Egypt, a Muslim judge uses codified Coptic
Orthodox law to judge a family law dispute between Coptic Orthodox co-religionists,
although some places may stipulate that only co-group members can adjudicate disputes.
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Unlike partial decentralization states, however, partial incorporation states retain control
over all legal codes used in its national courts, i.e. it uses a codified version of group law
that the group may not alter. It is usual for the existence of separate codes to be limited to
the domain of family law, although sometimes other types of civil law are included as
well. In other words, there exist separate laws for separate communities, but these laws
are fixed and often quite difficult to change. Examples of this type include Egypt, Jordan,
and some states in India.

Common Law Incorporation
The fourth category is common law incorporation, in which liberal, common law
states use various mechanisms to create judicial space for the customs and traditions of
religious and ethnic groups. These states have a unitary legal doctrine of common law
and unitary assimilating national courts. Assimilation takes place when, for reasons of
equity, they temporarily and voluntarily incorporate group-based legal systems into the
courts through the testimony of legal experts, or allow religious law to form a temporary
standard for arbitration. It should be noted that this category is somewhat rare and is
limited to states whose legal systems are not a hybrid between common law and other
legal systems. The most common mechanisms for accommodating non-state law are
arbitration, common law recognition, and permitting extrajudicial forums to exist on the
sidelines of state courts with the explicit understanding that their rulings are not legal
decisions. As opposed to countries in the full centralization type, these states permit, and
sometimes encourage, religious or identity group-based arbitration.
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In England, for example, groups may offer particularistic adjudication services,
such as Sharia arbitration, so long as they use only those elements of Sharia law that are
compatible with state law.60 In some states, magistrates and judges can choose to use
group membership as a criterion in judicial decision-making such that they incorporate
elements of the group’s legal system into the adjudication process despite having
officially adopted neither the group’s legal code nor its legal procedures. In England, for
reasons of equity, courts have chosen to recognize the validity of religious marriages that
are otherwise precluded from official status by the 1949 Marriage Act.61 States in this
category often also allow minority groups to provide wider-reaching adjudication outside
the purview of state law. For example, in the United States and the United Kingdom,
Jewish Beth Din and Muslim Sharia courts provide divorces and settle other family law
disputes, although these decisions are neither recognized nor enforced by the state. At the
same time, the government chooses not to eliminate these forums, unlike full
centralization states. The best exemplar of this type is the United Kingdom, although
certain states in the United States, such as New York, are also good examples.

Full Centralization:
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States characterized by full centralization are those whose laws do not recognize
the binding jurisdiction of any other judicial forums apart from the state judiciary. Their
legal doctrines are unitary, as are their national court systems. By and large, these are
civil law countries. Some states in this category permit arbitration tribunals, usually nonpermanent, to resolve certain types of disputes, such as those involving business
contracts, although not all of them do so. Even the ones that do allow arbitration retain
the authority to remove certain areas of law from arbitration entirely. For example, in
France, arbitration cannot ever be used in family law matters. Additionally, most
countries require that an arbitrator disclose any reason as to why he may not be fully
impartial in any given case. Religious or community membership can constitute such
grounds. Many of these states, such as Germany and France, are also secular. In the
judicial realm, this means that using religious standards for arbitration is impermissible,
unlike in common law states such as Britain and the United States.62 Finally, these states
do not tacitly accept the existence of minority group forums, even if they do not interfere
with state courts. In sum, then, these states fully centralize law to the best of their ability.
Examples of this type of state include France, Germany, Tunisia, Morocco, and Japan.

Methodology

With these six types established and defined, the next task is to develop a unified
theory to explain judicial decentralization, accounting for its different iterations.
Following Boone’s approach in Political Topographies of the African State, the

62

The distinction between common and civil law states here is not absolute, but, by and large, common law
states have more judicial structures in place to accommodate judicial diversity.

30
framework of analysis used here is one of institutional choice.63 The institutional choice
approach is particularly useful for explaining variations in institutional structure in
settings of contested authority where the state and other powerful groups, such as rural
elites or interest groups, vie for control over resources. Institutional choice theory has
been deployed to explain many different political and economic outcomes such as state
formation (Levi 1988), regime structure (Frye 1997, Boone 2003, Benoit and Schiemann
2001), democratic transitions and consolidation (Elster 1996, Bastian and Luckham 2003,
Bernhard 2005), and economic development (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1998, Bates
1998). Because it was developed, by and large, by scholars working in the state-society
literature, it was initially used to explain the process of state making—how do states
develop effective taxation strategies (Levi 1988)? How does the level of power vested in
the executive emerge (Frye 1997)? Boone summarizes the components of this type of
theory: “models of bargaining or competition over institutional choice should specify
actors’ choice sets, interests, resources, and relative bargaining power.”64 Institutions are
thus seen as the product of negotiations, or what Boone terms “battling”, between
multiple actors with different capacities for obtaining different sets of policy preferences.
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As will be further explained below, I argue that the degree of judicial
decentralization is shaped by bargaining between minority group elites and state elites.
The outcome of this bargaining is determined by the capacities that group elites and state
leaders bring to bear in the bargaining process. These capacities involve various factors,
such as control over and access to coercive force; control over institutions; popular
support; access to natural resources; wealth; and the degree of coordination that state
leaders and group elites are able to achieve, among other factors. The importance of any
one of these particular capacities depends on the context of the bargaining scenario, i.e.
what the state most needs from group elites at the moment of bargaining over levels of
judicial (de)centralization. Colonial legacies have a strong, but not exclusive role in
shaping these capacities, as I will show in the following case study chapters. Colonial
legacies alone, however, cannot explain changes in the degree of judicial decentralization
that have taken place since the original postcolonial bargaining moment.
It is common for states to modify their policies of judicial decentralization over
time, but the original degree of decentralization is usually arrived at during the process of
state formation and consolidation, often in the years after independence (for post-colonial
states). As such, any study of the phenomenon necessarily looks back in time to the
state’s first attempt to navigate judicial diversity. Ideally, it would be possible to know
each actor’s capacity and policy preference, and to track the process of bargaining
through all of its stages. However, using historical data, sometimes going very far back
(for example, Greif 1998, Levi 1988), or even in more recent cases where archival
material has been destroyed or badly preserved, it is usually impossible to meet this
standard. Even so, institutional choice theory is particularly well suited to situations
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where access to data is constrained. It is effective even without quantitative measures,
and for that reason it has been used to explain political outcomes in historical cases such
as ancient Rome and medieval Europe where full retrospective measurement is not
always possible.65
The more successful uses of institutional choice theory do not take actors’
interests as given, but rather use available data, historical or otherwise, to reconstruct
preferences and capacities involved in the bargaining process. As such, this study views
capacity formation as endogenous to the process as a whole. Accordingly, the first task
for institutional choice theorists is to infer the capacities and interests of the parties
involved from the available data. If one cannot know precisely what a group’s capacity is
relative to the state, it should at least be possible to find evidence that it was high enough
to prevent the state from implementing policy, or high enough to warrant attempts to win
the group over to supporting the state’s position, etc. Process tracing devices such as
smoking gun and straw in the wind tests (see below) can be used to ensure that the
inference has strong empirical support.66
Because colonial legacies play a role in shaping the capacity of both group elites
and state leaders, this study emphasizes the importance of temporality.67 Not all causal
processes unfold at the same pace or occur simultaneously, but in many cases, events that
happen earlier in a sequence have more causal weight than those that happen later.68
Pierson argues “placing politics in time—systematically situating particular moments
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(including the present) in a temporal sequence of events and processes—can greatly
enrich our understanding of complex social dynamics.”69 Accordingly, the trajectory of
the variables is traced back at least one, and sometimes two, historical periods before the
bargaining process.70 However, because bargaining happens at a defined moment in
history, these capacities must be examined through the lens of the bargaining context, i.e.
what the state most needs from the groups in question such that it is willing to give up a
degree of judicial control.
Because the analysis here involves inferring capacity formation across time, the
method adopted is one of process tracing. Bernhard argues that institutional choice theory
faces problems of evidence in articulating actors’ interests and preferences, but that these
difficulties can be attenuated by relying on thick description rather than surveys of crossnational data.71 His argument is borne out by how many institutional choice studies rely
on historically rich accounts.72 Process tracing has become widespread as a method to
guide the researcher’s use and interpretation of historical narratives and to map causal
processes over time.73 Process tracing involves the creation of theory-guided dense
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narratives. Many different sources of data can be used to construct these narratives, but
most process tracing involves using historical sources, interviews, and other qualitative
data.74 George and Bennett describe process tracing in the following terms: “In process
tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and
other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case
is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.”75
Although there are several varieties of the method, they all involve the use of narrative
accounts to test for the presence of sequences of events that permit the researcher to infer
causal processes that lead to specified outcomes.76 One of the greatest concerns is thus
ensuring that the hypothesized sequence of events is empirically borne out through case
studies. Various tests have been proposed to assess the strength of evidence brought to
bear in the causal narrative and to guide the researcher in determining whether particular
components of the theory constitute necessary or sufficient conditions.77
The most effective process tracing techniques involve the use of causal
mechanisms, which Falleti and Lynch define as “relatively abstract concepts or patterns
of action that can travel from one specific instance...of causation to another and that
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explain how a hypothesized cause creates a particular outcome in a given context.”78
They specify that causal mechanisms must be observable, generalizable across cases, and
irreducible, and that they are portable across cases with proper attention to context and
periodization.79 Causal mechanisms are valuable because they allow researchers to
establish causation with a greater degree of certainty than many other methods.
Problematically, few studies that use the paradigm of institutional choice refer to causal
mechanisms, although most rely on process tracing. In the absence of mechanisms,
process tracing techniques often fall back on sequence. However, most users of
institutional choice theory are for the most part unconcerned with sequences and
temporality, focusing instead on actor interests and capacities that are assumed to be
developed prior to the bargaining process. Without mechanisms and sequences, it can be
argued that institutional choice theory does not really use process tracing so much as the
approach modeled in Analytic Narratives.80 In a later exposition on the method, Levi
makes clear that analytic narratives are distinct from process tracing. Although the former
combine strategic, contingency-based choices with path dependence, they all explicitly
rely on rational choice theory.81
How then, can institutional choice theory best be used in conjunction with process
tracing? As previously stated, the institutional choice approach used here emphasizes
temporality and locates the various components of its theory, including preference
formation and bargaining or contestation, in time. Principally, it argues that long-held,
78

Tulia G Falleti and Julia F. Lynch, “Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis,” Comparative
Political Studies 42, no. 9 (2009): 1143–66, 1145.
79
Causal mechanisms interact with their surrounding contexts, so although they are portable across cases as
a generalizable causal explanation, they cannot be presumed to operate in isolation of “relevant aspects of
the surroundings” (Falleti and Lynch 1152).
80
Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Analytic Narratives, Princeton:
Princeton University Press (1998).
81
Levi in Mayntz (eds.) 2002.

36
unchallenged preferences give rise to stronger interest articulation before and during the
bargaining process. As such, timing matters. Next, it proposes to treat institutional choice
itself as a causal mechanism.82 In that it is an irreducible pattern of action that is both
context-dependent and portable across cases, the specific act of “choosing” an institution
acts as a causal mechanism. It has multiple inputs in the form of preferences, capacities,
and context, all of which are explained through prior processes in the causal sequence of
events, but the institutional configuration that is the outcome of interest ultimately results
from the mechanism of institutional choice.
Although only the latter explicitly acknowledges the role of causal mechanisms, a
comparison of Boone’s and Bernhard’s theories illustrates the point. Boone articulates a
theory of institutional choice to explain configurations of regime structure in rural
Africa.83 She argues that cash crop production, rural social hierarchies, and elite
economic dependence on the regime account for four outcomes that reflect the regime’s
strategy for navigating political contexts in which the regime has more or less local
authority and political presence.84 The causal mechanism is situated at the moment of
institutional choice, which results from the regime’s solution to maximizing power in
rural areas despite constraints. Bernhard, by contrast, argues that institutional choice
theory can explain democratic survival by bringing clarity to the democratic transitions
literature on political pacting.85 Examining two cases of democratic breakdown and two
cases of democratic survival in Germany and Poland, he contends that the coalitions that
assembled to create new rules of government did so using one of four choice
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mechanisms: consensus, imposition, splitting differences, and trading support across
issues.86 These four types of decision processes are, in his theory, the mechanisms that
interact with contextual variables to produce democratic breakdown or stability. His
causal mechanism is thus four-fold, with each mechanism acting in context to produce a
different outcome.87
This difference reveals two ways in which institutional choice theory can engage
with causal mechanisms. In the first, the single mechanism of constrained choice results
in various outcomes depending on context. In the second, actors select different
mechanisms of choosing, and the variation in types of decision-making is what accounts
for the variation in outcome. Although the second method has strong appeal because it
relies less heavily on context variables and can account for variation based on differences
in mechanism alone, it requires a tremendous amount of data about the actual process of
bargaining or negotiating between actors with different interests. For legislative debates
or treaty negotiations, it is a sophisticated method. However, for contexts in which there
is less evidence concerning the bargaining/contestation process, it is not feasible.
Accordingly, most institutional choice theories use mechanistic frameworks that more
closely resembles Boone’s, even if, like hers, they are not explicitly theorized. This study
follows the single mechanism approach.

Research Design and Data
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The aim of this study is to build a theory to explain judicial decentralization, but
to do so the conceptual typology includes judicial centralization as well, so as to not
select only positive instances of the phenomenon. This project thus encompasses three
full case studies accompanied by three shadow cases (six cases, each representing one of
the six types of judicial decentralization) to study the full range of the theory.88 The three
full case studies are of Lebanon (full decentralization), Tanzania (partial
decentralization), and Egypt (partial incorporation). The three shadow cases are Malawi
(tacit devolution), England (common law incorporation) and France (full centralization).
Limited observations from the three shadow cases are interwoven into the three primary
case studies. Apart from choosing one case of each type, cases were selected based on
two criteria. One is that the case be a good example of its category (Gerring uses the term
“typical case”).89 Using typical cases helps bring clarity to the inner workings of each
type.
The second is that cases were selected, wherever possible, to rule out competing
causal explanations. For instance, Tanzania and Malawi share a border and have similar
histories of Arab invasions followed by British colonialism, and they achieved
independence within two years of one another. Following independence, they were both
ruled by a powerful and mostly popular lifelong president who governed through a one
party system until the introduction of multi-party democracy in the mid 1990s.
Nevertheless, they adopted widely different policies on judicial decentralization. John
Stuart Mill’s famed comparative methods logic tells us that none of the factors that these
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two cases hold in common can be the cause of the divergent outcome. Additional
variation across cases provides even stronger support for ruling out what would otherwise
be plausible hypotheses. Given that Egypt also went through a long period of British
colonial rule and adopted yet another type of judicial decentralization, it is safe to argue
that differences in the colonial regime’s legal system are not the only driving force
behind variation in outcome.90
Likewise, Lebanon and Egypt are characterized by similar levels of government
decentralization in terms of administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization, but they
pursued nearly opposite approaches to judicial decentralization. Prior experience with
decentralization can thus be ruled out. England and France are in different categories in
the above typology and both are liberal democracies. Whether the relevant group law is
ethnic or religious does not seem to be important either. Variation within cases also
makes it possible to eliminate hypothesized causes such as minority group size. The size
of Malawi’s groups has remained more or less constant over time despite the 1990s shift
from full to tacit decentralization. As will become clear in the case study chapters, some
of these variables (such as whether the group is immigrant or indigenous) do have some
causal weight for their role as part of the context in which institutional choice occurs. For
the most part, however, comparison between cases helps to eliminate rival hypotheses.
Data used for process tracing is drawn from original fieldwork in each case study
country as well as primary and secondary historical sources.91 I conducted 22 months of
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fieldwork in my case studies, divided as follows: Egypt (3 months), the UK (3 months),
France (3 months), Lebanon (4 months), Tanzania (5 months), and Malawi (4 months).
During this time, I conducted four hundred and fifty three interviews with litigants,
judges, group elites, non-state judges, local experts, NGO workers, community
stakeholders, and members of government. Most of these interviews were conducted one
on one, but I also held several group interviews, particularly of participants in a court
case. I also observed court sessions at state and non state courts, and interviewed
participants afterward whenever possible. In addition, I accessed preexisting local
primary sources where I could find them, including court records, conference
proceedings, parliamentary debates, and interviews and raw data from Masters and PhD
theses written at local universities. I also used multiple histories of each case study
country for secondary source information, useful in particular for better understanding the
colonial legacies particular to each case.
Law is a vast field, encompassing the subfields of criminal law, tax law, civil law,
and family law, among many others, and its various branches differ from one country to
the next. For instance, one of the three branches of Tanzania’s High Courts, which are its
first level appeal courts, is its section of land courts—a form of law that doesn’t exist as a
discrete category in the United States. As a consequence, the domain of law in which
decentralization takes place (or is desired to take place) differs from place to place.
However, there are a few nearly universal trends concerning which domains of the law
are the most and least decentralized. Criminal law is almost never decentralized, and any
quantitative measure of legal pluralism that they plan to use to assemble a dataset that will contain a
judicial diversity score for every country, at present no such data exists. Additionally, most legal texts focus
on the formal judicial system, neglecting to mention parallel judicial systems that the state does not
recognize. Any study of judicial decentralization based purely on library sources would miss a good deal of
judicial diversity.
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non state criminal adjudication tends not to be recognized by the state. Branches of law in
which the state is a litigant are almost never decentralized. Family law is the most likely
to be decentralized, both formally and tacitly, as is land law, in places where it exists as a
separate branch of law. For the most part, then, this study focuses on family law (also
called personal status law) as the legal site at which judicial decentralization is predicted
to be mostly likely to occur. I do not restrict the domain of inquiry solely to family law,
but focusing on it helps to set useful limits on the scope of the study.
Compared with the more attention-drawing fields of criminal law, where crimes
are punished and societal justice is meted out (in theory, at least), and commercial law,
where lucrative contracts are negotiated and enforced, family law is perhaps
unglamorous. It is nevertheless an important area of the law, and should not be dismissed
as being of secondary importance. Personal status law and family law, although
considered to be different fields in some countries, govern marriage, the dissolution of
marriage, alimony and other transfer payments between spouses, custody, guardianship,
adoption, and inheritance, as well as further specialized fields in certain places.
Inheritance and the formation and dissolution of marriage entail property transfer
between individuals, which involves considerable sums of money and tracts of real estate
(just think of the perennial melee that ensues over the estate tax in the United States).
When, as in places like Lebanon and Egypt, personal status and family law are highly
decentralized, the result is that citizens of the same state may have their wealth, property,
and economic rights determined by very different rules. If we think property is
important, we must think family and personal status law are important.
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Additionally, custody and guardianship concern the welfare of children and their
education, as well as the right of parents to see their children, and is of tremendous
consequence. Family and personal status law are important for more than the crucial
question of who has rights to raise a child. It is also crucial for determining which
children will be citizens, and as members of what groups, who are eligible for often
varying individual and group rights. As Sezgin argues, “Family law has long been
considered by political elites as a useful instrument to ascertain the rules of inclusion and
exclusion within the political community by telling their subjects who could marry whom
or who could inherit from whom through juridification of reproductive relations in
society.”92 Diamant adds, “modern state rulers have both envisioned a new family order
and devoted considerable resources to remolding family structure and relations according
to this vision.”93 As such, personal status law is an important site of negotiation between
states and state sub-groups over group rights to maintain a distinct community within the
state and individual rights to live according to rules they find meaningful.
Although many people go through their lives without ever writing a formal
contract of sale or employing a lawyer, moreover, most inherit, marry, and have children.
Personal status law is the area of the law that probably touches the greatest number of
people, and as such it is one of the most important points of contact between the judicial
system and individual citizens. It is the most perennially relevant area of the law for most
people, which why it is also so deeply contested. In England, for example, some
Muslims, both citizens and non-citizen residents, seek out Sharia councils to decide
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matters of marriage, guardianship, and property, even though these decisions are not
binding according to state law or, indeed, even recognized by it. Ordinary people feel
sufficiently involved in family law, and feel that they have enough at stake, that they will
risk violating state law to preserve their personal status system. Accordingly, the
decentralization of personal status law involves more than a token transfer of power to
religious authorities. It allows non-state officials to regulate property transfer, determine
norms regarding the rights of women and children, and influence larger areas of state law
such as citizenship rights and civic education.

Causal Argument
It is proposed that states adopt one of six patterns of judicial decentralization as
the result of a process of bargaining with groups whose elites have a strong preference for
exercising judicial autonomy. Having outlined a conceptual typology above, the next task
is to develop an explanatory typology that serves as an effective model of the institutional
choice theory deployed here. Before continuing, however, it is necessary to establish a
domain for the theory. Specifically, the model proposed here applies to non-federal
states. This is true because institutional choice theory is best suited for situations in which
a government and societal groups are able to bargain or battle directly. Also, policy on
judicial decentralization may well differ between subunits in a single federal state. It
would be possible to analyze each subunit separately, but for the sake of clarity,
simplicity, and generalizability, this study is restricted to non-federal states.
To reiterate the point made above, institutional choice theory should articulate the
interests, resources, and relative bargaining power of the relevant actors. However, these
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factors must be assessed in context. Context informs both interest and capacity. For
example, in some contexts, small minority groups can exercise outsize power. During
Egyptian President Sadat’s visit to President Carter in 1978, protests by Orthodox Copts
caused Sadat considerable embarrassment and nearly stalled the ongoing peace process
with Israel. In response, Sadat tabled a constitutional amendment that would have
curtailed Coptic Orthodox law.94 Had Sadat been relying on the help of a non-majority
Christian country instead of the U.S., these protests would have been much less effective.
States bargain for various iterations of judicial centralization and decentralization
as the result of strategic interactions with ethnic or religious minority group elites.
Specifically, when states find that they need the cooperation or support of these groups in
achieving particular goals, and when groups strongly prioritize retaining separate law,
states compromise on certain aspects of judicial centralization to win group support.95
The outcome of the bargaining involved in this compromise is determined by the
capacities that the state leaders and the capacities that the group elites are able to muster
during the negotiations. I will further discuss some of these capacities below, but two sets
of capacities are the most important: first, for the state, the relative advantage of its
institutional development, along with its popular support, vis-a-vis the specific matter in
dispute, and second, for the group, its ability for group elites to effectively coordinate,
and the extent of its strength in the issue area that is being bargained over. For the
purposes of this argument, then, state capacities will refer to the state’s popular support in
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the area of bargaining and the strength of its related institutions, and group capacities will
refer to group elites’ ability to coordinate support and/or resources for bargaining. This
will be expressed through two variables--group capacity relative to the state, to capture
state capacities, and elite coordination, to capture group capacities—in the explanatory
typology below.
A brief review of the existing literature on state capacity will show the extent to
which this work draws on existing conceptualizations of the term and how it subtly
differs. Sikkink defines state capacity according to how well state institutions can
implement the state’s goals.96 Other studies have attempted to find proxies for state
capacity or to build quantitative tools to measure it. For example, Fearon uses state
reliance on lootable resources to proxy for state capacity.97 Following Krasner’s
argument that capacity varies from one political sector to the next, two recent studies
have developed multivariate measures of state capacity.98 Hendrix examines state
capacity in the context of civil war onset. He compiles 19 conceptualizations of state
capacity used in literature on civil wars and subjects each to construct validity tests. He
finds that bureaucratic quality and the percent of a state’s GDP that is made up of tax
revenue are the best measures of state capacity because they are highly correlated with
other indicators of capacity and are linked through direct causal mechanisms.99 Hanson
and Sigman emphasize the importance of tax revenue as a proportion of GDP, although
they find that the extractive, coercive, and administrative capacities of states are often
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inextricably inter-woven and are thus difficult to measure in isolation.100 A Harvardbased consortium of scholars has recently developed a measure of state capacity based on
three variables: extraction, reach, and allocation. This Performance of Nations project
resulted in a web-based data tool that allows researchers to access longitudinal data on
each variable for all of the world’s states.101
However, as Hendrix argues “Decisions about how to best operationalize the
concept of state capacity are, to a certain extent, driven by the topics that researchers are
addressing.”102 This study finds that states have widely different capacities in different
policy areas. For example, the state may have greater capacity to impose its trade policy
interests on groups because they have no way to negotiate trade agreements without the
state as intermediary, whereas the state may be more constrained in the area of
agricultural reforms because it generally has a weaker presence in rural areas. Two sets of
interests are necessarily held constant: the regime’s desire to centralize its judiciary, and
the group’s preference for judicial autonomy.103 It is the state’s other policy priorities,
such as economic development and trade regimes, that are of primary interest here.
Relative capacity is thus assessed within the specific domain of the policy interest that
forms part of the institutional choice scenario. Because the state’s political goals shift
over time, I use a context-specific measure of relative capacity that I establish through
process tracing. Process tracing allows me to uncover levels of support for the state, as
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well as its institutional resources, which are the capacities of most interest to this study.
Once process tracing has helped to uncover the factors underlying relative capacity, it is
categorized as high, medium, and low, as shown in the table below, because a binary
variable does not capture sufficient variation.
The second variable is elite coordination, meaning the extent to which group
elites share a strong interest in judicial autonomy and are able to muster resources and
support in their negotiation with the state. Elites disproportionately benefit from being
given the authority to adjudicate disputes or participate in the adjudication process, so it
is they who represent the group’s interest in maintaining separate law during the
contestation process. They derive advantages from several components of the
adjudication process. The first is that granting even partial judicial autonomy usually
gives group elites considerable say in determining the content of their laws. Given the
opportunity, they create norms that extend or preserve their status.104 When the same
elites are also in control of the judicial process, they can ensure that norms are enforced
and transgressions are punished. The act of adjudication in and of itself generates
power.105 Elite coordination is thus the primary vehicle for conveying interest in judicial
decentralization to the state. Process tracing is used to assess the group’s interest in
judicial autonomy and elite coordination. It should be noted that coordination does not
necessarily imply direct lobbying; merely having a coordinated, strong interest in judicial
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autonomy should be sufficient to signal to the state that judicial decentralization is a
fruitful area for granting concessions in return for cooperation elsewhere.106
Various factors may interfere with the ability to coordinate such as splits between
elites, geographical distance, or identity politics. Elites are able to overcome some but not
all of these obstacles, so elite coordination is not a binary variable.107 Instead, level of
coordination is categorized as high, medium, or low, as with the first variable.
With these two variables taken as its axes, the following table results:
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Table 2
Determinants of Judicial Decentralization

State capacities

Group Capacities

The greatest amount of judicial decentralization is predicted to take place when
the state’s capacity is low relative to that of the group and group elite coordination is
high, and the least amount when state capacity is high and elite coordination is low.
Crucially, even when elites are able to coordinate or strongly share an interest in judicial
autonomy, if the state’s capacity is high relative to that of the group, the state is not
expected to devolve judicial power. It should have no need to in this configuration
because it can impose its preference without needing to bargain or trade concessions.
Only one type of state is predicted to decentralize judicial power to some degree under
these conditions: liberal, common law states (described above). When state capacity is
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either medium or low, if elites fail to prioritize judicial decentralization highly enough or
are unable to coordinate to communicate their preference to the state, then judicial
decentralization does not occur because the state chooses some other policy concession to
win the group’s cooperation. The four primary types of judicial decentralization should
be found in the middle ranges, where state and group capacity are more evenly matched,
and elites can coordinate sufficiently to achieve various iterations of judicial
decentralization.
To summarize, then, bargaining or contestation between states and group elites
creates an institutional choice scenario that results in judicial decentralization, the degree
of which depends on the level of elite coordination and relative capacity. Next, it is
necessary give a temporal dimension to the theory. As made clear above, the variables
occur at different moments in time and the processes that shape them unfold at different
rates. Elite coordination changes relatively slowly over time.108 For example, the process
that split elites into rival factions in Coptic Orthodox Egypt unfolded over approximately
seventy years.
By contrast, relative state capacity changes more quickly because it depends
heavily on the context of the bargaining. For example, Sadat’s attempt to further
centralize the Egyptian judiciary in the early 1980s was borne of an initiative to win
support from conservative Muslims, and from start to finish the proposal lasted only
months. The schema outlined above represents the level of each variable at the moment
of contestation or bargaining. If either variable later changes, the level of judicial
decentralization may change as well. Other institutional choice models allow for
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institutional change as well. For example, Levi finds that changes in the relative levels of
bargaining power between parliament, the crown, and ministers in eighteenth century
Britain help account for changes in tax policy.109 However, the initial institutional choice
usually happens at moments of political transition, such as state formation, independence,
and the transition to democracy. Other types of transitions can also trigger these
processes, such as demographic shifts (including immigration and baby booms) and
economic changes (including recessions or exogenous shocks). Malawi’s institutional
configuration changed from the full decentralization adopted at independence to tacit
devolution during the shift to democracy in the early 1990s.
Generally, then, the sequence of events is as follows: elite preferences and ability
to coordinate coalesce slowly in the period before the political transition. Then, a political
transition creates space for the state and group elites to arrive at a new level of judicial
decentralization. Once the transition has occurred, the new regime decides on its policy
priorities. If it does not have sufficient capacity to enact them without the group’s
support, and if elite coordination in favor of judicial autonomy is high enough, then either
direct or indirect bargaining leads to some degree of judicial decentralization. The
resulting institutional configuration lasts until there is a large enough change in one of the
two key variables, or another moment of political transition intervenes. See the
illustration below for a visual representation of how the two variables unfold over time,
with the resulting bargaining matrix.

109

Levi, 1988 127.

52
Figure 2
Illustration of Causal Theory
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The following chapters provide detailed analysis of each case. They are ordered
from the greatest to the least extent of judicial decentralization among the full case
studies considered here. Chapter two examines the case study of Lebanon, which is an
example of full decentralization, where the state is relatively weak compared to societal
groups. The Lebanese state functions badly, or not at all, without compliance from
religious groups. Group elites in Lebanon are also well organized and able to make
coherent demands of the state. They strongly resist subsequent changes to the judicial
autonomy they are able to win. This is the sole category in which the state lends its
coercive power to enforce judicial decisions that it takes no part in. In Lebanon, religious
groups have full autonomy over personal status law, which encompasses the important
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areas of inheritance, marriage, divorce, child custody, and guardianship. Groups have full
control over both the content of the laws and the adjudication process. Until 2015, the
state was not even authorized to issue civil marriages. Decisions made by religious
tribunals cannot be appealed in state courts, which is the greatest extent of judicial
decentralization possible.
Chapter three assesses partial judicial decentralization in Tanzania, which occurs
when the state has somewhat less relative capacity than with the partial incorporation
type, but elites retain a high level of coordination. In the post-independence period in
Tanzania, the state had enough capacity that it could obtain more uncontroversial policy
objectives without needing group cooperation. However, when it came to larger projects,
or projects in a geographical area or interest domain where rural elites possess some
capacity, the state needed their support. Here, elite coordination did not involve direct
demands to the state. Instead, elite preferences aligned sufficiently strongly around
judicial autonomy that state was able to discern these preferences without specific
demands. Because the preferences were aligned so strongly, the cost for the state of
ignoring these preferences was high. Tanzania thus allowed groups to retain control over
the content of their customary law through codification as well as the use of assessors,
community elders who advise magistrates on local customary law and have a binding
vote on the verdict. It also created land tribunals and community arbitration forums that
use local customary law. Its post-independence constitution eliminated the provision,
preserved by many other African states, which automatically struck down customary law
that was repugnant to the constitution. Some of its national laws, such as its marriage law,
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preserve large portions of customary law. Nevertheless, it retains a unitary court system
with an appeals process that can reverse the decisions of all lower courts.
Chapter four examines the legal pluralism type of partial incorporation through a
case study of Egypt. In this case of partial incorporation, the state and group were
relatively well matched in terms of capacity at the moments of bargaining, although that
of the state was slightly higher. In this case, elites were able to coordinate only
moderately well. They were thus less well equipped to resist state demands or to hold out
for more concessions. The state was able to successfully offer concessions on terms that
it controls, such as by incorporating codified group law into state courts. In Egypt,
Orthodox Copts, Protestants, and other religious groups have the right to adjudicate their
personal status cases according to codified laws particular to each group, but they do so
in Egyptian state courts that are usually run by Muslim judges. Additionally, only cases
between co-religionists are subject to group law. Cases that involve members of two
religions default to Muslim personal status law. In Egypt, partial incorporation involves
only limited concessions to each group, amidst an otherwise strong and centralized state
court system.
Within chapters two, three, and four, comparisons from Malawi, England, and
France are incorporated in the form of shadow cases. To make these comparisons more
effective, I will briefly summarize each case here. The case study of Malawi investigates
the legal pluralism type of tacit devolution. Cases of tacit devolution are characterized by
high group capacity relative to the state, but only moderate amounts of elite coordination.
In Malawi, because the state needs the cooperation of tribal groups to secure electoral
coalitions, and to pursue rural development initiatives, it is loath to interfere in the
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strongly institutionalized domain of community dispute adjudication. Because elites are
unable to articulate a strong demand for judicial autonomy, Malawi does not lend its
coercive power to tribal courts, but it knowingly and purposely permits them to operate
their own judicial forums without state recognition. Especially after democratization in
the mid 1990s, political parties used chiefs to corral votes, and were thus unwilling to
erode any of their traditional powers. Accordingly, although the tribal court system that
the previous regime used as a parallel justice system for punishing dissidents was severed
of all ties to the state, it was left in place to function unofficially. Because there is no state
oversight, chiefs adjudicate disputes in their own forums according to local norms. A
recent law that has been passed by parliament but not yet implemented would reauthorize an attenuated version of these courts.
I evaluate the category of common law incorporation through a case study of
England. Common law incorporation is in some ways the most unintuitive because it is
restricted to a particular type of state: liberal democracies with common law legal
systems. Because state capacity is very high relative to that of the groups, there is no need
for the state to decentralize judicial power at all. It should be able to impose its policy
preferences without doing so. However, elite coordination in this category is quite high,
so the state is able to read the group’s strong preference for judicial autonomy. Because it
values inclusion and possesses the necessary legal mechanisms to achieve it, this type of
state is able to grant some judicial autonomy without giving away very much of its own
judicial power. That said, this only happens if specific groups of elites are committed and
coordinated enough to press these demands. These states are quite rare, but England is a
good example. Some members of the Muslim community in England have expressed a
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desire to have access to legal forums that use Muslim personal status law. The state has
accommodated this request in three separate ways. The first is through arbitration—
citizens have the right to have many types of disputes arbitrated outside of courts, and
specialist Sharia tribunals have opened to fill this demand. Second, British common law
courts are increasingly beginning to work with Muslim personal status law, for example
by recognizing as valid Muslim marriages conducted in England that are not legal under
the country’s law. Finally, the state refrains from closing the unofficial, unrecognized
Sharia law tribunals that issue religious personal status decrees. It makes clear that these
forums have no legal force, but does not shut them down, as other European states have
done. Interestingly, its response to the Jewish community in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries was similar.
France serves as a case study of full judicial centralization, with particular
attention to the legal practices of immigrant Muslims. Full centralization occurs when
relative group capacity and elite coordination are both low. France, like England, has no
need to devolve judicial power to achieve policy objectives. Although some elites in the
Muslim community may desire judicial autonomy, either they are in a minority or they
are unable to articulate their preference. France’s Muslim community is internally
divided into rival factions that approximate national divides between its three largest
North African Muslim former colonies. Because components of French society have been
suspicious of Muslim culture and personal status law, and French law is strongly secular,
elites do not publicly voice their preference for Sharia law. As a result, France does not
acknowledge any legal system apart from its own national law, and it even takes
preemptive steps to prevent private religious arbitration. For example, it is illegal in
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France to have a religious marriage ceremony before a civil ceremony, and France briefly
jailed several imams who broke this law.
The final chapter offers some empirical observations from my case study
research. It offers a glimpse of some of the court cases heard in state and non state courts
in both the case studies presented here and the shadow cases. It also suggests avenues for
further research on legal pluralism.
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Chapter Two: Full Decentralization in Lebanon

Introduction

Lebanon is a case of full judicial decentralization within a particular delimited
jurisdictional domain, in this case personal status law. Although a central legal system
governs criminal, property, and other types of law, the vast and important domain of
family law is entirely decentralized, with each of eighteen religious groups administering
its own system of family law courts. Because Lebanon was never able to even partially
centralize its personal status legal regime, until very recently the state had no power even
to issue a civil marriage license. It is relatively common in Middle Eastern states, such as
the case of Egypt (chapter four), for each religion to have a separate family law code, but
Lebanon is unique in the region for the extent of the power that it devolves to sub-state
groups. Religious groups, known as confessions (and sometimes sects) have the right to
determine their own legal codes, to modify them without the consent of the state, to
adjudicate family law matters, and to prevent laws that touch on their religious interests.
Additionally, as we will see, the state judiciary is curtailed in the extent to which is can
rule on issues such as women’s rights, citizenship laws, and inheritance tax, because all
of these issues touch on personal status law. In Lebanon, non-state groups are powerful
enough to rein in the central judiciary to preserve the powers of their separate courts.
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Causal Argument: The Enduring Strength of the Lebanese Sect

The weakness of the Lebanese state is well known, and discussions of state
strength and capacity are widespread in Lebanon. During research in other cases for this
study, locals who agreed to be interviewed rarely mentioned the state, and if they did, it
was in the context of a lack of state capacity to adjudicate certain types of disputes. In
Lebanon, taxi drivers, waiters, and political science professors spoke with nearly equal
fluency about the merits and perils of state strength for their country. The weakness of the
Lebanese state is a consequence of the same forces that produced support for legal
decentralization, and this central state weakness, in turn, contributes to the persistence of
legal decentralization. The driving forces behind both decentralization and state weakness
are, as further articulated below, the extraordinarily strong institutionalization of
confessional legal practices (and confessional loyalty), which produced durable elite
coordination in favor of decentralized authority, and the bargaining process between
strong, coordinated confessional groups and first the Ottoman, and then the French
administrators who ruled Lebanon.
Group elite capacities in Lebanon are sufficiently strong as to have blocked all
state attempts at centralization. This state of affairs came about through the period
leading up to and during state building, at which time political power was apportioned to
religious groups based on their share of the population. This compromise, meant to share
power between Lebanon’s diverse groups, ended up creating strong incentives for sects to
control their group membership to make sure that no members left the group, which
entailed the use of personal status law (family law) to police the group’s boundaries. By
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the time the first centralizing efforts came, under the French Protectorate, decentralized
personal status law had been so strongly institutionalized that the capacities of the
religious group elites were far stronger than the capacities of the state leaders.
Confessional leaders had strong popular support from their members and strongly
hierarchical institutions that facilitated coordination among group elites. State leaders, by
contrast, relied on their sect for their appointment to power (or their election to it). They
thus lacked the direct popular support awarded to group elites. Furthermore, the status
quo meant that state leaders were unable to centralize those portions of the law that
would change this situation, by eroding confessionalism. The durable strength of
Lebanon’s group elite capacities, pictured below, firmly place Lebanon in the category of
full decentralization.
Table 3
Trajectory of Failed Judicial Centralization in Lebanon
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In Lebanon, each confessional group, and there are eighteen of them, has strong
control over its coreligionists. However, the three largest sects have the greatest amount
of political power, both for the obvious demographic reason of proportional
representation, and because the original political formula crafted to share power between
Muslims and Christians gave the three most powerful political positions—the presidency,
the office of prime minister, and also of speaker of parliament—to the Maronite
Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Shiite Muslims, respectively (see below for more on
this). For this reason, this chapter will primarily focus on Maronite Christians (36% of the
population), Sunni Muslims (28.7 percent of the population), and Shiite Muslims (28.4%
of the population.110
The remainder of the chapter is divided into two sections. The first considers the
historical origins of the strongly institutionalized confessionalism that empowers
Lebanon’s group elites, thereby creating a political structure that involves strong group
elite capacities and levels of coordination. It also argues that the defense of decentralized
personal status law, individually controlled by each group, is essential to the preservation
of this governing formula. The second section examines moments of contestation
between state leaders and group elites during state efforts to centralize the judiciary. It
demonstrates how group elites were able to prevail in these encounters.

Personal Status Law and the Institutionalization of Confessional Politics
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Lebanon’s creation and maintenance of legal pluralism in the domain of personal
status law is closely bound up with sectarian politics and the institutionalization of the
confession-based consociational political system there. According to historian Safia
Saadeh, it is impossible to have a civil personal status law in Lebanon, even as an
optional alternative to confessional law, because “the preservation of the personal status
laws within society complement the sectarian representation of the political system and
the consociational system as a whole.”111 The consociational system relies on
demographics because parliamentary seats and other political offices are apportioned
proportionally, based on the size of the confessional groups. Were the lines around these
groups to fade, it would become difficult to count the number of adherents to each
confession and thus allocate seats accurately. Confessional leaders also fear that members
of their religion might opt for civil marriage and thereby reduce their demographic clout
in the next census.112 The fact that the last census was taken in 1932 does not seem to
diminish these fears, or the accompanying reluctance to allow any jurisdiction over
family law to leave confessional control. There is thus a strong and mutually reinforcing
relationship between confessionalism and a decentralized judiciary.
This state of affairs grew out of the Ottoman millet system, summarized below, in
which subject populations within the Ottoman empire were permitted to be governed by
their own personal status laws even though they fell under central Ottoman jurisdiction in
all other matters. In Lebanon, this had the effect of strengthening two groups who did not
share the Sunni Muslim religion of the Ottoman Empire: Maronite Christians and Druzes,
an offshoot of Shia Islam, who lived, respectively, in the north of the area known as
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Mount Lebanon, in and around Bsharre, and in the south of Mount Lebanon, in the Shouf
mountains. Preservation of their personal status laws gave both groups the opportunity to
at first retain and later expand their influence vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire, such that in
the mid eighteenth century, reinforced by external alliances, both groups put forward a
claim for self-rule. The Ottoman Empire, unwilling to further subdivide its territory,
created an autonomous area ruled by both groups, and also apportioned a certain amount
of power to the other groups living in Mount Lebanon, such as the Greek Orthodox and
Greek Catholics. From this moment onwards, confessionalism became a self-reinforcing
institution.113
The preservation of personal status authority allows Lebanese confessions to draw
boundaries around their group based on distinctions in religious practice. These
boundaries keep group members distinct from adherents of other groups, and they operate
as a basis for counting these members for the allocation of political authority. The
institution of confessionalism becomes self-reinforcing because demographics are the
basis of political power, so each group has a strong incentive to increase their population.
The only way to do that is to keep people within the boundaries of the confession by
regulating their marriages and the propagation of children by that particular group’s laws.
As early as 1936, before Lebanon gained independence from France, Muslim community
leader Salim Salam wrote to French High Commissioner Damien de Martel, in response
to a proposal to partially centralize family law “Your Excellency knows that the main
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principle on which the political system in Lebanon stands is the proportion of the
populations of the communities to each other. The size [of community] determines the
distribution of rights, [so the demographic issue] is vital from the view point of the
Muslims.”114
Having separate personal status courts creates a world in which sub-state groups
can manipulate their demographics, which is to their advantage in a proportionally
representative system. Without separate personal status law, it would be possible to
distinguish between groups, but only based on the more fleeting ties of voluntary
association. To compete politically in a confessional system, the groups therefore prefer
to make religious affiliation an ascriptive characteristic that is recorded at birth,
registered on each citizen’s national identity card, and changeable only with maximum
cost to the individual. As long as the Lebanese political system is consociational and
based on confessionalism, Lebanon’s confessions fight hard to maintain control over
personal status law, and thereby control group demographics. And as long as Lebanon’s
confessional groups control personal status law, the largest groups have no incentive to
permit the system that so benefits them to lapse. A summary of Ottoman and postOttoman Lebanese history will illustrate the self-reinforcing nature of an institutionalized
confessional personal status regime and demonstrate the depth of its institutionalization.
In 1922, an anonymous American commentator on the King-Crane mission and
the beginning of the French mandate observed. “The intricate mixture of races and
religions that constitutes the population of Syria [greater Syria, including Lebanon]
interferes naturally with any real national solidarity…In addition to the great
Mohammedan-Christian division there are also the many subdivisions whose hostilities
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toward each other are often equally acute. The Maronites, Greek Catholics, Greek
Orthodox, Latin Catholics, and other Christian communities have at times almost the
same aversion to each other that the Sunnite Moslims have for the Shiites. Nor may one
forget the communities of Aleouts [Alawites], Jews, and Druses that add their variations
to the variegated whole. Religiously and racially, for the two factors are often
inseparable, the Syrians have little unity.”115
Although this fragmentation has been overcome periodically, when temporary
alliances between disparate religious groups formed to protest particular laws, the
community-based divisions delineated above are long-standing. They date from the
Muslim conquest of the Middle East and the accommodations reached between the newly
dominant religion and the preexisting enclaves of Christians of various denominations
and Jews.
Lebanon was conquered by Muslim invaders from the Arabian Peninsula in the
630s and was officially ruled by Muslim empires (including the Ummayad, Abbasid,
Mamluk, and Ottoman) from then onwards. The area was already home to Jewish and
Christian communities. From almost the beginning of the period of their coexistence in
Lebanon, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim communities shared space but lived according to
their own sets of rules. During the beginning years of the Abbasid Caliphate, legal
scholars gathered the texts of previous treaties between Muslim rulers and the Christian
communities living within their jurisdiction.116 The Abbasids referred in particular to the
“covenant of ‘Umar,” Caliph Umar’s instructions for the treatment of non-Muslims living
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in Muslim lands. The actual covenant varied from place to place according to the ruler’s
preference. By the early-middle Abbasid period, scholars had reached a consensus that
the covenant had eleven precepts, including a prohibition on building or repairing places
of worship without permission, required service in the army, along with a mandatory tax
“in return for protection from enemies.”117 In practice, however, these rules often fell into
disuse, as evidenced by the periodic decrees issued by rulers to eject non-Muslims from
the governing apparatus.118
By the time the Ottomans invaded Lebanon in 1516, the dominant groups in
Lebanon were the Druze, an offshoot of Shii Islam, and the Maronites, a Christian group
from Syria who settled in the north of Lebanon.119 As was their standard practice, the
Ottomans placed Lebanon under indirect rule. They tasked local notable families with
collecting taxes for the empire in return for substantial local power including political
administration and the creation and maintenance of a judiciary.120 These families built up
considerable client networks and wealth derived from extra taxes that they were
permitted to collect, and by the mid sixteenth century had amassed sufficient power to
revolt against Ottoman rule. Over the next three centuries, rule over Mount Lebanon
alternated between direct Druze rule, when rebellions against the Ottomans succeeded,
and the reimposition of Ottoman rule and the tax-farming system.121 Lebanon even fell
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briefly under Egyptian rule between 1831-1840, when Muhammed Ali invaded Lebanon
and Syria.122
During this period, Lebanon was not considered to be a separate state, but rather
part of Greater Syria, which included Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine. There is no
consensus as to when a distinct Lebanese political identity emerged. Zamir, an Israeli
historian, dates “the history of Lebanon as a separate entity…[as beginning] in the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries during the reign of Fakhr al-Din II,” a Druze
Ma’nid ruler who ruled Mount Lebanon from 1590-1633.123 For most of his rule, he
served as Emir of the Ottoman sanjak (province) of Sidon-Beirut, an area approximately
one-fifth the size of present-day Lebanon; but between 1605-7 and 1621-1633 successful
rebellions allowed him to rule independently.124 Interestingly, a crucial part of his success
in an even temporary victory against the Ottomans was an alliance with Florence, which
prompted Pope Gregory XIII to write to the Maronite Patriarch to ask him to lend
Maronite military support to Fakhr al-Din’s campaign.125 Fakhr al-Din even spent five
years in exile in Florence from 1613-1618. During his stay, he noticed that one of the
most profitable trade goods entering Italy at that time was silk, and he resolved to
introduce silk production to Lebanon upon his return. His success in this project changed
Lebanon in two fundamental ways: first, by bringing Maronite farmers from the north to
the Druze-dominated Mount Lebanon to cultivate silk, he created the first mixed DruzeChristian principality, which would eventually become Christian-dominated. Second, his
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silk exports drew the attention of France, which would later become Lebanon’s largest
trade partner and official protector of the Maronite confession.
The first major shift in Lebanese politics during the Ottoman era, and the moment
most historians point to as the beginning of a Lebanon separate from Greater Syria, was a
series of peasant revolts, which mostly took the form of Maronite-Druze clashes, between
1841-1861, and the consequent administrative reorganizations of 1843 and 1860. In 1843,
the Ottoman Empire imposed the “double qa’imaqamiyyah” system on Lebanon, under
which a dual administrative structure governed Lebanon, ruled by a Maronite Christian in
the north and a Druze in the south.126 This division came about primarily because of
increased European interest in the Levant following Napoleon’s incursion into Egypt in
1798 and the strengthening of the French-Lebanese silk trade through the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. In fact, the “double qa’imaqamiyyah” system was suggested by
Chancellor Metternich of Austria, who brokered the agreement with England, France, and
the Ottoman Empire to help bring an end to fighting caused at least partially by foreign
intervention.
France, the largest import market for Lebanese raw silk, which had considered
itself the foreign protector of the Maronites since the Crusades, a status Louis XIV
renewed officially, backed Maronite domination of Lebanon as Ottoman influence began
to wane.127 The British supported the Druze claim to counter that of the Maronites, and
indirectly, the French. Austria hoped to replace France as the guarantors of the Maronites.
The Ottoman government, in the meantime, “tried to reassert its authority over the
semiautonomous amirate [sic] by convincing the European powers that local rule was
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impossible.”128 Metternich’s solution left the Ottoman Empire in control of the region but
gave the two most influential groups significant spheres of influence by creating a
Maronite governor for the north of Lebanon and a Druze governor for the south. They
were each advised by a Maronite and a Druze wakil (deputy), each of whom would
exercise judicial and fiscal power over their community.129
The “double qa’imaqamiyyah” was Lebanon’s first foray into confessional
governance, i.e. the allocation of political power and representation based on religious
affiliation. It did not stop the fighting between Druzes and Christians. By 1860,
widespread massacres of Maronites living in Druze-dominated areas precipitated a civil
war and the expulsion of Druzes from northern Maronite villages and Maronites from
southern Druze areas.130 France, in their role as protector of the Maronites, invaded the
Chouf mountains to pacify the Druze troops. In 1861, the Ottomans invited France,
England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia to a conference to find a solution to the fighting.
The result was the Règlement Organique of 1861, which made Lebanon an autonomous
province within the Ottoman Empire, to be governed by a non-Lebanese Christian
authority appointed by the Ottoman administration and approved by the European
signatories to the Règlement Organique.
This system, known as the “mutasarrifiyyah” after the appointed mutasarrif
(governor), also created Administrative Council to advise the governor and exercise veto
power over tax increases and permission for Ottoman troops to enter the territory. It was
elected by village notables on a proportional basis. Christian groups were awarded six
seats of twelve seats, with the remainder reserved for Muslim deputies, until the
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Règlement was altered in 1864 to give the Christians, then the largest group, seven seats
to the Muslims’ five.131 This gave the Maronites four seats, the Greek Orthodox two, the
Greek Catholics one, the Druze three, and a single seat each to the Sunni and Shia
Muslims.132 The signatory powers arrived at this apportionment by excluding Beirut,
Sidon, and Tripoli from the mutasarrafiyyah and leaving them under the control of the
Ottoman province of Damascus. Otherwise, Sunni Muslims would have been the
dominant group demographically.133 The treaty further divided the territory into seven
smaller provinces to be administered by the majority confession in each area, which gave
judicial and administrative control of each province to the largest group in it. The
judiciary was made up of both officials elected by the central governor and locally
appointed village notables, although minorities within each province were allowed to
continue to seek out their own religious officials for matters of personal status law.134
When asked about their history, the Lebanese frequently point to the
mutasarrafiyyah as the moment when confessional politics in Lebanon became the status
quo.135 Although the “double qa’imaqamiyyah” divided Lebanon into two zones, each
administered by one of the two dominant religions, the mutasarrafiyyah went further by
including six different confessions in the governing formula and institutionalizing the
idea of confession-based proportional representation. Indeed, just sixty years later, when
Lebanon was a French Mandate territory and the French conducted opinion polls of
Lebanese politicians and notables concerning provisions to be included in the new
constitution, opinion was almost unanimous that confessional politics was a necessary
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evil. In his analysis of the Lebanese constitution, Edmond Rabbath summarizes the
findings of the French commission. The sixth item on the questionnaire asked the
deputies, drawn from prominent families, a wide range of professions, and government
officials, whether they would support a confessional basis for apportioning parliamentary
seats.136 Of one hundred thirty two deputies consulted, there was unanimous agreement
that confessional politics would create prejudice between the various religious groups and
undermine Lebanon’s stability.137 Nevertheless, one hundred twenty one of the deputies
voted for confessional apportionment because they were concerned that failing to ensure
representation for the smaller groups would give too much power to Lebanon’s largest
groups, and also that Lebanese citizens would never accept a system in which confession
was deemphasized for the sake of the larger political unit.138
The constitution promulgated by the French Mandate in 1926 did apportion
parliamentary representation politically in Article 24, which also left changes in electoral
law, such as a move away from proportional representation, to be determined by future
electoral laws.139 This system has resulted in a certain amount of instability in the run up
to elections in Lebanon, because each group attempts to change the law to whichever
option would give it the greatest representation. The proportional system in place today is
based on a census taken in 1932, which determined that Christians were the majority in
Lebanon, with approximately 54% of the population.140 Since then, no census has been
taken, and calls for a new count are seen as politically inflammatory because they might
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change the makeup of the Lebanese government. As a consequence, anything touching on
demographic issues, such as laws concerning nationality, birth, and marriage, are
particularly sensitive. Attempts to legislate around these issues are met with strong
resistance, as will be shown in the next section, which covers political bargaining over
personal status laws.
Article Nine of the 1926 constitution had the effect of further institutionalizing the
already strong role of religious groups in Lebanese politics. Article nine states “There
shall be absolute freedom of conscience. The state, in rendering homage to the Most
High, shall respect all religions and creeds and it guarantees, under its protection, the free
exercise of all religious rites, provided that public order is not disturbed. It also
guarantees that the personal status and religious interests of the population, to whichever
religious sect they belong, are respected.”141 This article is directly derived from the
French Mandate document for France and Syria, Article Eight of which states “The
Mandatory shall ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all
forms of worship which are consonant with public order and morality,” and Article Six of
which pledges “The Mandatory shall establish in Syria and the Lebanon a judicial system
which shall assure to natives as well as to foreigners a complete guarantee of their rights.
Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and for their religious interests shall
be fully guaranteed.”142 Edmond Rabbath notes that Article Nine has the effect of
constitutionalizing the customary right that had governed Lebanese groups for centuries,
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and thereby also guaranteed the “particular morphology of confessionalism.”143 Rabbath
further notes the irony of including an article that guarantees absolute freedom of
conscience in a country that does not recognize the right to disassociate oneself from a
religious group.144
Lebanon won independence from France in 1943, although French troops did not
leave Lebanon until a year after the end of the Second World War in 1946. Post-Mandate
Lebanon had two sources of governing principles: the new Lebanese constitution, based
heavily on the 1926 text, promulgated in 1943, and an unwritten understanding known as
the “National Pact.” The new constitution changed very little from the old except to
remove any reference to the Mandate and to strengthen the role of the presidency to adopt
some of the former powers of the Mandate. The National Pact, in contrast, changed
Lebanon fundamentally.145 It was arrived at by two leaders of French resistance,
Maronite Beshara al-Khoury and Sunni Riad al-Solh, as a means of creating a mixedconfessional governing structure that would be acceptable to both Christians and
Muslims. The terms of the unwritten pact specified that the President of the country
would be a Maronite, the Prime Minister Sunni, and in 1947, the position of Speaker of
the House was reserved for the Shia community, then Lebanon’s third largest.146 In
addition, it left the Head of Security, the Head of the Army, and other key security
positions in the hands of the Maronites and reserved a certain number of cabinet posts for
Muslim deputies. It addressed the greatest fears of both sides by guaranteeing that the
Maronites would not seek external interference in Lebanese affairs by the French, and
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that the Muslims would not attempt to reattach Lebanon to Syria or any pan-Arab
alliance.147
Although the Pact was never written, it became the dominant understanding of
Lebanese politics, such that even when provisions of the Constitution fell into disuse, the
Pact was maintained. The 1989 Ta’if Accord that ended Lebanon’s civil war was based
largely on the Pact, although it also extended the previous agreement in certain areas.
Later, the terms of the Ta’if accord were incorporated into the constitution. In effect, the
Accord reapportioned the confessional system, giving Christians and Muslims 1:1 parity
in the number of parliamentary seats and ministerial posts and strengthening the role of
the Prime Minister while diminishing the President’s power.148 More importantly here,
the Ta’if Accord gives concrete expression to the absolute power held by Lebanon’s
various religions over personal status law. Article Three calls for the creation of a new
Constitutional Council competent to determine the permissibility of laws already passed
by parliament, and Section B[2] of Article III stipulates “To ensure the principle of
harmony between religion and state, the heads of the Lebanese sects may revise the
constitutional council in matters pertaining to: 1. Personal status affairs; 2. Freedom of
religion and the practice of religious rites; 3. Freedom of religious education.”149 This
gives the heads of Lebanon’s religions the right to petition the Constitutional Council if
the Parliament makes any law concerning personal status affairs that any of the religious
authorities has not already approved. Although this seemingly gives a large amount of
power to Lebanon’s confessions, as personal status law touches on many other areas of
147
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national life, in reality section B[2] merely codifies the centuries-old principle of state
non-interference in religion and the legal effects of religious affiliation.
Following centuries of communitarian life, it is unsurprising that levels of support
for non-community based institutions are low. Only in recent years has the level of
support for even optional civil marriage attained a majority. French political scientist
Theodor Hanf conducted opinion polls in Lebanon on matters pertaining to attitudes on
coexistence through and after the civil war, and in the mid 1980s began to track support
for civil law as well. He finds that in 1987, fifty percent of the population would have
supported an optional civil personal status law, and in 2006 that number had increased to
70%.150 Polls conducted by the International Information Center, published in Lebanese
newspaper Al-Nahar in January, 1997, report much lower levels of support for an
optional personal status law. Although a majority of college students were in favor, only
seventeen percent of the general population would have chosen to allow civil personal
status law, even in optional form.151 The poll revealed that wealthier and more educated
Lebanese tended to favor optional civil marriage, and that of the confessional groups,
Christians were the most in favor and the Druzes most opposed.152 It is possible that the
higher levels of support in Hanf’s poll in 2006 are a reflection of a general liberalizing
trend, but interview evidence from 2012 evidences levels of support below fifty
percent.153 The next question on Hanf’s poll also contradicts his findings, as fifty four
percent of Lebanese in 1987 and sixty-nine percent in 2006 agreed that “it doesn’t matter
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what anyone wants, secularization doesn’t seem to have a chance in Lebanon.
Community membership is a reality you have to accept.”154
Further evidence of the high level of institutionalization of community authority
lies in the relative lack of judicial independence. In 2007, Judge Jon al-Azzi ruled that
Lebanese women should have the right to pass on their nationality to their children even
if the child’s father is not Lebanese, which had never been permitted, ostensibly on the
grounds that it would open the door to many Palestinian refugees gaining Lebanese
citizenship.155 His decision was reversed only months later, and Judge Azzi was
transferred from the Court of Cassation (Lebanon’s highest court) to a lower level court.
His state-appointed office was confiscated as well, leaving him to borrow a desk in a
colleague’s office or work from home.156 Judge Ahmed Ayoubi was transferred from a
central appeals court in Beirut to the real estate court of Tripoli after ruling against a
Sunni judge in two cases.157 Even judges on the religious courts have been punished for
upholding tenets of civil law in religious courts.158 Historian Safia Saadeh notes that a
true sectarian system like that of Lebanon precludes an independent judiciary because the
judiciary is prevented from arriving at rulings that might threaten sect interests.159 She
further explains that "the demand for an independent judiciary means the eradication of
the consociational system, because the sectarian grand coalition ascribes to itself absolute
power, a reality that robs the judiciary of its two basic and fundamental principles:
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impartiality and integrity."160 Thus, in Lebanon, the primacy of non-state law results in a
system where the power of the state judiciary is reduced to safeguard confessional
personal status law. According minority group rights to adjudicate family law according
to each confession’s religious precepts has the net effect of weakening the state judiciary.
This stands in direct contrast to places like England, where the legal system was
fully institutionalized before identity groups with different norms sought to carve out
spaces where their separate rules could apply. It was only in the early 2000s that Muslim
immigrants to England began to form Sharia councils, and they never attempted to win
state recognition for them.161 The adjudicators in these councils view their rulings as
having a binding effect only insofar as the disputant’s faith dictates she follow them.162
Perhaps most importantly, these councils have no state-backed enforcement power. Thus,
their existence has no effect of weakening the state judiciary’s monopoly on access to
enforcement for its rulings, or legitimacy for the vast proportion of citizens.163
Confessional politics and personal status law, as described above, have a mutually
reinforcing tendency at the institutional level. That large groups would favor the
maintenance of a system that guarantees their dominance makes sense, but the support of
smaller groups is less intuitive. Lebanon’s smaller groups, such as the Syrian Catholics
and Coptic Orthodox are complicit in keeping the system in place. Religious leaders
realize that they would gain little by switching to majoritarian democracy, as they would
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still be a minority group, and they would perhaps lose even the small share of influence
they possess under consociationalism.164 Additionally, both small and large groups gain
substantial revenue from managing personal status affairs. Although Muslim courts are
included in the state budget, bribery is widespread and non-Muslim courts, which are not
part of the state apparatus, are self-financed and thus charge hefty fees for annulment,
guardianship transfer, and other family law services that require more than just the
registration of an action such as marriage.165 At the individual and group level, family
law adjudication is a lucrative business. Perhaps more importantly, the ability to
adjudicate personal status disputes gives religious judges the power to set and reinforce
community norms.166 It also reinforces the authority and legitimacy of the religious
authorities. As Becker and Shapiro note, courts are effective in centralizing political
power for whoever administers them.167 Religious judges in Lebanon are very much
aware of the benefits that accrue to both them, individually, and to their confession from
adjudicating personal status disputes, and as such are committed to keeping the system in
place.

Contestation and Bargaining: Preserving Judicial Decentralization

Saadeh sees the preservation of confessional personal status law as a game that
the various confessions play to keep power away from the central regime. In Lebanon,
she claims, “the sects did not extricate powers from the state all at once, but proceeded to
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follow the step by step method. First…[they acquired] a legal status that give them a wide
range of leverage within the political system.”168 While Saadeh’s description is perhaps
too cynical to be strictly accurate, Lebanese history evinces many episodes of bargaining
between the leaders of confessional groups and the governing authorities concerning
personal status jurisdiction. Thus far, none of the attempts to centralize Lebanon’s
judiciary has succeeded even partially.
Although the French Mandate document for Syria and Lebanon guarantees the
preservation of religious personal status law, France had always envisaged the creation of
a general civil law statute that would apply to everyone regardless of religion and end a
system that privileged religious law over civil law.169 Accordingly, the Mandate
authorities sought on several occasions to centralize judicial authority and to introduce a
civil personal status law. During the first attempt in December, 1921, High
Commissioner Gouraud abrogated Article 156 of the 1917 Ottoman Family Law code,
which gave authority to each religion to manage its own family law and associated
courts. Widespread protests immediately broke out and after only weeks, Gouraud
reinstated the law to restore peace as the League of Nations oversaw the final
preparations for the beginning of the Mandate in 1922.170 The Mandate Document itself,
as discussed previously, guaranteed the preservation of the Ottoman personal status
system. In 1923, the first full year of Mandate authority, France decided to officially
recognize the authority of confessional law in Arrêté No. 2851, and in the 1926
constitution guarantees the preservation of religious personal status law.171 Shortly
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thereafter, however, High Commissioner de Jouvenel issued Arrêté No. 261, which gave
civil tribunals the jurisdiction to hear personal status cases and created a civil marriage
option; but the law was suspended with Mandate Decree 102 only two months later when
protests grew difficult to contain.172
The French authorities did not attempt to alter the personal status law again until a
decade later, when High Commissioner Damien de Martel issued Arrêté No. 60 of March
13, 1936, amended by Mandate Decree 136 of November 23, 1938, which together
reformed personal status law in Lebanon.173 Arrêté No. 60 recognized Lebanon’s
confessions as distinct legal entities and required them to submit a copy of their legal
code and rules of procedure, as well as their internal functioning, structure of their
hierarchy, and many other details to Mandate Authorities.174 The laws of 1936 and 1938
together introduced three major reforms to the personal status system. The first created a
procedure by which a Lebanese citizen could move from one personal status community
to another, in effect an official means of conversion from one religion to another. The
second placed Muslim and non-Muslim communities on an equal footing according to
state law, such that Muslim personal status courts, previously part of the state, became
independent and privately administered entities like their non-Muslim counterparts. The
third divided Lebanese citizens into two groups: those who belong to historical personal
status communities, of which the Arrêté lists fifteen, and those who belong to the
common law community, an original French creation comprised of anyone who wanted
to opt out of their confession and place themselves under the jurisdiction of secular, civil
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law.175
In 1938, massive protests broke out.176 Muslim leaders said that they would never
consent to be treated as just another minority community in the state, and Druze and
Alawite authorities refused to submit their personal law codes, because their religions
required that these codes remain secret.177 All confessional groups expressed outrage over
the creation of an optional civil status community available to all Lebanese, particularly
coupled with the introduction of an official way to move from one community to another.
Muslim protests, however, were the largest, and so in March 1939, High Commissioner
Puaux, who took over from de Martel, issued Arrêté No. 53 to except Muslims from
Arrêté No. 60 and Mandate Decree 136.178 In effect, this exempted approximately half of
the population from the new laws, which severely dampened their effect. Nevertheless,
both remain on the books and apply to non-Muslim communities. Combined, they are
what allow Lebanese citizens to travel overseas to conduct a civil marriage that is then
recognized in Lebanon.179 1936 was the last attempt any of the French High
Commissioners made to alter Lebanon’s judicial system.
In 1951, five years after the final French troops withdrew from Lebanon,
President Beshara Khoury’s government again passed a law requiring Lebanon’s
confessions to register their personal status code with the state, and again the confessions
refused to do so.180 Although the government was prepared to accept failure, the Lawyers
Syndicate decided to press the issue and went on strike on January 12, 1952 for eight
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months in an attempt to abolish confessional law and create a unified civil code for
personal status law. They claimed that working across eighteen different personal status
codes undermined efficiency and wasted state resources when policemen were routinely
sent after Muslim wives who had left their husbands without a legal divorce.181
Furthermore, they protested the violation of Lebanese sovereignty that occurs every time
a Lebanese couple marries abroad and then returns home, where the marital law of the
country where they were wed must govern their union.182 The strike ended when the
Grand Mufti, the leader of Sunni Muslims in Lebanon, and the Patriarch, the head of the
Maronite community, joined together to petition the President for an end to the strike, and
to threaten to send their followers into the streets if the Lawyers Syndicate succeeded in
its demands.183
During the 1960s and 70s scattered attempts took place to introduce a civil
marriage option, but 1952 was the last time that any attempt was made to eliminate
confessional courts. From then onwards, and particularly in the period after the civil war,
contestation in the domain of personal status law was reduced to attempts to introduce an
optional civil law for secular Lebanese citizens. The state ended any attempts to
centralize its legal system and instead attempted to assert equal authority in the area of
family law to give its citizens a civil option. What is striking about the attempts to curtail
confessional law described above is that there was very little true bargaining, in the sense
of negotiations between rival parties. Contestation has thus far involved religious
authorities inciting their followers to demonstrations, strikes, and sometimes-violent
protests until the governing authority reverses its course. The 1998 attempt by President
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Elias Hrawi to introduce an optional civil status law nicely demonstrates a wider range of
tools available to religious authorities in bargaining with the state beyond protest.
In early 1998, President Hrawi worked with lawyer Ibrahim Traboulsi to draft a
law that would create an optional civil law for marriage, divorce, and all other areas of
the law covered by personal status law. On February 2, he submitted the draft law to the
Council of Ministers, which approved the law on March 18 and passed it to Prime
Minister Rafiq al-Hariri to present to the President to forward on to the Parliament for
debate.184 Before submitting the law to the Council of Ministers, Hrawi shared the text of
the law with the heads of Lebanon’s religious communities to ask for their input, which
was universally against the bill. As soon as the Council of Ministers approved the law,
the confessional leaders began to campaign against it. According to Lebanese newspaper
Al-Nahar, the Islamist group Jama’ah Islamiyya, based in Tripoli, organized mosque sitins for a month, at the end of which the group organized for its followers to be bused to
Beirut to fight against the law by organizing massive protests outside the Parliament
building and the homes of Council members.185 The Grand Mufti of Lebanon issued a
Fatwa announcing that any Muslim who contracts a civil marriage in Lebanon would be
considered guilty of apostasy.186 The Head of the Shia High Council, Mohammed Mahdi
Shamseddine issued a statement saying “this law threatens to undermine Muslim and
Christian religious courts and infringe on people's private lives; Lebanese citizens cannot
be ruled by a law common to all sects.”187
Some religious figures did support the draft law. Mohamed Hasan al-Amin, a Shia
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cleric, publicly announced that the law was necessary for Lebanon as a first step to erode
sectarianism, which weakens Lebanon with internal divisions.188 But these isolated
statements were insufficient to stop the momentum building against the law, particularly
once Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir took the lead in attacking the proposed
law.189 The leader of the Maronite Union told Al-Nahar “President Hrawi has connected
the issue of civil marriage with that of the abolition of sectarianism in politics. We
believe this act to be extremely dangerous as it violates the principle of power sharing
between the sects.” By tying the introduction of civil personal status law to the
weakening of the Lebanese confessional system, statements like these spread distrust of
the law among the smaller Christian sects that had originally supported the bill. Patriarch
Sfeir was slightly more subtle in his opposition to the bill, claiming that on a personal
level, he was neither for nor against the bill, but as long as Grand Mufti Qabbani opposed
the law he could never support it, and he thought it was bad timing for President Hrawi to
raise religious tensions immediately before an election.190
When it appeared that Parliament might debate the bill, religious leaders escalated
their tactics. Patriarch Sfeir spread the word that as far as he was concerned, anyone who
contracted a civil marriage would be denied the last sacrament, and he urged his
followers to protest against any Members of Parliament who voted in favor of the law.191
Grand Mufti Qabbani warned that if the bill moved to open debate he would take
Lebanon back into civil war and command his followers to attack the state.192 Privately,
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Qabbani also made phone calls to Muslim Members of Parliament to ask them to oppose
the law, and he approached Prime Minister Hariri and urged him not to let the bill reach
Parliament. Qabbani also noted that both he and Patriarch Sfeir were prepared to exercise
their constitutional right to challenge the law, if it passed, in front of the Constitutional
Council.193 Allegedly to forestall violence, Hariri shelved the bill in violation of the
Lebanese Constitution, which mandates that once a draft law has been approved by the
Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister, as Head of that Council, must present it to the
President to send on to the Parliament for debate.194 Nevertheless, the law was never
presented to Parliament.
Hrawi’s draft law demonstrates the power of Lebanon’s confessions. Religious
leaders were able to not only eliminate the law—they prevented it from even reaching
open debate in Parliament. Lebanon’s religious communities have a considerable amount
of political power, delegated both officially in Lebanon’s constitution and rules of civil
procedure and unofficially, through their ability to exercise leverage over their followers.
As Saadeh notes, politicians generally follow the interests of their confession and the
religious leaders who help them attain power—and who can just as easily endorse their
rivals.195 The Grand Mufti and Patriarch also both use public sermons, the Friday khutba
and the Sunday sermon respectively, to instruct their believers on religious matters, but
also about who to vote for and how to respond to political events.196 The Lebanese state
is more than an agglomeration of the confessional groups it is made up of, as
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demonstrated by the occasional passage of laws that one or another religious group
opposes, such as a recent law concerning violence against women.197 The procedure for
passing laws is democratic, however; even if elections are not always entirely free and
fair, laws are not created by decree—they only come into being once voted into existence
by Parliament and signed by the President and Prime Minister. As such, religious
officials are able to maintain control over Lebanon’s legislative agenda so long as they
exercise influence over Members of Parliament. That they do so is well known.
According to Parliamentarian Ghassan Moukheiber, certain Maronite Members of
Parliament are known to bring calculators to sessions of Parliament so that they can
determine, during the course of the debate, the demographic effect of a proposed law.198
As long as Deputies are elected along confessional lines, religious officials are vital to
helping candidates secure their seats, and once elected, the Deputies make sure to retain
the support of their confession by voting in its interest. At yet another level,
confessionalism is a self-reinforcing institution and creates conditions that make it
difficult, if not impossible, for Members of Parliament to ever vote to centralize personal
status law.

Contemporary Legal Pluralism in Lebanon

Several case studies of personal status law disputes in Lebanon show the ongoing
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problems that durable judicial decentralization creates for Lebanese citizens. Mirna
Shirdawi is a consultant who works for various non-governmental organizations such as
USAID on Lebanese electoral reform. Her father is a Maronite Christian and her mother
is a Sunni Muslim. Her parents had a civil marriage and, in order to respect both of the
religions in their household, opted not to baptize their children.199 Under Sunni law, as
applied in Lebanon, Mirna is not considered to be Muslim because her father is not
Muslim, and religion is determined according to paternity.200 Although the Lebanese state
considers her to be a Maronite Christian because she, like all other Lebanese children,
was registered at birth as belonging to the religion of her father, the Maronite religious
establishment does not consider her to be Maronite because she was not baptized.201
Accordingly, she may not inherit from either her mother or her father, as Muslims and
Christians have adopted internal laws that prohibit inheritance from non-group
members.202
One of her friends, a personal status lawyer, has helped Mirna put together a
revocable trust that should permit her and her siblings to gain the property of their parents
after their death, but only because the property will be considered to have already passed
into the children’s hands before death.203 If anyone were to contest the arrangement, it is
likely that, at a minimum, the Sunni religious establishment would be able to divide her
mother’s estate according to sharia rules of inheritance, which would give her uncles the
bulk of her mother’s property and block Mirna from inheriting at all.204 Mirna’s brother
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decided when he attained the age of majority that he wanted to be baptized, and he is the
only one of the children who can officially inherit his father’s property. However, when
he wanted to separate from his wife, he was unable to procure an annulment from the
Maronite church, which does not permit divorce, so he converted to the Syrian Orthodox
Church, which solved his divorce problem but cut him off from his family and
confession, as he is barred from rejoining the Maronite church.205
Perhaps one of the most (in)famous cases of personal status law-related problems
involves Selim Hoss, former Prime Minister of Lebanon. Hoss and his wife had only one
child, a daughter, who under Hanafi law, would inherit half the share of her brothers if
she had brothers, and if not, then she would inherit nothing and her uncles would inherit
her share instead.206 To allow her to inherit, he converted to Shii Islam because Jaafari
law allows daughters to inherit as much as half of the family estate, even if they have no
brothers.207 However, under the terms of the National Pact (and reinforced by the Ta’if
Accord), the Prime Minister must be a Sunni Muslim, so Hoss converted back shortly
after safeguarding his daughter’s inheritance so that he could remain Prime Minister of
Lebanon.
These cases vividly illustrate the potential problems caused by legal pluralism in
personal status law. It would take a book-length study to document cases of all of the
jurisdictional problems that result from Lebanon’s system, but it is worth summarizing a
few more of them. According to Lebanese lawyers, only certain types of mixed marriages
can take place in Lebanon. For example, a Muslim man may wed anyone from Lebanon’s
eighteen confessions within the Sunni Muslim faith, but a Muslim woman cannot, and
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only certain of the confessions that her husband might belong to would recognize their
union unless she converts. As Lebanon does not have any civil marriage option, Lebanese
solve the problem by leaving the country and marrying in another country that does have
civil marriage.208 Cyprus is considered to have the most neutral laws for both parties, so it
is a popular choice. Adoptions are banned for all Muslims and couples who married
under Muslim law, even in mixed marriages. As previously mentioned, Muslims may not
inherit from Christians and vice versa. Without recognition of civil law, all Lebanese are
bound into one or another of these systems. Even if they marry abroad, issues relating to
their children are often (but not always) governed by religious law. Some cases are never
resolved because both civil and religious courts deny jurisdiction, leaving the litigant
searching for a court to take up his case. Although a convenient means for groups to
police their boundaries, decentralized personal status law creates legal quagmires in
Lebanon that one suspects could rival Jarndyce and Jarndyce.

Conclusion

The Lebanese example stands in opposition to the trajectory of judicial
centralization in Egypt (see chapter four). Unlike in Egypt, confessional courts are firmly
established in Lebanese family law and have deep roots in the Lebanese political system.
Repeated effects to repeal or legally circumvent their power and authority have failed,
despite the popularity of the proposed reforms and their widespread adoption by other
states. That religious law has such power demonstrates the self-reinforcing nature of
Lebanese confessional politics. Unlike in other cases, strong institutionalization of these
208
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norms and the extensive bargaining power of confessional elites at the time of the
system’s formation guaranteed the existence and preservation of independent family law
courts.
As long as ascriptive identity groups form the basis of political power in Lebanon,
demographic policy will be a site of strong political contestation. The ability to draw
boundaries between groups and control marriage, divorce, adoption, and other actions
related to family life, is of central importance to group demographics, and thus political
power. Once confessional politics was in place, it became self reinforcing by giving its
constituent groups the need to police their boundaries. This necessitated preserving legal
pluralism in family law.
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Chapter Three: Partial Judicial Decentralization in Tanzania

Introduction

Tanzania is a case of partial judicial decentralization that allows space for locally
distinct customary law, the content of which is determined by local or tribal communities.
Although there have been several attempts to further centralize its judicial system, the
contours of today’s judiciary were established soon after independence in the early
1960s, and efforts to change the balance between unified law and local law have not gone
far. Nonetheless, largely as an artifact of other policies during the state building period,
greater degrees of centralization in practice have been achieved over time. Consistent
with the theory proposed in Chapter 1, Tanzania’s partial decentralization, stemming
from the conditions of its modern origins and still only slowly altering, can be ascribed to
a combination of the state’s need for the support of rural elites in implementing economic
development programs after independence, and the strong, coordinated support of tribal
elites for locally distinct customary law.
That coordinated support was far from inevitable. Challenges to elite
coordination and support for local law came during the British colonial period, when the
policy of indirect rule so radically altered the structure of the chieftaincy that deep splits
formed between rival factions of elites. These splits worsened during the movement for
independence, when the nationalist party’s strongest supporters were mostly antitraditionalist, whereas the chiefs who practiced customary law by and large aligned
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themselves with the British colonialists. Nevertheless, support for locally distinct
customary law did survive among both more pro-nationalist and more traditionalist rural
elites. During the post-independence period of reform, the nationalist party decided that
it would support preservation of customary law as a means of diminishing rural elite
opposition to its policies, thereby creating the system of partial decentralization that has
endured since then.
Table 4
Trajectory of Judicial Decentralization in Tanzania

In Tanzania, there are over 120 tribes, and the largest makes up only 13% of the
population. The next largest comprises less than 5% of the population.209 Accordingly, no
one group has anything close to a plurality of the population, so it is less fruitful to study
only one or two groups, as I do in the cases of Lebanon and Egypt. I therefore focus on
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the largest group, the Sukuma, along with several of the smaller tribes including the
Chagga, Nyamwezi, Haya, Kuria, and Shambaa. These tribes have been selected for their
high level political involvement, and the depth with which they have been studied across
multiple historical periods by anthropologists and historians. However, Tanzania’s
history has been subjected to much less scrutiny than that of most European countries,
and the existing accounts were by and large written by European scholars. Before the
colonial era, there was very little record keeping, and records were not well preserved.
The German and British colonial periods brought more widespread record keeping, as did
independence, but not all of these records are accessible to researchers. Accordingly,
while I have attempted to make mention of the majority of the above listed tribes in each
section of the following chapter, I am not able to trace each individually through each
historical period. However, their histories are similar, which suggests that there are broad
commonalities in the trajectories of Tanzania’s tribes. Reference to supplementary
material on other tribes helps to confirm this. While I would never claim that each tribe’s
history is the same, I find that their shared characteristics, such as the ways in which they
were managed by each colonial power, and their relationship to the post independence
central government, are sufficiently similar to allow me to draw causal conclusions about
their elites’ capacities and levels of coordination.

Summary of the Argument

The remainder of the chapter is divided into three sections. The first examines the
evolution of support for locally distinct customary law during the German and British

94
colonial periods, despite widespread changes that were likely to have eroded its salience.
This section begins with a brief history of pre-colonial East Africa, followed by an
examination of the German and then British colonial periods. During the discussion of
colonial rule, it emphasizes the changes made to the chieftaincy and the use of custom
and tradition to support the structure of indirect rule. During these two periods, the
primary variable of interest is elite coordination. It was the British structuring of
customary law that created strong rural elite support for judicial decentralization.
The second section of the chapter considers the evolution of group elite
coordination and the relative capacities of state leaders and group elites vis-à-vis post
independence reforms. It also focuses on bargaining between group elites and state
leaders over levels of judicial decentralization. During independence, divided elite
opinion (some supported continued British involvement, and others favored
independence) weakened the ability of rural elites to coordinate in support of
decentralization. This left the state with sufficient capacities to enact certain components
of centralization. However, the elimination of the chieftaincy after independence served
as a rallying point to bring group elites together to coordinate in favor of judicial
decentralization. As a result the state leaders, led by Julius Nyerere, acquiesced to a
limited amount of judicial decentralization in return for group elite support for the
government reforms in rural areas that were the group elites’ areas of strength. The sheer
scale of Nyerere’s desired reforms provided the opening for contestation that resulted in
the level of decentralization that persists today.
The third section considers judicial decentralization in Tanzania over the last
twenty years and offers a perspective on the contemporary situation in Tanzania’s rural
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courts. The chapter concludes that the relative though still partial centralization of
Tanzania’s judiciary, particularly compared to other African countries, was caused more
by the increase in group elite relative capacity that resulted from Nyerere’s nationbuilding policies than his original plan for judicial unification.
The case of Tanzania makes for an interesting comparison with that of Malawi, its
neighbor to the south. Although the two share many characteristics, they adopted widely
different approaches to judicial centralization after independence. Both are former British
colonies that achieved independence at nearly the same time, were governed by single
parties dominated by strong presidents, they share a border, and they have similar ethnic
makeups, but Tanzania ended up partially decentralizing its judiciary, while Malawi
began by fully decentralizing it, and then changed course to only tacitly devolve judicial
authority. In Malawi, state leaders had relatively higher capacity than those in Tanzania,
mostly because the post independence government was able to take over indirect rule
system to concentrate power in the hands of President Banda, while Tanzania replaced
the indirect rule structure with a decentralized governing system that gave more power to
local elites. Tanzania’s decision to eliminate the chieftaincy brought group elites together
to defend locally distinct customary law, one of their few remaining arenas of power,
whereas Malawi’s government coopted group elites by binding the structure of the
chieftaincy to the state, and thus making group elites dependent on state leaders for their
authority.

The Evolution of Customary Law and Elite Coordination
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Pre-Colonial and Early German Tanganyika

It is difficult to generalize about judicial and political institutions in pre-colonial
East Africa because practices varied widely from one geographic area to the next. Most
East Africans were members of tribes, but a large number of them were not, instead
living in loose kinship associations without a single leader or group of leaders. The two
most common units of political organization were the kinship group and the tribe,
although there were many different ways of organizing authority within each. While
some of East Africa’s tribes were strongly organized and hierarchical, others were
components of much looser structures where village elders and other elites were part of
the decision-making process.210 Mamdani emphasizes “the diversity of the pre-colonial
experience” that encompasses stateless communities, traditional chiefs, administrative
chiefs, and the melding of matrilineal and patrilineal practices within single societies.211
Far from the colonial perception of the tribe as a concrete, long-lasting, and locally
legitimate form of rule, the power of chiefs was often highly contingent, subject to
takeover or conquest, and tempered by the limits of obedience that were invisible to
colonial officials.
Herbst notes that conquest was not a purely colonial endeavor.212 Because there
were no maps with agreed-upon borders, expansion was a perennial project, and tribes
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raided one another for cattle and arable land.213 Some tribes conquered others to form
empires, some of which endured until the German conquest. These conquests spread and
altered some tribal customs at the expense of others. To the extent that conquest changed
local norms, judicial reform took place routinely; however, without a single
administrative apparatus for the territory. Consequently, these episodes of transformation
cannot be viewed as judicial centralization or decentralization. Rather, it is important to
examine pre-colonial legal institutions and practices to gain an understanding of the
norms that were, at least to some degree, institutionalized among their practitioners, as
well as the power structures within them. There are over one hundred twenty different
tribes in present-day Tanzania, so it is not practical to scrutinize each in depth. However,
a brief look at some of the larger tribes provides an idea of pre-colonial structures and
norms, and adjudicative practices.
Sally Falk Moore describes organization among the Chagga of Kilimanjaro in the
18th-19th centuries as highly institutionalized and complex, consisting of a patrilineal
chieftaincy with several layers of authority including chiefs, sub-chiefs, and lineage
heads as well as the heads of age-set groups.214 Adjudication among the Chagga was both
highly routinized and highly contingent. Most legal disputes were settled among
particular social groupings such as the age-set, which included all young men born within
several years of one another who progressed through life stages together. More formal
2
 15

dispute resolution began with the leader of the patrilineage, and it was considered taboo
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to seek recourse outside the lineage group.216 Unresolved cases were sent to the


chieftaincy for a hearing at one of approximately thirty Lawns of Justice, where chiefs
judged disputes. In all legal venues, context and social ties were important to deciding
217

how general norms should apply to a specific case.218 Enforcement of judicial decisions
was achieved through shaming or the threat of exclusion from the community.
Adjudication was thus a component part of and reflection of the political structure. Minor
disputes were managed at the lowest-level political unit, the age-set, and appeals and
more serious cases went to the higher levels of the kin group head and chief. The male
heads of age-sets, lineage heads, and chiefs accordingly derived power from their
adjudicatory role, and the norms they enforced typically upheld Chagga hierarchy.
By way of contrast, Wijsen and Tanner describe pre-colonial Sukuma social
organization and adjudication as markedly different from that of the Chagga. The
Sukuma, Tanzania’s largest tribe, never adhered to an age-grade structure or its
associated life-cycle rituals of circumcision and other puberty-related ceremonies.219
Sukuma social groups were generally flexible, and it was possible for a person to belong
to several different social sets simultaneously and identify with each of them depending
on context. Norm enforcement relied much less heavily on authority structures or
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hierarchies and more on institutional mechanisms. For instance, community elders had
the power to overrule the chief, and the numerous resulting veto points had the effect of
decentralizing power. The position of chief was also not inherited, nor was the chief
awarded extra land or property upon ascension to office.220 Authority nevertheless
resided in the same places as other tribes: the families of chiefs and male village elders.
Legal structures, too, were diffuse, with large variations in law between neighboring
chieftaincies.221
The most routinized norms were those concerned with family law, and in
particular, marriage, divorce, and child custody rights. In particular, most kinship groups
had a bride wealth system to govern marriages, and as Abrahams notes, “in bride-wealth
marriage, a husband customarily acquires full rights over the children his wife bears.”222
Men also had “customary rights to compensation” in the case of his wife’s adultery, but
only in bride wealth marriages.223 Wijsen and Tanner, however, note that in matrilineal
areas the bride wealth price was often set so high as to be impossible to pay fully over the
course of a lifetime, which ensured continuing support for the wife’s family and a
measure of control over her treatment.224 Although in matrilineal areas the wife’s family
typically retained rights over children in marriages without bride wealth, the husband’s
family had the option to purchase full rights to their labor.225 Cases of bride wealth
payments, adultery, and other family law matters were typically settled between lineage
groups, and inheritance cases rarely went beyond the immediate family for settlement. As
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such, chiefs wielded less direct judicial authority than in other tribes. Crucially, the
family law system gave tremendous power to men, and particularly village elders, who
came to own the rights to labor of multiple wives and their offspring. Possession of labor
gave them the ability to farm more acres and, accordingly, accrue more wealth. It has
been argued that African customary law is usually structured to privilege the accrual of
wealth and power by a small set of elites.226
Malawi had a similar level of variation in types of adjudication and in the extent
to which tribal court systems were formalized in the pre-colonial era. Before the arrival
of British authorities, tribes in the south had a highly institutionalized method of dispute
resolution that began with adjudication by family elders, followed by village elders and,
as a last resort, the tribal chief.227 Tribes on the border of present day Zambia had some
of the most powerful chiefs in pre-colonial East Africa, and their efforts to preserve their
power to adjudicate disputes in post-independence Malawi were a strong component of
its later judicial decentralization. The fact that in Malawi, unlike Tanzania, commitments
and practices of local dispute resolution were more strongly institutionalized helps
explain why the British strategy of indirect rule did not divide local elites as much as in
Tanzania, requiring greater state acceptance of judicial decentralization in Malawi from
the very start of independence.228
Variations in Tanzanian tribal politics, however, continued into the era of German
colonialism from the late 19th century to the end of WW I, when the peace settlement
included transferring imperial governance to the British. Although the German colonial
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officers sought to standardize political and judicial structures in East Africa, their level of
penetration varied considerably across the territory. The majority of German settlers who
arrived in East Africa in the mid-1800s settled in the northern, mountainous parts of the
country, whereas many fewer chose to live in the arid central plains. Accordingly, their
ability to enact lasting reforms was stronger in the north. In the center of the territory,
tribes such as the Bena led a revolt against German rule to resist change, mostly
successfully. According to Swartz, the German presence eroded the importance of the
warrior class and introduced new taxes, which forced a transition to growing more cash
crops. But the overall social organization did not change, and the Bena chiefs, who had
wide powers to allocate land, marry into important families, and adjudicate disputes,
retained their influence.229
The arrival of Germans settlers near Kilimajaro, on the other hand, altered the
Chagga tribal power structure significantly. Colonial administrators sought allies among
local rulers, in the manner of Britain’s “indirect rule,” because they also believed their
work would be easier without local opposition. They accordingly abolished the tribe’s
warrior class, effectively eliminating the only checks to the chief’s power. 230 While the
new German civil law courts had little effect on the Bena, as few of them ever came into
contact with the new institutions, German colonialism altered Chagga judicial practice by
giving the chief more judicial authority, supported by a German-run native affairs court
whose decisions usually backed chiefly power.231 While German-introduced courts had
little influence among the Sukuma, Abrahams notes that Sukuma kin groups that were
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matrilineal were converted to being patrilineal during the German colonial period, as
German administrators recognized only the existing chiefs’ son as rightful heir.232 Thus,
in the areas of heaviest German penetration, there was a certain amount of judicial
centralization around the figure of the tribal chief, but the Germans did not attempt to
create a single court system for all of the tribes. Early efforts at building alliances
between colonial administrators and tribal chiefs began to change the selection of and
powers accorded to chiefs, but unevenly across the territory.233
At the end of this period, certain chiefs had gained in power through cooperation
with German settlers, and others, particularly among the Bena and their allies, had been
stripped of the chieftaincy. In the center of the country, there was thus strong antiGerman feeling, but there were no territory-wide coalitions or movements to displace
German rule. At the same time, however, though customary law had shifted in some
areas to accommodate German reforms, such as the strengthening of chiefly courts and
weakening of age-set heads’ adjudication, there was no systematic attempt across
German East Africa territory to replace local law with German law or the practices of
other tribes. Entering the next critical period, tribal elites (including chiefs and lineage
heads) and non-elites still supported local customary law, which was often the only local
option. Accordingly, by the end of this period, the processes important to judicial

232

Abrahams 1967, 257.
This alteration of custom and customary law would seem to undermine its authenticity and thus the
value of its preservation, either for those wishing to preserve it or the government that would later
recognize portions of it. As with my other cases, the historical purity of the law, or the extent to which it
was altered by accidents of colonial history, do not undermine its salience for group elites. As discussed in
Chapter 1, dispute resolution and the authority to determine the content of the law confer power. Group
elites act to preserve this power from the threat of centralization in case after case, even when the
“customary” laws are really anything but. Also, in societies without record keeping, the chief’s word, or the
word of the group elite, was often sufficient to convince non elites of the value of these norms. Finally,
norms evolve over time. Just because they changed from one generation to the next doesn’t mean they
wouldn’t still be more welcomed than entirely unfamiliar laws propagated from the political center.
233

103
centralization and decentralization had not yet begun to unfold.

The British Colonial Period

The transfer of German East Africa from Germany to the United Kingdom in
1918 as part of the settlement that ended the First World War brought major reforms that
would eventually reshape the chieftaincy and the practice of customary law. The League
of Nations gave Britain a mandate over the territory, which, since Kenya and Uganda
already formed British East Africa, they called Tanganyika.234 Unlike German rule, the
British colonial period was transformative for all of East Africa’s tribes. During their
tenure, British colonialists created a central judiciary based on Britain’s common law
tradition, which would soon come to compete with local customary forums, and they
fundamentally altered both the tribal system and the local balance of power with the
imposition of indirect rule. The transfer of the colony can thus be taken as the first critical
moment in the causal sequence because of its effect of strengthening chiefly authority
through indirect rule, thereby increasing rural elite support for customary law, and their
subsequent desire to protect it against centralization.
Because early British colonialists were able to build on Germany’s infrastructure
of roads and defensive installations, they were able to provide for their own defense and
so faced relatively few armed insurrections. Previous colonial experience in India,
Rhodesia, and, in particular, Nigeria, gave them the groundwork for putting a governing
structure into place quickly. Although British administration at first took the form of
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direct oversight and intervention, Donald Cameron, Tanganyika’s second governor,
imported the indirect rule structure that Lugard had used with such comparative success
in Nigeria.235 Indirect rule involved centralizing power around willing local tribal chiefs
who were made dependent on British support for their authority.236 With the 1926 Native
Authority Ordinance (Cap. 72), Cameron recognized traditional chiefs as rulers of their
tribes, incorporating them into the colonial administrative structure. These men were
expected to collect taxes, adjudicate disputes, and carry out development projects, among
other things. They reported to District Offices, local outposts of the colonial regime
usually manned by a District Officer and sometimes one or two other officials.
Cameron used indirect rule because it was an effective method to run a colony
with very few resources, but he and his fellow officers were also concerned with building
a structure that they believed could eventually function after Tanganyika gained
independence. Because the most prominent indigenous political structures were tribal,
they believed that tribes should form the basis for local governance. According to Iliffe,
among colonial officials “the belief was that as every European had a nation, so every
African had a tribe.” During the same year that Cameron introduced indirect rule to
Tanganyika, he wrote “It is our duty to do everything in our power to develop the native
on lines which will not Westernise [sic] him and turn him into a bad imitation of a
European…We want to make him a good African…We must not destroy the African
atmosphere, the African mind, the whole foundations of his race, and we shall certainly
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do this if we sweep away all his tribal organisations…” 237 As he announced to his fellow
administrators, “If we aim at indirect administration through the appropriate Native
Authority—Chief or Council—founded on the people’s own traditions and preserving
their own tribal organisation, their own laws and customs purged of anything that is
‘repugnant to justice and morality’ we shall be building an edifice with some foundation
to it.”238 Realizing this vision required radically restructuring East Africa’s tribes.
In some areas, colonial officers encountered pre-existing hierarchies led by chiefs
with whom they could form alliances. In many places, these structures did not exist
naturally, and British administrators were required to create local partners for the project
of indirect rule. The goal, as one provincial administrator explained to his staff was that
“Each tribe must be considered as a distinct unit…Each tribe must be under a chief.”239
Accordingly, colonial officers, sometimes aided by anthropologists, decided which tribes
would participate in indirect rule, and how. When they found groups who claimed no
tribal identity, they usually classified them as members of the nearest large tribe. Small
tribes without a strong hierarchy were similarly lumped together with other tribes. The
Nyika of southern Tanzania, for example, were classified as a sub-group of a nearby
tribe, despite linguistic differences and historic mistrust between the two peoples.240 In
large or well-defined tribes that lacked a clear ruler or hierarchy, the British appointed
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chiefs selected from locally prominent families.241 In other areas, they aggregated tribal
subsets into larger units, such as the Nyakyusa, who shared a language, but had
previously lived as separate smaller chiefdoms.242 In the Usambara mountains, the British
discovered evidence of a powerful Shambaa kingdom that had existed before the arrival
of the Germans, which they decided to revive under the rule of a previous contender for
the throne.243 The new Shambaa territory was much larger than the old one, and included
the Zigua and Pare people, who had previously formed separate tribes, and who
maintained strong opposition to Shambaa rule.244
In tribes that already possessed a clear structure of authority, British officials built
new levels of hierarchy to centralize administration under as few leaders as possible. For
instance, several separate Bena lineages were brought together under a single paramount
chief in 1926.245 The eight separate Haya chiefdoms were unified in 1926 under the rule
of Francis Lwamugira, whose ability to force “through the building of schools and
dispensaries and roads” and support for “any project of economic development unless it
threatened the established order” won him strong British support.246 When local
resistance to centralizing power around the chieftaincy was too strong to overcome
easily, colonial officials found other ways to organize rule. According to Rwezaura, the
British faced setbacks when they tried to appoint a paramount chief of the previously
acephalous Kuria, who for a long time had been governed in small agnatic groups whose
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lineage head represented his group in a non-hierarchical tribal council.247 The British
resolved this with the creation of a Kuria federation, which left the lineage heads (who
they called sub chiefs) in control of their kin-group, but jointly responsible for a common
treasury and court.248 Sukuma administration also took the form of a council rather than a
single chieftaincy.249
Many of the newly appointed chiefs worried about their legitimacy among their
constituents, especially since their promotion came at the instigation of occupying forces.
To bolster their claim to the chieftaincy, British officials revived and prioritized historical
accounts that emphasized the importance of the families from which the new chiefs were
drawn. Chiefs also spent considerable time and resources building histories of their
family’s historical and hereditary right to rule.250 Iliffe quotes a Pare chief who claimed
that when he chose to claim his tribe’s chieftaincy, he “wrote a ‘history’, which
established that the chieftainship of the Pare District was [his].”251 Opponents to their rule
and rival chiefs created separate histories to support alternate claims to power. The
Ndamba tribe, which British officials categorized as part of the larger neighboring Bena
tribe, sent historians Anton Mwilenga and John Kwalevele to Dar es Salaam to present
their tribal histories and ethnographies to the British colonial government to make their
case for independence from Bena rule.252 Similarly, according to Iliffe, “a Chagga
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dissident of 1937 wrote a history of Kilimajaro aimed against chiefly authority.”253
Histories of the Shambaa, Haya, Gogo, Safwa, and numerous other tribes appeared
during the interwar years, and these treatises made a strong argument for or against the
lineage-based legitimacy of particular chiefs.254
Aside from commissioning or writing histories, chiefs reinforced their authority
through references to, and sometimes reformulations of local customary law, and in
particular those aspects connected to family life. Because the hierarchical structure
introduced to many chieftaincies was usually unfamiliar to locals, chiefs attempted to
portray “chiefly authority as an extension or elaboration of the authority normally
exercised by senior men over their families.”255 In doing so, they often affirmed practices
that shored up the power of senior men in the tribe, some of whom supported their claim
to rule in return. They also used old rituals or invented new ones to lend legitimacy to
their practices.256 Colonial officials collaborated with chiefs in articulating and
formalizing (and sometimes inventing) versions of local custom that privileged the role of
local elites, and in particular male village elders and patriarchs. These projects were often
advanced even in areas where the population had a significant number of matrilineal kin
groups.257
In comparison, British rule in Malawi (known as Nyasaland) actually began
earlier than in Tanganyika. The first British Consular Court, at first reserved for use for
British officials only, was established in 1891, after Nyasaland declared a crown
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protectorate.258 This court was expanded into a three-tiered system of courts for
Europeans, Asians, and “natives”, respectively, in 1902. In 1933, colonial administrators
created a class of Native Courts, which were meant to adjudicate customary and petty
criminal disputes. These were meant to bring tribal law under the control of the state, but
because these courts were staffed with outsiders who were friendly to the colonial
regime, they were mostly ignored in favor of preexisting local courts. Hence, this limited
effort did not significantly alter already well-institutionalized patterns of judicial
decentralization. At this stage, this pattern in Malawi largely replicates the British
experience in Tanzania, in that both countries emerged from the colonial era with a multitier court system that used the preservation of customary law to bind traditional
authorities to the colonial state. In both countries, the system’s skeptics would become
some of the first anti colonial-nationalists.
The varied conditions in what would eventually become Tanzania, however,
provided more opportunities for the British policy of indirect rule. Through it, the British
created Tanganyika’s first centralized government, made up of British administrators and
the tribal chiefs who enforced their laws. While some of these chiefs quietly opposed
British rule, the majority of them supported British reforms, principally for the increased
power and status that their cooperation brought.259 As in nearly all other colonies of the
period, British or otherwise, a strong nationalist movement then grew to challenge
colonial rule. One of the earliest movements was the Tanganyika African Association,
founded in Dar es Salaam in 1929 as a forum of discussion for African urban elites. It
wasn’t until the 1950s, however, that the Association, brought under the leadership of
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Julius Nyerere, one of twenty-six children of the chief of the Zanaki and the first
Tanganyikan to pursue higher education in Britain, became a widespread political
movement. The Tanganyika African Association (TAA), which in 1954 was renamed the
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), drew diverse supporters, including
dispossessed former chiefs, urban women, and educated young Tanganyikans who
opposed colonialism as an institution.260
Other proto-nationalists movements were also formed during this period, but the
Tanganyika African Association was the first to gain widespread appeal beyond the
immediate area of its inception. Others tended to be limited to membership by cotribesmen. Maguire describes a group of Sukuma chiefs near Mwanza organizing, in
1937 to block changes to local treasuries, and a petition to the first United Nations
visiting Mission to Tanganyika by the Sukumaland Federation in 1948, detailing
demands for further African representation in the nationwide Legislative Council, more
opportunities for education, greater allowance for native societies, invitations to trade
meetings, and the prohibition of land alienation without the consent of local chiefs.261
The Sukuma Union, formed in 1945, began as a mutual aid society but quickly morphed
into a forum for airing political grievances as its members, mostly teachers and clerks,
began to realize that their economic complaints were bound up with the system of
colonial governance.262 Hyden describes the activities of the Bahaya Union in the Haya
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tribe, which brought grievances to British administrators.263 Here, as well, the TAA
eventually gained greater local support when it more vocally demonstrated against British
agricultural policies such as mulching banana stems.264 The Kilimanjaro Union served the
same purpose for the Chagga.265
Maguire argues that the development of nationalism in Tanganyika “varied in
pace and differed in certain other respects in disparate areas depending on the impact of
the colonial government’s policies, on the character of traditional tribal institutions, and
on the nature of the economic and social environment.”266 Across most regions, however,
some of its most prominent early followers were members of families who had been
passed over for chieftaincy despite some claim to the title, or former chiefs whose small
tribes had been amalgamated into larger tribes. When Anton Mwilenga and John
Kwalevele, the Ndamba historians who traveled to Dar es Salaam to present their case for
independence from the Bena, failed to win support for their cause, they went to a TANU
rally to learn more about the nationalist movement.267 They decided to join the party, and
they took 54 membership cards back home with them, which eventually yielded over one
hundred Ndamba supporters who thought that TANU might be able to help free them
from Bena rule.268 Iliffe cites Nyamwezi rival chiefs and village dissidents as the tribe’s
first members.269

263

Hyden 1968 107.
Ibid., 115.
265
Iliffe, 525.
266
Maguire, 1969 xxii.
267
Monson in Giblin and Maddox, eds, 108.
268
Ibid.
269
Iliffe, 533. It is worth repeating here that the vast remaking of Tanzania’s tribal landscape risks making
customary law, and its defense, look like weak demands for a separate system of law that has no historical
basis for its protection. That custom and customary law changed fundamentally during this period is
undeniable. However, because local group elites were tasked with writing and then administering these
“customary” laws, they became tremendously valuable to these elites as sources of power. It is largely on
264

112
Because chiefs were directly responsible for carrying out some of the most widely
opposed colonial initiatives, such as taxes and land alienation, opposition to colonial rule
across the territory took the form of opposition to chiefs. Lord Hailey wrote a paper in
1950 warning that British over-reliance on Native Authorities would create opposition to
their rule. His memorandum led to efforts to create more representative local government,
but most chiefs refused to accept elected advisors.270 In the Arusha region, popular
protests against colonial rule were almost always directed against local chiefs.271 In
Njombe, British administrators forced local chiefs to help with confiscation of land for a
large wattle (acacia) farm managed by the Colonial Development Corporation, which
earned the latter widespread resentment.272 TANU accordingly received widespread
support in Njombe as “TANU activists blamed the ruling clans for denying positions to
well qualified and educated individuals, protecting unqualified office-holders, preventing
appeals against the decisions of chiefs’ courts, and perpetuating inefficiency and
corruption.”273 In Sukumaland, farmers came increasingly to resent the mandates that
forced them to change the way they farmed by requiring that certain crops be fertilized
with manure, demarcating where new cultivation might take place, ordering the killing of
certain numbers of cattle every year, and the planting of a minimum acreage of cassava
these grounds that I believe they were so strongly defended by rural elites, rather than their historical
authenticity. However, this does not undermine the argument that group elites bargain for judicial
decentralization based on their support for it. In fact, the elimination of the chieftaincy in Tanzania made
preservation of these laws even more vital for chiefs, as one of the last remaining preserves of their power.
270
Lord Hailey, Native administration in the British African territories, 1: East Africa (London: HM
Stationery Office, 1950) in Maguire, 21.
271
Spear in Giblin and Maddox, eds, 77.
272
Giblin in Giblin and Maddox, eds, 139. According to Maguire, District Officers in Busega, Sukumaland
refused to hear grievances aired by the TAA unless they were relayed through the chief’s office (116).
273
Ibid., 143. According to Giblin, “when TANU organizers became active in Njombe in the 1950s, they
directly attacked the concept that authority should be vested in particular clans. They did so because they
recognized that, while clan identities could indeed unify chiefly office holders in defense of privilege,
among common villagers ideas of clan hierarchy were foreign. Outside the tight circle of chiefs who
controlled offices and opportunities for schooling, they failed to persuade anyone that the British-appointed
chiefs possessed the right to rule.”

113
and cotton.274 Elites among the Sukuma accordingly created local associations and
cooperatives meant to represent crop producers’ interests to the British administration.
Concerned that these associations would provide alternative forums for political
organization, the local District Officer prohibited them from operating in units other than
that of the tribe.275 As a consequence, association and cooperative leaders became
outspoken critics of the Native Authorities. Although in some cases chiefs chose to ally
themselves with TANU, in most cases they remained loyal to the source of their
authority. The British viewed party membership as open resistance to colonial rule, so
many chiefs either joined in secret or never joined at all.276 Many of the early conflicts
between British colonialists and nationalists was mediated by the role of the chiefs, which
only grew worse as TANU began to address the British directly, rather than channeling
their concerns through their chiefs, especially since many of their grievances concerned
chiefly rule.277 Accordingly, the elimination of chiefly power formed an early part of
TANU’s political platform, which meant that most traditional authorities remained strong
supporters of the colonial regime.278
TANU also drew early support from women who hoped that they might gain
personal autonomy if it followed through on promises to eliminate traditional authority.
By 1955, the majority of TANU members were women.279 Women were particularly
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enthusiastic about TANU because it promised dignity and equality and a vision for the
future that included “men and women working side by side,” which they had been denied
in the past.280 Geiger argues that colonial authorities regulated the activities of men
directly but often left women’s affairs to African men: “the control of women was
invariably left to colonized men—to fathers, husbands, brothers, or uncles—while its
legal parameters were defined and redefined by colonial officials, including Native
Authorities.”281 Perhaps the second most important figure in TANU, and the only other
aside from Nyerere who was instantly recognizable to most members of the public, was
Bibi Titi Mohamed, a Muslim woman from Dar es Salaam who was the first women’s
chapter secretary. She, along with other women she recruited from local dance troupes,
“stimulated and facilitated the emergence of a grassroots leadership and democratized the
process of TANU organizing while at the same time providing TANU’s central
leadership with a readily activated network for the transmission of information….”282
TANU also appealed to youth, who had few rights and little autonomy in most
tribal societies.283 They, like some of TANU’s women, opposed Traditional Authorities
and hoped for the erosion of “traditional” organization. Because TANU’s membership
consisted mostly of opponents of the alliance between tribal chiefs and colonialists that
formed the structure of indirect rule, TANU supporters favored eliminating chiefs and
deprioritizing tribal identities.
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Between 1954 and 1960, when Nyerere was elected to lead Tanganyika during the
one-year transition from British Mandate status to independence, TANU recruited
members and opened offices in every province. In 1959, in every district, its members
were voted into local and district level councils created by the British in preparation for
the transition to independence, and some chiefs began to support the party in an attempt
to retain power, although “most proved unable to convince TANU leaders of their
nationalist credentials.”284 The 1959 and 1960 elections made TANU Tanganyika’s
representative in independence negotiations and gave it decisive control of the first
representative assemblies that presided over the transition at both the local and national
level. In December, 1961 the transition period ended and Tanganyika became officially
independent, and in 1962, Nyerere won over 99% of the vote to become the country’s
first president.285
The coalition that brought TANU to power was a sometimes counter-intuitive
amalgamation of actors whose interests were either anti-British or anti-chieftaincy.
Unpopular agricultural measures mandated by District Officers and threats of land
alienation for British development schemes created strong opposition to British rule, and
because they used Traditional Authorities to disseminate and enforce these policies,
nationalists began to oppose chiefly rule as well. Thus, the British decision to rule
through a coalition of Traditional Authorities and local chieftaincies presaged the antitradition composition of the pro-independence alliance. As will be shown in the
following section, because the British chose to govern through local chiefs, they
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supported, in general, most of what they believed were the traditional trappings of chiefly
rule, and Traditional Authorities thus found it easy to institutionalize more deeply those
components of local practice that furthered their authority. For this reason, although
British administrators introduced a central judiciary and attempted to codify laws and
rationalize the judicial bureaucracy, they never attempted to eliminate customary law. It
formed the foundation of chiefly power, which was essential to the success of their
strategy of indirect rule. However, the introduction of a centralized, British-run judicial
system paved the way for eventual partial centralization of the post-independence judicial
system.
As they had done in other Mandate territories and colonies, the British introduced
far-reaching reforms into the Tanganyikan legal system. They established a bifurcated
judiciary that separated cases involving the personal matters of colonial officers and other
European expatriates, as well as commercial, criminal, and other cases in which nonAfricans were involved, from “native” law, which governed East African colonial
subjects.286 The former types of cases were heard in British common law courts, and the
latter in tribal courts manned by Traditional Authorities and their deputies. Although they
introduced the framework for a nationwide judiciary, then, British officials never
seriously attempted to eliminate the adjudication function of chiefs, which they viewed as
useful for social harmony.287 Under the new system, chiefs retained the right to
adjudicate local cases, though now with few opportunities for the rest of the community
to participate. Chiefs were also now required to keep records, and to pay the clerk’s
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salary, a small fee was levied on all litigants.288 Furthermore, British officials created an
appeals system for the “Native” courts, such that cases from chiefs’ courts could be
appealed to regional colonial administrators.289
After 1950, the judicial role of chiefs diminished as magistrates began to replace
them in the “Native” courts. All of the new magistrate courts were established at the site
of former chiefs’ courts, making use of the same building and often the same clerks.290
Because there were very few trained magistrates available, however, only a small number
of chiefs’ courts became magistrate courts. The new magistrates often knew little about
customary law, so the British introduced assessors to advise them on points of local law
and to replace a formal jury system. Assessors were similarly introduced into many
British colonies to replace the full jury system, which was often deemed unfeasible due to
financial and administrative constraints. Assessors are lay members of the local
community (usually elders) who are empowered to advise the magistrate on how a matter
might be handled according to local custom. In some places, including Tanzania, they
were later given power to overrule magistrates at the primary court level.291 Once they
had created them, British officials also provided magistrates with copies of codified
versions of tribal law that they could use to adjudicate cases that fell under the purview of
customary law.
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In order to create these codifications, the British led a widespread effort to
research tribal norms and customs. This project was almost universally undertaken by
European and American researchers, primarily anthropologists, who observed tribal
practices and interviewed locals to create written versions of local norms that could be
compiled into legal codes. Hans Cory, an Austrian anthropologist, was responsible for
more of the codifications than any other scholar, including those of the Gogo, Nyamwezi,
Sukuma, Haya, and Shambaa, as well as treatises on the political organization of Arushaarea tribes such as the Meru and Chagga. According to Maddox, Cory’s codification
process privileged the accounts of senior men. During the codification of Gogo legal
practices, for example, he called a group of male clan heads to a meeting in Dodoma to
comment on his findings from several observation sessions.292 Their suggested changes
shifted the focus to inheritance, adultery, and other family law matters that were often
peripheral compared to other issues such as land and theft, and in any case were usually
settled according to context rather than fixed rules.293 In protecting or promoting the legal
agenda of village elders, Cory strengthened the alliance between them and the colonial
administration. He also strengthened the support that patriarchs and lineage heads had for
local customary law, because, having been given the opportunity to codify rules of their
making, senior men took the opportunity to entrench rules that strengthened their
authority.
Other studies have dealt, at length, with the problems of codifying customary law.
The primary question here is the effect of codification and the disruptions to pre-colonial
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political organization on the institutionalization of customary legal practices.294 Because
the level of support for local customary law changes slowly, it is important to ascertain
levels of support for it, or for other forms of law, in the period preceding the moment of
judicial (de)centralization. Judicial reforms during the British Mandate period had a
somewhat paradoxical effect on the institutionalization of locally distinct customary law.
No contemporary surveys asked Africans about their preferences for one style of
adjudication over another, or their attitude regarding the new tribal courts or legal codes.
It is clear, however, that by and large, locals only used British institutions when required
to do so. Many of them soon fell into obsolescence through disuse.295 As discussed, the
close ties between chiefs and colonial authorities eventually earned the former the
opposition of many of their constituents. One might expect that customary law, harnessed
to bolster chiefly power, would lose support as well, particularly because new
government courts provided an alternative to chiefly adjudication.
However, most litigants chose not to use courts set up by the government,
whether those run by chiefs or the magistrate courts introduced at the district level, so
some form of non-chiefly customary law continued to exist outside the domain of
colonial government authority. By all indications, locals solved disputes mostly as they
had before the advent of other types of courts, by referring disputes to village elders or
settling them privately between those concerned. As Wijsen and Tanner note, most
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Sukuma used colonial courts as a threat of escalation to gain advantage in the local
dispute resolution process.296 In some places, local customary courts persisted because
the magistrate courts were too far away or too unfamiliar to be of use to litigants.297 In
others, there was more active resistance to the new legal order. Rwezaura argues that
courts in Tarime District were unable to both attract litigants and enforce the law,
particularly in cases concerning bride wealth, the sum of money paid by one family to the
other when a marriage is contracted.298 The Nyamwigura chief’s court registry for 1955,
for example, shows that 48 percent of officially registered marriages involved a bride
wealth payment above the permissible limit.299 Because chiefs could use their official
capacity to sanction marriages, magistrates found that the only way to get locals to
register their marriages in accordance with colonial policy was to ignore the details of the
union.
As previously mentioned, many of the women and youth who joined nationalist
movements hoped that independence would weaken the hold of chiefs and tribal
hierarchies and give them greater freedoms, particularly with regard to marriage and
work. Their importance to TANU, and the unwillingness of most chiefs to support
TANU, meant that there was widespread support for the idea of abolishing the
chieftaincy. In many tribes, customary law was tied closely to chiefly power, and the
British practice of having chiefs perform adjudication (whether or not they had
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traditionally done so) strengthened the link. Support for eliminating the chieftaincy could,
thus, be seen to imply similar disenchantment with customary law. At the same time, the
only alternative to the customary law was colonial common law courts, and their promise
of autonomy from chiefly rule was undermined by their direct association with colonial
rule.
Additionally, while nationalist rhetoric emphasized democracy and selfdetermination, it also drew on pan-Africanism and respect for indigenous customs and
institutions. Village elders and patriarchs were unwilling to forego rights to land and
labor accorded them by customary law, which they could continue to enjoy even without
chiefs to adjudicate disputes.300 Speaking generally, the women and youth who supported
TANU had more influence in urban areas than the countryside, where customary law
remained more popular. Also, as mentioned, the widespread invention of custom by
British administrators, Western academics, and traditional authorities created
stakeholders among the local elite whose status relied on the forces of tradition.
Predictably, the beneficiaries of this arrangement continued to support it, and in rural
areas, overall support for customary law remained high. In 1966, Tanner found “a
noticeable withdrawal of customary law cases from primary courts” because litigants
preferred to take their disputes to unofficial neighborhood arbitration tribunals, which
would have been operated by community elders according to local rules of customary
law.301 He ascribes this to the fact that “Most communities are so closely integrated that it
would be impossible for anyone to act against their customary law and remain within the
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community afterwards.”302 This helps account for the low usage rates of primary courts,
which within three years became so noticeable as to bring complaints from the
government.303 That the same people who had brought TANU to power avoided its courts
points to strong preference for local customary law. Tanner ascribes this preference to the
relative proximity, low cost, and familiarity of local arbitration, but also that the
unfamiliarity of the magistrate and “the shortness of the hearing will deprive them of
personal satisfactions” in the process.304
During the 1980s, war with Idi Amin’s Uganda took up vast amounts of state
resources, and the resulting poverty and lack of funding for police and magistrates led to
a crime wave in rural Tanzania. The result, in the Sukuma and Nyamwezi middle of the
country, was the formation of vigilante groups (sungusungu) whose job it was to find and
punish perpetrators, particularly of cattle theft, which could be devastating to already
impoverished communities. The quick formation of these groups and their near ubiquity
suggest that many of these communities had continued to supplement state courts with
non-state justice for the previous twenty years, lending support to the idea that customary
law retained importance well beyond the colonial era.305 In 2013, there was still
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widespread support for the settlement of local disputes by village elders rather than
courts, although there was more willingness to take “serious” matters such as large-scale
thefts and violent crime to the police. Helen, an assessor for the Mtae Magistrate court in
Lushoto district, explained that although she has an official role as an assessor at the local
court, many people, especially women, bring their potential court cases to her for private
resolution.306
In the same village, a wealthy bar and cafe owner joins with two fellow village
elders to hear disputes in his café on weekends. He hears cases concerning inheritance,
land boundary disputes, marriage problems, theft, and “many, many people who got in a
fight.”307 The procedure varies little between cases: the elders summon the disputants and
their families, hear each person who wants to contribute to the proceedings, and then ask
both sides what they want from the other party and negotiate until an agreement is
reached. The settlement or solution is rarely the same even across similar types of cases
because the parties involved have different demands.308 During a focus group session at a
Magistrate court in Iringa, an assessor claimed that in his village, several kilometers
outside Iringa, it was quite common for village elders to adjudicate disputes privately
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because the court would not recognize many transgressions as violations of law, so there
could be no redress.309

Summary of the Argument

That local customary law and village-level arbitration forums still have salience
long after independence, especially since there has been a general erosion of tribal
identity in Tanzania, emphasizes that formerly tribal tribunals retained support through
the colonial era despite opposition from urban dwellers, rural youths and women, and the
shocks to the system that resulted from power struggles between British-appointed chiefs
and their rivals. The forces that opposed locally distinct customary law succeeded in
undermining its hegemony to the extent that the government, after independence,
attempted to unify customary law, and it created space for the limited success of
government primary courts, which did receive some, if not a preponderance, of
customary cases. However, because local elite support for a decentralized, non-state
controlled version of customary law remained high, and villagers continued to bring
judicial matters to the same places they had before independence, the level of
institutionalization of these practices remained quite high. Accordingly, despite the
divisions between local elites that resulted from the restructuring of the tribal system,
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elite coordination remained high, as former chiefs and other types of elites all prioritized
the preservation of local customary law.
The vast remaking of Tanzania’s tribal landscape risks making customary law,
and its defense, look like weak demands for a separate system of law that has no
historical basis for its protection. That custom and customary law changed fundamentally
during this period is undeniable. However, because local group elites were tasked with
writing and then administering these “customary” laws, they became tremendously
valuable to these elites as sources of power. It is largely on these grounds that they were
so strongly defended by rural elites, rather than their historical authenticity. Group elites
bargain for judicial decentralization based on their support for it as a source of power and
authority, regardless of the alteration of custom over time. In fact, as I will argue in the
next section, the elimination of the chieftaincy in Tanzania made preservation of these
laws even more vital for chiefs, as one of the last remaining preserves of their power.

Post Independence Coalition Building and Judicial Centralization

As long as TANU’s supporters shared the common goal of independence for
Tanganyika and the end of chiefly rule, they did not have to address any of the more
contentious issues that might divide them, such as the nature of post-independence
economic reforms or the status of customary law. Shortly after independence, these issues
came to the forefront and resulted in the beginnings of opposition to TANU’s rule. These
disagreements had far-reaching implications for the types of policies that were enacted,
the coalitions needed for their passage, and the legitimating narratives put forward to
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explain their importance to the new nation. During this period, Tanganyika faced the
question of whether to create a centralized judicial system with a single legal standard
that would apply to all of its citizens, or whether it should adopt some kind of hybrid
legal system that would preserve a place for different types of customary law, or perhaps
whether it should even retain two distinct court systems, as colonial administrators had
done, to manage customary and non-customary cases.
With most of TANU’s membership and supporters (made up mostly of urban
elites) opposing chiefs and tribal custom, the elimination of locally distinct customary
law was a logical agenda item. Early on, Nyerere outlined an agenda for judicial
centralization that would consist of a single court system that would use both common
and customary law, the latter of which, crucially, would comprise a single form of
customary law that would be amalgamated from the diverse existing customary legal
regimes. According to Nyerere’s plan, the same magistrates would preside over common
and customary law cases. The proposal is discussed in further detail below, but it is
important to note that although there were some commonalities across the customary
norms of some of Tanganyika’s tribes—for example, most tribes practiced some form of
bride wealth—there were important discrepancies even within common practices. Even
starker differences existed across regions. For example, family law rules varied among
matrilineal and patrilineal tribes, and there were similar differences in rules concerning
cattle between pastoralists and farmers. Creating a single version of customary law that
could be codified for use by magistrates with no special training in the subject constituted
an ambitious centralization project, as did the aim of bringing the two systems together.
At independence, the majority of magistrates in Tanganyika were British, and it would

127
take some time to train sufficient numbers of African lawyers and judges to replace them.
British magistrates would thus preside over customary law cases in Nyerere’s proposed
courts.
Less than a decade later, Tanzania’s judicial system remained far more
decentralized than Tanganyika’s leaders had initially intended. There was a single court
system, but no unified customary law code. Instead, each tribe used its own customary
law as interpreted either through an official codification or (and sometimes and) through
the advice of assessors drawn from the local community. Other agents besides
magistrates were empowered to adjudicate low-level disputes, and these neighborhood
authorities formed a network of first instance hearings that screened cases for referral on
to the court system when necessary. Most of these agents were TANU party officials,
usually drawn from the ten-cell block, the most local unit of the party. In rural areas,
many cases continued to be taken straight to village elders, regardless of whether they
happened to also be TANU officials or not, as was customary.
The failure of Nyerere’s judicial reform agenda can best be explained by two
separate processes, both of which began during the colonial era. The first, described
above, is the survival of strong group elite support for locally distinct customary law. The
second is the formation of opposition to the policies that Nyerere and other TANU
officials built to enact economic reforms. Nyerere prioritized economic development
highly, and most of his proposed policies were in the area of agricultural reform and
village reorganization. In both of these domains, the capacities of state leaders to enact
these reforms were relatively low, and required the cooperation of local group elites. The
section on coalition building below makes the case that to attract support for his reforms
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from rural elites, Nyerere had to abandon full judicial centralization. First, however, it is
necessary to review the components of Nyerere’s legislation that were most concerned
with (de)centralization.

A Summary of Legal Pluralism in Tanzania

The section that follows is not part of the causal argument. It contains an
important sidebar on the nature of legal pluralism in Tanzania. The components of legal
pluralism (the results of judicial decentralization) are a confusing tangle of certain
individual pieces of legislation and exemptions to others. They are also manifest in the
authority given to local government officials (ten cell heads) and assessors (court
advisors). This description is vital for understanding the remainder of the causal
argument.
Nyerere viewed judicial centralization as a necessary component of nation
building because if Sukumas, Benas, and members of other tribes organized family life
on the basis of tribal law, they would continue to prioritize their tribal identity over that
of their new nation. His other reforms, such as a national curriculum and the resettlement
of many Tanganyikans to under-populated areas, could be undermined by what he saw as
tribal parochialism. In 1961, he accordingly wrote a letter to the first post-independence
parliament asking them to help him unify customary law as a prerequisite to unifying the
nation. 310 As part of this initiative, in 1963, Tanganyika hosted a conference on local
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courts and customary law in which it and other former African colonies gathered to
discuss strategies for unifying the many tribal and local legal systems into a single,
effective judiciary. Cheikh Amri Abedi, Tanganyika’s Minister of Justice, welcomed his
fellow delegates as follows: “The Tanganyika Government, having devoted much
attention to the integration and unification of the legal and judicial systems of the
country, believed that it would be valuable to review developments and consider
objectives in this area of law together with other African states.”311
All of the countries in attendance agreed that the long-term goal was for “local
courts to become an integral part of an independent judiciary,” but the question was how
best to accomplish this.312 The delegates recognized that many of their citizens preferred
the customary practice of arbitration by village elders because it was cheap, informal,
close to the litigants involved, and trusted.313 For this reason, and because it is an
authentically “African” form of law, “there was wide agreement that there was no
question of the disappearance of customary law in the foreseeable future as a significant
part of African legal systems.”314 The question was “how far this could be accomplished
without attempting to impose a law so alien to the norms of a community as to be
unacceptable.”315
Accordingly, the delegates came up with a five-step roadmap for judicial
centralization that would preserve a form of modified customary law. Many of the steps
had been accomplished under colonialism and, for all but a handful of countries, only
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step five remained. In the first step, which they termed “non-recognition or toleration,”
European courts were introduced into only limited areas of the country, so existing
customary legal institutions continued to function as they had in the past, governing most
of the population. They were allowed to function as long as there was no clash with
official policy. The second step was recognition, in which colonial policies of indirect
rule brought recognition to local courts, although their jurisdiction was restricted to cases
where all parties were Africans and there were some limitations on the severity of crimes
that they could judge. The third step was termed “control.” During this phase, the central
colonial government gradually increased control through administrative officers who
were allowed to inspect courts and transfer cases from one jurisdiction to another. In this
phase an appellate body was also introduced. During the fourth step, “colonial reorganization,” colonial officials begin to replace chiefs with magistrates, which reduced
the number of customary courts but increased their jurisdiction. In the fifth and final
stage, “African re-organization,” newly independent African states would enact
comprehensive legislation to reform their judiciary.316
This last step is noticeably vague. Conference delegates disagreed on the
necessity of assessors versus full juries, the training of magistrates, and the appeals
structure, so wide latitude was given for each state to plan its phase of “African reorganization.” Some states even left the conference no longer fully committed to judicial
centralization, having newly understood the extent of possible dissent. Malawi, for
example, chose to maintain a separate but officially recognized system of chiefs’ courts
for political reasons. Indeed, despite Abedi’s affirmation of Tanganyika’s commitment to
centralization, articulated in a special Appendix to his report on the conference,
316
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Tanganyika’s plan for phase five noticeably leaves wide latitude for locally distinct
customary law.317
Nyerere’s chosen vehicle for unification was a restatement (codification) of
customary law for patrilineal tribes.318 Cotran describes the process as follows: “tribal
representatives, chosen for their expert knowledge of customary law by the District
Council of the area meet to discuss their customary law, and agree on a first draft. The
text is then submitted to a national panel of experts which considers it, makes
amendments if it so wishes, and then refers it back to the District Council of the area
which debates the text until it is finally approved.”319 A central panel of experts then
compiled the various restatements into a single version that reflected the broad consensus
of customary law in patrilineal tribes. The codification process began in 1961, and in
1963, Parliament promulgated Government Notices 279 and 436 as the official
restatements, with the intent that all patrilineal tribes should adopt them as binding,
replacing or amending portions of local customary law that were incompatible with the
new codes.320
However, the Judicature and Application of Laws Ordinance gives district councils
the right to amend portions of the unified restatement that they found objectionable.321
Effectively, although a single customary law code was meant to govern the patrilineal
tribes, each local area, as defined by district boundaries, was given the authority to amend
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the code as it would apply to them. If a district council decided to amend the code, it was
required to submit the modification to the Ministry of Justice for approval, but the
Minister only had the right to overrule portions of amendments that were contrary to
Tanganyika’s written laws or those that imposed criminal sanctions for civil offenses.
Otherwise, he had little authority to override District Council amendments, which gave
districts the power to reinstate local versions of law.322 When the Government Notice 279
was sent to the districts for ratification at the end of June, 1963, only eighteen of
Tanganyika’s then sixty-six districts signed on with no reservations or additional
amendments.323 By 1964, twenty-six more joined, but the majority of districts did not.
Effectively, these Notices gave tribal groups the power to preserve their own, separate
forms of customary law.
Abedi’s Appendix makes clear that aside from the Government Notices regarding
customary law, the government would entirely centralize the judicial system in its
forthcoming Magistrates Courts Act, the first post-independence piece of legislation to
reorganize the entire judiciary, which had previously only been modified piecemeal. The
final version of the 1963 Magistrates Courts Act, however, also preserved wide swaths of
local customary law. The Act, which establishes the structure of and rules of procedure
for the judiciary, states specifically in its fourth schedule:
“In the exercise of its customary law jurisdiction, a primary court shall apply the
customary law prevailing within the area of its local jurisdiction or, if there is more
than one such law, the law applicable; in the area in which the act, transaction or
322
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matter occurred or arose, unless it is satisfied that some other customary law is
applicable; but it shall, subject to rules of court, apply the customary law prevailing
within the area of its local jurisdiction in matters of practice and procedure to the
exclusion of any other customary law.324
The Act clarifies that no court may refuse to recognize a rule of customary law just
because it has not been established by evidence. It must “accept any statement thereof
which appears to them to be worthy of belief which is contained in the record of the
proceedings…or from any other source which appears to be credible, or of which the
court may take judicial notice.”325 The standard for determining whether particular
citizens should be governed by customary law is a mode of life test, described in the
Judicature and Application of Laws Act in the following terms:
“A person may become a
member of such a community…by his adoption of the way of life of the firstmentioned community or his acceptance by such community as one of
themselves, and such adoption or acceptance may have effect either generally or
for particular purposes; (b) a person may cease to be a member of a community
by reason of his adoption of the way of life of some other community (whether or
not any customary law is established or accepted in such other community) or
acceptance by some other community as one of themselves, but shall not be
treated as having ceased to be a member of a community solely by his absence
therefrom.326
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In 1972, the High Court ruled in the case of Abdullah Shamte v Mussa (1972)HCD no. 9,
customary law is presumed to apply in rural areas unless shown otherwise.327 For a long
time, the presumption was in favor of customary identity, and it took several decades for
magistrate courts to begin to use civil law codes for residents of large urban areas.328
These sections, read together, are unequivocal—local customary law continues to
be binding in the vast majority of disputes that come before magistrate courts. Appeals
concerning whether customary law is the appropriate standard for adjudication can only
be heard at the High Court level.329 In 1963, the government also removed the
repugnancy clause from the constitution, which had previously proscribed the use of any
customary law contrary to human rights or natural justice.330 In its absence, magistrates to
this day are required to accept all customary law not specifically contravened by statute,
and Tanzania’s parliament has been slow to curtail the reach of custom.
Other reforms adopted in the first ten years of independence continue to reflect a
mixed agenda of centralization in some areas of the law coupled with a failure to
centralize others. In 1962 and 1963, Tanzania replaced the British era penal code with its
own criminal procedure code, and in 1966 and 1967 it published a binding, unified code
of civil procedure for its courts.331 It also passed a unified Evidence Act, to make sure
that its magistrates used consistent standards across Tanzania’s diverse districts.332 These
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acts unified much of Tanzanian law, and eliminated distinctions between Africans and
Europeans that had differentiated the two legal systems during the colonial era. The longawaited Law of Marriage Act of 1971, which was expected to unify procedures of
marriage and divorce including norms that varied widely from place to place such as
rules concerning bride wealth and standards for divorce, however, failed to standardize
key areas of the law.
The Law of Marriage Act places some limitations on forms of customary
marriage, such as mandating the registry of all marriages, the maintenance of children,
and stipulating equality between multiple wives, but it does so with strong deference to
local customary law. For instance, part II, section 25(d) recognizes that a marriage may
take civil, religious, or customary form. A state official need not be present for any of
these types of union to be valid.333 Divorce must be granted when a marriage has broken
down irreconcilably, and one standard for determining that is the custom of the local area.
Perhaps more importantly, the post-divorce division of assets must take into
consideration “the custom of the community to which the parties belong.”334 The act does
eliminate customary law in some areas, such as by ordering state officials to treat
marriages that are contracted without customary dowry or pre-marital gift-giving as valid
(section 41(a)), by banning corporal punishment of wives (section 66), and freeing
widows from all obligations to their husband’s family upon his death (section 68), among
others. In these cases, magistrate courts can use state law in lieu of local customary law.
If these legal codes, which operate in all of Tanzania’s courts, were the only
evidence available in assessing the degree of centralization in Tanzania’s judiciary, one
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could argue that most aspects of family law are left fairly decentralized according to
locally distinct jurisdiction of customary law, whereas the more extensive criminal and
civil procedure codes are unified, effectively centralizing the majority of the judiciary.
Two structural components of the new judiciary, however, complicate this picture, and
demonstrate a surprising level of decentralization. The first of these is the government’s
decision to preserve the office of assessors, first instituted under British rule. Because
magistrates were given little to no training in understanding customary law in general,
assessors were on hand to explain local rules concerning polygamy, bride wealth, cattle
loaning, or other unfamiliar legal concepts. As experts in customary law, assessors have a
large amount of discretion in dictating the content of the law.335 Allowing local elites to
determine their own laws, through the office of the assessor, is a major devolution of
judicial power. Assessors are still used in all first instance courts, and also at the level of
the High Court. Meetings with assessors in several villages in three distinct regions of
Tanzania confirms that in most cases, the office of assessor is held by a village elder or
someone with previous bureaucratic experience, as originally intended.336 In 1969, the
Magistrates Courts Act was amended to give assessors a binding vote in magistrate court
hearings.337 Because the Magistrates Courts Act requires that a primary court may not
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issue judgments without two assessors present, the binding vote gives the assessors, if
they agree with one another, the authority to overrule the magistrate’s decision.338 Village
elders who serve as assessors therefore have the power to prevent the magistrate from
issuing any rulings that contravene local law.
Three additional pieces of legislation strengthened the role of local officials in
determining the content of and managing disputes under local customary law.
Government Acts 219 and 219A of 1969 established Ward Tribunals, which initially
consisted of five members appointed by the local TANU party office, and today up to
five members appointed by the Ward or District Executive Committee. According to
Ghai, these tribunals are “intended to bring about an amicable settlement of the dispute,
and if such a settlement is achieved, it can be filed in the primary court and then becomes
enforceable as a judgment of that court.”339 These tribunals, although less formal than
first instance courts, are nevertheless part of the formal structure of the judiciary because
they are subject to the Magistrate courts through appeals.340 These Tribunals have
original jurisdiction in civil cases up to approximately three million shillings
(approximately $2,000), which is more than the annual GDP per person, meaning that
most civil cases are first heard by local government-appointed officials with no legal
training.341 They are empowered to hear both civil and criminal cases, although not
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capital crimes or instances of severe assault. Ward tribunals have jurisdiction over land
disputes, but when it comes to matrimonial cases, they have the authority only to
reconcile disputants, not divorce them. The adjudicators are usually village elders or
other locally prominent people who are expected to have some knowledge of local
custom.342 They also have no enforcement power.343 Although there are legal manuals
available in some Ward Tribunals, most reconciliation sessions take place without
reference to the law.344 Accordingly, at the lowest level of the Tanzanian judiciary, it is
local understandings of justice and standards imposed by village elders, rather than
national legal codes, that form the standard for adjudication.
Even before disputes reach the Ward Tribunals, however, they have almost
always begun at one of two additional quasi-governmental institutions. The first is the
head of the most local level of organization, the ten-house cell. The ten-cell was first
instituted by TANU in 1963-4 to organize local political participation, provide
information about the government to villagers, inform party officials about village
activities, and provide order and security. 345 Ten-cell units were units of the political
party, not of the central government. Each cell consisted of ten households, and the
households jointly elected one of their heads of household to lead the cell and to sit on
various local committees such as the Ward Executive committee. Leaders were also
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expected to adjudicate any disputes that occurred in their cell.346 By 1967 they had
become the most influential unit of governance, and several studies that year report that
most people would take a dispute or problem to a ten-cell leader before almost anywhere
else, with the possible exception of former chiefs.347 Ingle argues that the ten-cell system
functioned as an extension of the colonial system of indirect rule because ten-cell leaders
performed the same function as the former traditional authorities, and many chiefs whose
office disappeared following independence became a ten-cell leader.348 When TANU
merged with the Zanzibar ruling party, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), to form Chama Cha
Mapinduzi (CCM), the ten-cell system continued as local party units. After the transition
to multi-party government, the ten-cell system was officially abolished, but the vast
majority of ten-cell units still exist, and research studies on agriculture, public health,
local governance, and other all reference interviews with ten-cell leaders.349 Despite lack
of official recognition, ten-cell leaders still adjudicate the majority of disputes before they
are referred to the Ward Tribunal.350 Magistrates still ask disputants whether they have
consulted their ten-cell leader before appearing in court.351 Ten-cell level adjudication is
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based “entirely [on] customary law” and involves no reference to national laws or
standards.352
Although ten-cell leaders address disputes that occur within their units, conflicts
often occur across multiple ten-cell units. The official mechanism for disputes of this type
is recourse to the local first instance court or Ward Tribunal, depending on the nature of
the conflict and the parties involved. Ten-cell leaders, assessors, village heads, and
villagers agree, however, that it is common to consult a group of village elders before
resorting to either official venue (see above). Because village elders are called upon to
participate in so many juridical functions, it is perhaps unsurprising that in many villages,
the same elders function as assessors or Ward Tribunal members, ten-cell leaders, and
unofficial arbitrators. Even if they do not serve concurrently, those with ten-cell or Ward
Tribunal experience are likely to be chosen as assessors, and vice versa. Village elders
accordingly have a near monopoly of control over judicial processes in rural areas of
Tanzania. In urban areas, perhaps because of greater proximity to a wider range of
judicial institutions and the declining importance of custom, recourse to elders is less
common, although ten-cell leaders do still provide adjudication. For the seventy-five
percent of Tanzanians who live in rural areas, however, courts are often not the first
recourse for disputants. Even in the course of issuing recommendations for judicial
centralization, Abedi’s 1963 report stressed the importance of non-formal adjudication,
noting that the customary practice of arbitration by village elders is an “authentic feature
of the customary system” for resolving disputes.353 He acknowledged that local people
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prefer it and make frequent use of it because it is cheap, informal, close to the litigants
involved, and it trustworthy.
Many of the judicial reforms enacted during the first years of independence tread
a fine balance between centralization and unification on the one hand and
decentralization and the preservation of locally distinct forms of law on the other. Most
serious crimes and civil cases involving over $6000 (depending on the exchange rate) are
handled in a uniform manner involving a single legal code or codes adjudicated in the
centralized judicial structure of Tanzania’s first instance and appeals courts. Petty civil
cases as well as those concerning some matters of family law begin at the quasi-judicial
level of the Ward Tribunal, but are still connected with the central judiciary. Even if these
disputes go straight to a first instance court, the rules used to govern them may vary from
place to place according to local custom as dictated by local variations on Government
Notices 279 and 436 or as explained by assessors. When it comes to more minor matters,
state law, until 1995, made provision for locally distinct answers provided by ten-cell
leaders that might never make it to court. Given the strong reasons to centralize the
judiciary following independence, as well as Nyerere’s stated intention to do so, why did
the government never achieve more than partial centralization? Below, it will become
clear that Nyerere’s reliance on rural elites, usually former chiefs, in implementing his
economic reforms gave the rural elites sufficient relative capacity to protect locally
distinct customary law.
In Malawi, the trajectory has been far more halting, and reversed itself several
times. A full explication of the case is beyond the scope of a brief comparison with the
events in Tanzania as they are outlined up to this point, but even brief reference to the
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events taking place immediately south of Tanzania’s border is interesting from a
comparative perspective. Where Nyerere sought to bring the structure of customary
adjudication under state control by creating local level adjudication, he stripped it of
decentralizing tendencies by attempting to replace the vast majority of local laws with a
central legal code. In Malawi, no such attempt was made. Malawi’s first postindependence President, Hastings Banda, came to power as leader of an anti-colonial
independence movement, in a similar fashion to Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah of
Ghana. Instead of eliminating tribal courts, however, he created a parallel justice system,
where state courts and local courts had concurrent power. Instead of abolishing
chieftaincies and creating non-tribal institutions to take their place, Banda coopted the
colonial system and took control of it.354 He made chiefs reliant on his patronage, and
replaced those who resisted him.355 Having created a class of dependent traditional
authorities, he then granted concessions to them in turn. Rather than negotiating specific
areas of the law that might remain under local customary control, or attempting to codify
customary law to bring it under the purview of the state, Banda granted state recognition
to customary, tribal courts that formed an entirely separate court system.356 Later attempts
to centralize the judiciary were impeded by the very fact that these former Banda loyalists
were unwilling to relinquish the power he had given them, and had an easy avenue to
coordination with one another through the chiefs’ council that Banda had formed.
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Capturing the Rural Elite

With an understanding of legal pluralism in Tanzania in place, it is possible to
turn back to the causal argument. In the section covering the colonial era, it was
established that levels of support for locally distinct customary law were high enough for
it to retain salience in the post-independence era. That precondition being met, however,
bargaining between groups and the process of political coalition building is the most
proximate cause of the level and type of judicial decentralization. In Tanzania, the first
push for centralization came soon after independence, as did the coalition building that
tempered its reach. After the initial level of centralization was set in 1962-4, it was tested
once in 1970-1 before both sides widely accepted the status quo. Minor attempts to
further centralize in the 1990s and 2013 failed, reinforcing the necessity of partial
centralization to all parties. The period from 1962-4 receives the most detailed treatment
here for its role in establishing the partial centralization that persists, at least on paper,
today.
Following independence, Nyerere was elected to the presidency of Tanzania with
over 99% of the vote. Equipped with a strong mandate, Nyerere identified economic
development and the propagation of a national identity that would eliminate any tendency
toward inter-tribal conflict as his two central priorities. In his inaugural address, he
outlined his goals for the first ten years of Tanganyika’s independence, putting the
greatest emphasis on the fight against hunger, poverty, and disease.357 Ideologically,
Nyerere was committed to socialism, but rather than try to translate the ideas of Marx,
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Trotsky, and other theorists of collectivism, Nyerere developed a new, context-specific
form of socialism that, as Hyden explains, “explicitly stressed the use of local ideas and
resources.”358 In 1967, Nyerere gave a speech to an assembly of TANU representatives
that for the first time, fully articulated the political and economic philosophy that he had
begun to put into practice in 1962. He labeled his philosophy “ujamaa”, a Kiswahili word
meaning “extended family,” which he coined in a 1961 paper titled “Ujamaa—The Basis
of African Socialism.” 359 Over time, it became known as a uniquely Tanzanian form of
socialism.
The first elements of ujamaa were put into effect in 1962. To achieve needed
economic development, Nyerere drew on proposals that the World Bank had drafted
during a visit to Tanganyika in 1960, during the transition to independence. The World
Bank report suggested “planned and supervised settlement of areas which are at present
uninhabited or thinly inhabited” to improve agricultural output.360 Most of these
proposals involved reforms in rural areas where the capacity of rural elites was relatively
high. Nyerere acknowledged that the government’s lack of resources would prevent it
from being able to subsidize individual family farms. He therefore announced that,
following the World Bank’s plans, “for the next few years, Government will be doing all
it can to enable the farmers of Tanganyika to come together in village communities,”
which he saw as the only way of providing equal access to tractors, schools, hospitals,
clean drinking water, and other goods.361 The resulting plan, fully articulated in 1967,
began as a voluntary effort to urge farmers to relocate to under populated areas of the
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country and, in more densely populated areas, to persuade families to live more closely
together to share agricultural implements and one another’s labor. To fulfill some of the
promises TANU made its supporters before independence and to eliminate potential
obstacles to the new development agenda, Nyerere adopted two controversial policies
within his first year and a half in office: he nationalized all land in Tanganyika, and
eliminated the chieftaincy.
In 1962, shortly after assuming the presidency, the Tanganyikan government
adopted a socialist land policy in Tanganyika and made the “state the ultimate trustee of
all land and rule[d] out individual freeholding.”362 Nyerere had publicly argued for state
control of land during the campaign for independence. In 1958, in a pamphlet written on
property rights, he explains that because “we are mere tenants over land that does not
actually, belong to us” it is impermissible to “distribute this land to other persons….”363
Land that had been held in the trust of the community would now transfer to national
ownership. Referring to the pre-colonial era, he argues, “In the past, when our population
was divided into different tribal groups, the land belonged to the particular tribe living on
it. In future, however, our population will be united as one nation, and the land will
belong to the nation.”364 Nyerere understood that ujamaa could not proceed under a
system of private ownership. Farmers would not voluntarily move away from land that
they owned, which would hinder resettlement schemes, and there was insufficient public
land for the creation of communal villages. Although the reforms quickly generated
opposition, especially among farmers who lost valuable plots to redistribution or
villagization schemes, Nyerere saw nationalization as the first step in the larger process
362
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of achieving economic development. His preliminary pamphlet on the topic generated
widespread support in rural areas, so Nyerere had good reason to believe that the policy
would succeed despite opposition from some landholders and rural elites.365
Although they were optimistic that many of their reforms would be popular,
Nyerere and his ruling party colleagues had observed that most resistance to colonial
policies came from tribal chiefs. Even when chiefs capitulated, dissidents could organize
themselves around a rival chief. During the years of transition toward self-rule, most
villagers refused to join TANU until their chief had already done so.366 In light of their
strong capacity to organize resistance and their perceived ambivalence about the new
ruling party, Nyerere decided to remove the possible threat. In 1962, TANU officials
began to request that chiefs voluntarily resign, and those who failed to resign were told
that they must do so by the end of the year.367 In 1963, the African Chiefs Ordinance
(Repeal) Act abolished the institution of the chieftaincy entirely, and later in the same
year, the Chiefs (Abolition of Office: Consequential Provisions) Act made it illegal for
former chiefs to seek judicial redress for loss of office.368
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To replace the structure of tribal authority, Nyerere and his advisors instituted an
elaborate system of overlapping local committees, all of which were connected to the
single party then governing Tanzania. At the very most local level, the ten-house cell
system organized every village into groupings of ten houses that elected a leader to
represent the cell to the local TANU office, manage security, and perform basic judicial
functions for its households.369 These leaders were accountable to two types of local
administration: village and ward committees, which were part of Tanzania’s local
government structure, and local TANU party offices and the TANU Youth League,
which were under party control.370 Some cell leaders were also elected to membership in
local government offices.371 The shift from rule by chiefs to rule by political party bound
citizens directly to the state through the ten-house cell system and created a two-way
conduit of information: cell leaders reported local affairs to district party and government
officers, and transmitted ideological statements and reform prerogatives to their local
constituents.
Another of Nyerere’s reform platforms, national unification, envisioned a wide
range of projects to forge a national identity and sense of cooperation. Nyerere’s speeches
from the period demonstrate his awareness of the devastating consequences of tribal
conflict in neighboring countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As early
as 1955, he explained to the United Nations that one of TANU’s main concerns was “to
build up a national consciousness among the African peoples in Tanganyika,” and that to
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do so, it was necessary “to break up this tribal consciousness among the people and to
build up a national consciousness.”372 The judicial centralization project described above
formed part of this same effort to combat tribalism. Nyerere believed that creating a
single judiciary and, more importantly, unifying customary law would weaken tribal
loyalty while still infusing the judicial system with a distinctly African, customary
character, which was necessary for the government’s bona fides as protector of African
family structure and traditional identity (see below for more on this). Tanganyika was the
first African country to attempt to codify and unify customary law.373 It was the instigator
of the international conference on customary law and the state that had progressed the
furthest in its thinking on customary law because the President stressed that “a unified
code was important for the building of a nation.”374
In his inaugural address in 1962, Nyerere announced the creation of a Ministry of
National Culture and Youth, whose first task would be to compile the traditions and
customs of Tanganyika’s tribes to form a national culture.375 As part of the project of
national transformation, school curriculums across the country were standardized and
Kiswahili was introduced as the universal language of instruction, in the hope that it
would soon become the lingua franca.376 Nyerere also prioritized Africanization, the
replacement of colonial British personnel with Tanganyikan staff, and by 1966 the
process had been completed in two thirds of the lower rungs of the bureaucracy.377
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Africanization and the creation of a national school system succeeded within the first
decade of independence. Although it took longer, Kiswahili did become the national
language following its classroom use by generations of Tanzanian schoolchildren.
Taken together, ujamaa and its concurrent centralization and bureaucratization
measures constituted an enormously ambitious project to remake Tanzania. Old
hierarchical tribal structures and forms of loyalty were dismantled by eliminating the
chieftaincy and physically resettling Tanzania’s new citizens into sub-units that could be
monitored by the one party system and organized by units of local government. Disputes
that would have been taken to the village headman or local chief to resolve were now
directed to the 10-house cell leader or the village chairman. Local youth, instead of
entering the ceremonial warrior class after attaining majority, joined the TANU youth
league. Scott argues that villagization can best be interpreted as a “high modernist”
attempt to “reconfigure the rural population into a form that would allow the state to
impose its development agenda and, in the process, to control the work and production of
the cultivators.”378 Nyerere’s speeches point to the nation-building character that he
attempted to infuse into much of the reform process including the goals of equality
between Tanzanian citizens, preventing class and tribal warfare, and furthering the
principles of dignity and self-reliance. But ujamaa, first and foremost, was a program of
economic development.379
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Other post-independence African states used chiefs in their development plans in
much the same way that colonial officials had. Mamdani argues that in the many African
states that failed to do away with chiefly power (and in some of those that did), the same
traditional authorities who came to power through indirect rule continued to govern after
independence, perpetuating the colonial structure of rule with African elites replacing
colonial administrators.380 In Malawi, for example, President Banda used chiefs to corral
votes, oversee development projects, and preside as judges in special, executive-branch
controlled courts that were sometimes used to persecute political opponents. Without
chiefs to oversee villagization, agricultural reforms, and other components of ujamaa,
Nyerere and TANU required a sufficiently strong coalition to make sure that their
reforms not only became law in Parliament, but also were carried out on the ground. This
coalition necessarily had to involve rural elites, who had the most influence in the
countryside, where most of the reforms would take place. In this particular domain, elite
capacity was relatively high compared to that of the state, so the state needed to build a
rural-national coalition to implement its reforms.
If the political coalition hypothesis is correct, it should be possible to find several
indicators of its presence, even if no direct statements from Nyerere or TANU attest to
the tradeoff between customary law and other goals. These indicators include the
presence of opposition signals by TANU of willingness to attenuate or alter some sets of
policies when confronted with opposition; and, to establish the place of judicial
centralization in the larger process of bargaining, evidence that halting judicial
centralization was timed to coincide with quelling opposition. Additionally, it should be
possible to find evidence that Nyerere and other TANU politicians prioritized other
380

Mamdani 1996.

151
policy goals higher than that of judicial centralization, and that they were less willing to
compromise concerning these reforms. The evidence is in fact consistent with these
expectations.
Within a year of Nyerere’s election, pockets of opposition to TANU had begun to
develop in rural areas, including places such as Sukumaland, which had served as
TANU’s strongest recruiting ground only years before. TANU’s success at gaining a
strong following in the late 1950s was largely predicated on its ability to present an
effective critique of the colonial regime’s policies. The most widely hated colonial
policies involved changes to traditional methods of agriculture and tax collection. The
post-independence policies went even further to transform rural agriculture, and quickly
generated dissent. Hyden argues that Nyerere’s commitment to multiracialism and his
decision to nationalize all land generated the most dissent, which created widespread
opposition movements in 1962 through 1964.381 Although popular support for Nyerere
remained strong, TANU became so unpopular in some regions of Tanganyika that during
the District Council of 1963, just a year after Nyerere and TANU’s decisive victory,
some of TANU activists who had played a role in the struggle for independence failed to
be reelected to office.
The two primary centers for opposition to TANU were two rival political parties:
the Tanganyika African National Congress (ANC) and the People’s Democratic Party
(PDP). The ANC was founded by Zuberi Mtemvu in 1958 after a disagreement over
TANU’s willingness to participate in the pre-independence elections of 1958.382 Its
platform was, according to Hyden, traditionalist. Although it promoted some arguably
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leftist ideas such as a refusal to cooperate with multiracialism (in post-independence
Tanganyika, multiracialism referred to protections for European and Asian land rights in
Tanganyika), it drew most of its support from chiefs and other local elites who opposed
the abolition of the chieftaincy.383 In Sukumaland, the local ANC leader explained that
the difference between ANC and TANU was that ANC favored freedom for Africans
only, “whereas TANU was a multi-racial [read: European-favoring] party,” and that the
ANC “wished chiefs to retain their positions” after independence.384 Many ANC leaders
were chiefs or sub-chiefs who had lost their position under British rule, and hoped to
regain it after independence.385 ANC also opposed chiefs who favored TANU or who lent
their voice to liberal projects such as inter-tribal social integration or land
nationalization.386
The People’s Democratic Party was founded in 1962 by a former TANU
parliamentarian, C. K. Tumbo, who believed that TANU had not been radical enough in
its approach.387 The PDP gained a strong following among the Sukuma, particularly after
David Kidaha Makwaia, a prominent former chief, joined its ranks and began to recruit
followers.388 Maguire argues “That the government was gravely concerned about the
prospects for the organization and articulation of opposition sentiments in
Sukumaland…could not have been made more clear than by the stern steps of deportation
taken against them.”389 In other regions of Tanganyika, PDP failed to gain a local
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following, but other, non party-affiliated opposition movements proliferated after
independence. In Buhaya, a consortium of teachers, many of them already elected to the
District Council on the TANU platform, decided to run as independents during the 1963
District Council elections.390 They won half of the local seats, but were ousted when the
Minister of the Interior dissolved the Council and appointed local TANU supporters in
place of the independence candidates. During the same 1963 District Council Elections,
independents also won a quarter of the seats in Chaggaland until they were similarly
dismissed.391 Hyden argues that the success of independent candidates in 1963
demonstrates that “some of the locally important groups had not been fully assimilated
into the ranks of the party.”392
In order for controversial reforms to move forward, TANU needed local elites—
usually, former chiefs and traditional authorities—to lend them their support because, in
most areas of Tanganyika, chiefly power retained salience even after the abolition of the
chieftaincy. Surveys at the time show that few people openly opposed abolition, but few
people supported it either.393 Well over 80% of survey respondents among the Haya tribe
agreed that one-party rule was necessary for good governance, and over 90% agree that
eliminating the patronage system surrounding the chieftaincy was a good thing.394 At the
same time, fewer than 5% listed the abolition of traditional authorities as having had a
positive influence in their life.395 In 1965, surveys among the Nyamwezi determined that
chiefs still played an important role in rural life.396 80% of local leaders (defined as
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members of local government and TANU) still believed that “a man should always obey
his traditional chief,” and 98.5% of non-leaders believed the same.397 Hyden finds that in
the Buhaya tribal region, former chiefs “remained influential among those who still
believed in the validity of the traditional Haya myth.”398 Support for ten-house cell
leaders was high, but support for TANU and local government officials was mixed; of
those who supported either, few knew the function of various village officers.399 When
villagers supported TANU officials, it was often for reasons other than political ideology,
such as a personal or family connection within the village. Also, many former chiefs and
sub chiefs became party officials. Maguire finds that in Sukumaland, half to two thirds of
Divisional and Assistant Divisional Executive Officers were drawn from former
traditional authorities.400 According to Miller, of 108 chiefs and village headmen in
power when the chieftaincy was eliminated, 93 later obtained a position in the local
government or TANU regional office.401 In other regions where chiefs were less
successful, 25-35% were still able to find influential government jobs.402 Most villagers
continued to feel more connected to fellow villagers and traditional institutions than to
the new party structure, which made it difficult for TANU to achieve compliance with
some of its new laws, particularly those involving agricultural reform and villagization,
which aimed to physically resettle large numbers of Tanzanians.
Nyerere’s speeches from before independence and during the first few years of his
presidency reflect a keen understanding of the need for popular support of his reforms.

397

Ibid., 278.
Hyden 1968, 133.
399
Many ten-cell leaders were former traditional authorities. See Miller 1966, 280-290.
400
Maguire, 334.
401
Miller 1968, 191.
402
Ibid.
398

155
He argued, “the peace resulting from imposed law is short-lived. The moment a man feels
himself strong enough he tries to throw off this law and substitute another more to his
liking. Or he may even break out in sheer destructive desperation if the law appears to
him to be threatening his life or that of his family…".403 An early presidential
commission established to determine the long-term viability of one party rule noted that
its recommendations must be tempered with consideration to the President’s strong
feeling that “Democratic government cannot be practised [sic] nor individual rights
protected in a society torn by internal disorder. For a young nation, public order is
precious but it is also fragile.”404 In 1963, Nyerere noted, with respect to his economic
reforms, “All schemes must be drawn up in relation to the people who are most directly
concerned in them, and the amount of cultural change required should not be greater than
they can accommodate.”405
The later failure of TANU’s villagization project illustrates that the government
was not always capable of legislating within the bounds of what ordinary Tanzanians
might accept, but certainly to begin with, there is evidence that TANU was aware of
growing opposition and worked to find ways to make their platform more palatable.
Nyerere’s primary means of lobbying for his reforms, both before and after
independence, was to couch his ideas in traditionalist terms that presented them as a
familiar and authentically African form of power relations that predated the despised
colonial laws. Tradition lent legitimacy because it evoked a now long-distant but
seemingly better time before the introduction of taxes, cattle dipping, etc.
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In 1958, in a pamphlet on property relations, he wrote “By his traditions, the
African knows that the land belongs to his tribe and that he has traditional rights over that
land.”406 The pamphlet, and others like it, extend this idea to make the case for promoting
the nationalization of land. In a paper published in 1961, Nyerere makes the case for
socialism by analogizing nation and tribe; just as individuals were rich or poor
“according to whether the whole tribe was rich or poor,” the material well being of
individual citizens depends on the nation’s prosperity.407 In 1963, in a pamphlet prepared
to defend the idea of one-party rule, Nyerere contends that Africa was democratic before
the advent of colonialism because elders gathered under a tree to discuss village affairs
and decide matters together, and that TANU fulfills the same role at a larger scale via
representatives.408 Crucially, the basis of ujamaa was the traditional African family. In
these disparate policy areas, as well as with agricultural reform, education, villagization,
and other matters, Nyerere reaches for tribe, patriarchal family organization, and the
authority of village elders to explain and justify his reforms. In places, he even cites
customary law.409
Mamdani identifies the post-independence reference to tradition as a continentwide strategy adopted by new rulers to preserve or reinforce colonial barriers between the
educated, urban ruling elite and the uneducated rural peasant class to circumscribe
privilege. The seeming contradiction between frequent reference to the virtues of
traditional African values and anti-tradition policies such as eliminating the chieftaincy
and moving to restrict customary law arguably lend support to Mamdani’s contention. It
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misses, however, both the difficulty and necessity of building a coalition of local elites
who might support TANU’s post-independence program, particularly since its
continuation of taxes and agricultural reforms was bound to, and did, generate dissent.
Having eliminated the chieftaincy and put into place a plan to centralize customary law,
Nyerere was, as demonstrated, at risk of losing support from rural elites who had
succeeded in retaining influence at the local level through TANU party and local
government positions. As argued above, these elites, having helped to craft customary
law, and relying on it for much of their power, would not support policies that weakened
it. His framing of reform issues in traditional terms could not be credible if his new laws
enfeebled or eradicated the institutions on which he claimed to base ujamaa.
Having disbanded the chieftaincy, both as a means of launching the nationbuilding project that must begin with the erosion of tribal identity and eliminating
possible rallying points of opposition, Nyerere’s proposals to substitute local customary
law with a unified code threatened the main sources of revenue and influence that
empowered former chiefs, sub chiefs, and village heads even without their former titles.
Because ordinary Tanzanians continued to express allegiance to former chiefs, the
support of those chiefs was crucial to effecting reform. In fact, when political
participation declined after independence, the party asked village elders to enlist new
members because “it was hoped that these elders would be more acceptable to the
ordinary citizen than the…Youth League contingents,” who were restricted to activities
overseen by the elders.410 Their outsize political influence gave their preferences greater
weight at the national level.
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Lineage heads and village elders traditionally held the right to the fruits of labor
from their daughter-in-laws’ children and the power to allocate land within the family
and to negotiate marriages. They accordingly resisted those elements of the new
economic and social order that diminished their influence. Compulsory schooling took
away from time that children spent laboring for village elders.411 Resettlement
jeopardized their ability to allocate land and proposed reforms to family law threatened
one of their most valuable resources: the wealth of cattle paid to them at their daughters’
marriage. Lineage heads and elders consequently found elaborate ways of bringing social
pressure and shame to bear on their children to ensure compliance with the old order
despite government reforms.412 Any woman who complained to the courts was usually
expelled from her home and kept away from her children, and she would be considered
socially dangerous.413 Lwoga notes that in the village of Bigwa, when peasants were
ordered to relocate as part of the villagization scheme, village elders refused to go and
initiated a long-running dispute with higher authorities in Dar es Salaam, which they
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won.414 Rwezaura documents village elites orchestrating thefts from ujamaa villages to
protest their existence.415
Although nation-building and other reforms were important to Nyerere, there is
no question that economic development came first and foremost, and that he was willing
to forego success elsewhere to achieve development. In August of 1964, Nyerere
contended “As circumstances change—and are changed by us—so the emphasis we can
give to the social, economic, and political freedoms will also change. At present,
however, we have to face the fact that in general terms the freedom for all to live
a decent life must take priority. Development must be considered first, and other
matters examined in relation to it. Our question with regard to every matter—even
the issue of individual freedom—must be “How does this affect the progress of
our Development Plan?416
In 1965, he emphasized that economic development relied, above all, on agriculture, in
the following terms: “Agricultural progress is indeed the basis of Tanzanian
development—and thus of a better standard of living for the people of Tanzania.”417 If
former chiefs and village heads actively opposed agricultural development policies, they
could (and as demonstrated, sometimes did) have a deleterious effect on creating the
needed agricultural surpluses. As Hyden argues “TANU was anxious not to take
unpopular measures…Government policies slipped as a result of peasant indifference to
their demands.”418 Nyerere’s stated priorities and his willingness to compromise are
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strong indicators that his reversal on judicial centralization was due to a need to win rural
support for his reforms.
Furthermore, there was a financial cost to arresting the course of judicial
centralization, which implies that it would only have been seriously considered if there
were benefits to outweigh the cost. The creation of a unified customary law code was
completed in 1963 for Tanzania’s patriarchal tribes, which included the vast majority of
the country, and codification of matrilineal law was not anticipated in the short term. The
capital required to interview locals about local customary law had already been spent.
Also, allowing districts to submit modifications to the code, or to opt out entirely, added
administrative expenses. Additionally, magistrates had already been posted to most rural
courts, and more were in training. Adding assessors to primary courts for the purpose of
advising on local customary law increased the judicial budget and tripled the number of
individuals required in any given court session. The gains that accrued from halting
judicial centralization must have outweighed the added capital outlay, particularly given
Nyerere’s stated preference for the adoption of a uniform customary code. Given that
there were no economic or ideological motivations for arresting the course of
centralization, political tradeoffs are the most likely reason for it.
No records exist to document negotiations between rural elites and TANU
officials, nor are there transcripts of parliamentary sessions or other documentary
evidence detailing TANU’s decision to abandon judicial centralization to ward off
opposition. However, TANU’s demonstrated need for the support of village elders in
implementing policy, especially given the abolition of the chieftaincy; Nyerere’s
demonstrated ability to prioritize goals and to decelerate or halt unpopular measures; the
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strong preference of rural elites for locally distinct customary law; and the lack of
alternate reasons for abandoning the carefully planned process of centralization create the
strong inference that partial centralization was the result of political compromise. The
timing of the reforms points to this conclusion as well. The abandonment of a unified
customary law did not entirely forestall opposition in Tanzania, but it coincided with the
end of opposition based on the idea of restoring the positions of former chiefs and the
participation of chiefs in opposition parties. Maguire argues that the inability of rival
parties to rally the support of greater numbers of rural supporters presaged their demise
and the nearly universal support for the transformation to a one party state.419 The
transition fundamentally changed the nature of opposition—challenges would now come
to particular policies, such as villagization, rather than to Nyerere’s or TANU’s rule.420
Widespread opposition to TANU policies did unfold in the second half of the 60s,
particularly after Nyerere announced widespread villagization in the 1967 Arusha
Declaration, in which he launched the comprehensive development plan that he called
ujamaa, drawing on a term he had used earlier to describe African socialism.421
Encouraging farmers to live in close-knit settlements where they could share goods and
labor had been party policy since independence, but villagization took the idea of
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communal living much further. Villagization schemes moved farmers from their
farmland into villages, where they were governed by the 10-house cell system.
Villagization also collectivized labor; the new villagers were expected to farm
surrounding land collectively, sharing profits equally between households.422 Nyerere
hoped that the creation of cooperative villages would facilitate the introduction of new
agricultural methods and projects, which were planned by agricultural experts in the
central government.423
The resulting movement of people was, according to Hyden, “the largest
resettlement effort in the history of Africa.”424 For communities that resettled voluntarily,
Nyerere promised wells, piped water, schools, and other development projects.425 The
policy was made compulsory in 1973, but even then, compliance was not universal.
Coulson demonstrates the many ways in which farmers resisted state sponsored
agriculture programs from 1946 through 1976 by sabotaging crop production, machinery,
and refusing to move.426 Once the new villages had been established, Walsh observes,
“the village government was only as effective as local interests would allow.”427 Farmers
often fled their new village. In Seeing Like a State, Scott argues that even Nyerere was
surprised by the brutality that was required to forcibly move farmers off their land.428
Nyerere chose to make villagization optional to begin with because, as Maguire argues,
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he had learned that “if compulsion and resistance were not to feed on each other,”
changes were necessary that would reduce government coercion.429
Accordingly, Nyerere went to great lengths to persuade his citizens that
villagization brought tangible benefits. To convince the people of the Dodoma Region to
move into ujamaa villages in 1970, Nyerere spent a “long time” living in an early ujamaa
village, Chamwino, to demonstrate its benefits, and afterward toured other villages to
urge farmers to relocate.430 As with his efforts to eliminate opposition to agricultural
reforms in the early 1960s, Nyerere again moved to further restrict the lingering influence
of traditional authority, to further enmesh former chiefs into the party structure, and to
maintain a balance between standardizing legal rules and giving local customs legal
stature, this time with the regulation of marriage and divorce. With the African Chiefs
Act of 1969, the Tanzanian Government eliminated the last official remnants of chiefly
power by barring former chiefs from exercising any function under customary law or any
other form of authority. The Act was designed to eliminate the vestiges of chiefs’
authority gleaned from citizens’ unofficial recourse to former chiefs as a source of
dispute resolution.431 At the same time, the government’s passage of Government Acts
219 and 219A of 1969, which established Ward Tribunals, paved the way for chiefs to
continue to exercise power, but on behalf of the Tanzanian government and TANU.
Miller finds that local TANU officials often approached former chiefs to ask their help in
mobilizing local support, particularly in increasing agricultural production and other
“issues which required mobilization for an unpopular cause, or one requiring a great deal
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of individual labor without visible rewards.”432 In this particular area, the state’s capacity
was lower than that of local elites. Finally, the Law of Marriage Act, described above,
which was originally intended to standardize marriage and divorce law, was written in
such a way as to allow local variations to persist.433
The same sequence of events involving controversial government policies
coupled with the elimination of rival sources of power or their cooptation to serve
government purposes, further combined with careful avoidance of curtailing the powers
accorded rural elites through customary law, played out in both 1962-64 and 1969-71. Its
duplication suggests that judicial centralization was a bargaining piece in the
government’s attempt to win loyalty from rural elites. The fierce opposition to attempts to
further centralize law in the 1990s and 2013 suggests that the accommodations granted
concerning locally distinct customary law are still strongly protected by select
communities. An effort in the 1990s to create a uniform law of inheritance along the lines
of the Law of Marriage Act (1971) was so controversial that the Law Reform
Commission’s report on the law was immediately made confidential, and it remains
impossible to obtain a copy.434 Debate over removing the binding vote of assessors in
magistrate courts brought Tanzania’s parliament to a near shutdown during the spring of
2013, and the government was forced to withdraw its proposal in the face of massive
resistance, particularly from parliamentarians from rural and strongly Muslim districts.435
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Because rural elites, whose support was necessary for effecting reform, prioritized the
retention of locally distinct customary law, Nyerere slowed the process of judicial
centralization to prevent their opposition to his policies. The resulting partial
centralization has become strongly institutionalized. As will be seen in the next section,
however, change is beginning to favor further centralization.

Fifty Years Later: The Slow Erosion of Customary Law

In 2013, fifty years after the Parliament session that gave rise to the Magistrates
Courts Act and Government Notices 279 and 436, concerning the unification of
customary law, much of Nyerere’s vision of judicial centralization had come to pass.
These laws are still in effect, but the sections that allow for local variation in customary
law are rarely invoked, and it is common for magistrates to ignore customary law
entirely, except through the advice of the court assessors. Today, Tanzania’s judicial
system is mostly centralized, and although some legal matters are resolved in venues
other than state courts, no secondary system, recognized or not, vies for litigants or settles
large disputes in a routinized manner. For the most part, the adjudication that takes place
elsewhere than in primary courts happens within local government structures such as the
ten-cell system.
Centralization was achieved not through changes of policy in the permissibility of
using local customary law, but through the lengthy process of nation building that
Nyerere put into place.436 Three elements of his program, in particular, caused important
changes. The first is the adoption of Swahili as a national language. Although local
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languages still thrive, all Tanzanians speak Swahili and can thus travel from one region to
another without encountering language barriers, which has had a strong unifying effect.
The language used in courts is Swahili, so there is no longer concern that people might
not understand an esoteric court language, as is still the case in some states that have
preserved English in the judiciary (such as Malawi). Second, the introduction of
mandatory education exposed Tanzanians to a curriculum that teaches national history at
the expense of local tribal history.437 As a result, many young Tanzanians know the
names of important independence-era politicians, but few are able to say for sure who
used to be a chief in the tribe, or which of their schoolmates might once have been chief
or sub chief.438
Perhaps most vitally, Nyerere brought about the vast movement of people across
territory, both through villagization, but also through smaller, but more lasting,
mechanism of rotating government officials through posts and sending children to
different districts for different phases of their schooling. Although this last practice is
beginning to weaken, official policy for most of the 1970s-90s was for students who
qualified for anything beyond primary education to pursue their studies far from home,
housed in government dormitories, and for secondary and tertiary education, they would
move again. Many people met spouses or found employment far away from where they
grew up, with the result of a large-scale intermixing of languages and cultures.439 This
process is credited with increasing diversity across Tanzania and weakening tribal
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loyalty.440 Urbanization has also speeded this process. Magistrates were also rotated
through posts fairly frequently, with the result that they never gained proficiency in the
local form of customary law, and came to rely more on the unified version published in
the Government Notices. As the cases that came to courts more commonly involved a
mixture of tribal backgrounds and magistrates knew less of local custom, the use of
locally distinct customary law declined.
Although magistrates-in-training do study customary law, they spend the bulk of
their time on Tanzania’s civil and criminal law codes. Even at the primary court level,
where customary law most often makes an appearance, magistrates are unable to say
what the codified customary law rule is for a particular question, whereas they are more
likely to know the relevant portion of the civil law code without needing to look it up. All
of this means that custom is used less frequently in the courts as time progresses, and
when “custom” is used, it takes the form more of common sense than of codified law. For
example, in Iringa Mjini primary court, the magistrate issued a judgment in a case
involving a local woman and the driver of one of the private shared vans that provides
most transport in the area. The woman had paid a single fare for herself and her toddler,
who she held in her lap, but when she grew tired she placed the child on the seat next to
her. The driver demanded extra payment for the child, the woman refused, and so the
man removed the child from the van and then locked the woman and the other passengers
inside the van until she paid. She began to hit him, and a fight resulted in which the driver
was slightly injured. The driver was the complainant in the case, wanting compensation
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for the assault. The magistrate acknowledged that assault had taken place but, with the
consent of the assessors, advised the complainant that separating a toddler from his
mother was unpardonable, and that the result of doing so was foreseeable. He accordingly
dismissed the case on the grounds of lack of evidence, which he describes as a common
means of dismissing cases where achieving any real justice would either be impossible
based on the original suit, or so time-consuming as to not be worth it.441
Locally distinct custom, that linked originally to the tribe, mostly survives
through the position of court assessor. Assessors base their recommendations mostly on
local customary law or, sometimes, on the practicalities of the case or their knowledge of
the litigants. They are given a minimal stipend, and many of them are quite old, so there
have been problems with absenteeism from court. Because the court cannot hear a case in
the absence of either assessor, the result can be massive delays and backlogs of cases.442
Many magistrates, frustrated with the assessors’ lack of legal education, fail to consult
the assessors entirely, or neglect to inform them that their vote is binding.443 Accordingly,
the Attorney General’s office has introduced a bill to eliminate the position of court
assessor entirely, which most magistrates support.444 However, several MPs from
predominately Muslim and rural areas have blocked a second reading of the bill,
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threatening to shut Parliament down if the bill progresses to a second reading. For now,
the official level of centralization continues to be protected by the same coalition as when
it was originally established.
Outside of the court system, customary law continues to thrive, but in a modified
sense. The Ward Tribunals are now mostly used as the first step for adjudicating land
disputes, with appeals possible at the High Court level, and the Ward Tribunals do use
custom. Likewise, the ten-cell system continues to thrive, and most disputes that
eventually wind up in primary courts start at the ten-cell level, where elders use custom to
decide the questions brought to them. In both Ward Tribunals and ten-cell adjudication
sessions, custom has changed, and now mostly refers to a participant-driven process that
uses few set rules and relies much more heavily on the values and interests of the parties
involved. Compensation is regularly used, and everyone is given a turn to speak without
formal rules of evidence or procedure. In many ways, customary law as practiced today
more closely resembles the descriptions of customary law found in books on pre-colonial
law, as opposed to the codified and hierarchical systems established by the British. For
example, in Lushoto district, the practice of formal bride wealth payments has nearly
disappeared, and it is now more common for the groom’s family to give gifts such as
blankets, cookware, money, or chickens to the parents and uncle of the bride, who would
once have been the recipients of bride wealth payments.445 The one major exception to
this is in land disputes and inheritance, where it is quite common for elder male relatives
to use local custom to dispossess widows, particularly in patriarchal areas.446 Although
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disputes are sometimes settled outside of the formal court system and the party system,
most cases of a more than trivial nature are soon brought to one or the other.447
A focus group meeting conducted in a court in Iringa, a small city in the south of
Tanzania, illustrates the general attitudes toward the provision of justice. The magistrate
had just issued a judgment in the case concerning a local woman and driver described
above, and the magistrates, assessors, and magistrates-in-training gathered to discuss the
case, the ruling, and other interesting cases of the day. Several times, the question of the
place of customary law in primary courts came up. At one point, Andrew, the magistrate
who had issued the ruling, asked if it would be better to simply eliminate customary law
entirely. The resulting conversation ensued:

Male assessor 1: It is better for people to stick to customs because every place in Tanzania is
different. It is good for them to follow their customs, because to adopt other customs makes
people live not according to their specified place in life.
Magistrate (Mbeya): Due to developments and technology, it is better to eliminate customary law
because some of it is discriminatory, and it is bad for people.
Magistrate (Mjini): I prefer that customary law continue to exist but in a form that is in accordance
with the state law because if you have a custom that is contrary to the law, it must, by definition,
be bad or discriminatory, for example female mutilation. Customs should continue through law
because it makes people get along with one another better in the village and makes them continue
to have good relations with the government.
Female assessor: Customs prevail to prevent ethics from being destroyed.
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Male magistrate-in-training 1: It is better to leave custom in place because it helps kids learn good
behavior, but you have to adhere only to that customs that lead to a better society
Magistrate (Mbeya): But what is really the difference between customs and norms and laws?
Magistrate (Mjini): Where does law come from? It must come from norms, and there is a fine line
between customs and norms
Magistrate (Mbeya): But doesn’t all law in Tanzania come from Europe?
Magistrate (Mjini): Some of it does, but norms are what creates laws, and how life is lived from
day to day creates norms, so law comes from daily life. At least, it should. In law school we were
taught that customary law is made up of norms that are so generally applicable that they can be
enforced because they are expected.
Male assessor 1: I remember a case from my village where the elders of the village ruled that a
man should be punished by caning. The circumstances were that the man had refused to attend
local funerals when his neighbors died.448 Later, someone in his family died, and all of the other
villagers attended the funeral to condole with him. At the same time, they asked him if he had
been sick at the other funerals, and, when he said no, the elders voted to punish him by caning him
in front of the village for breaking the law.
Magistrate (Mbeya): These elders were not in a position to punish this man. This is horrible, the
man was not accused and he was not brought to court. They cannot just act like a court, they
should go to jail for assault!
Magistrate (Mjini): Yes, but it is all very complicated, because for the villagers, they were
enforcing the law. What would they have said in court?

This conversation reflects a wider debate across Tanzania about the place of custom in
law. In general, there is widespread support for the preservation of custom as a valued
piece of African and Tanzanian identity, and as a necessary means of instilling values in
young people and ensuring harmony within communities. However, there is an increasing
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discomfort with custom as a judicial matter, particularly as women’s rights groups and
international organizations bring to light the systematic use of customary law to
impoverish rural women and children.449
The role of custom in Tanzania is further complicated by the growth of the
Muslim community on the mainland. Tanzanian law does not recognize Islamic religious
law (sharia) other than as part of local customary law, with the major exception of the
island of Zanzibar, which joined then-Tanganyika to form Tanzania using a federal-style
arrangement that permitted Zanzibar to leave Islamic law as its primary legal system.
Because there is no codified version of sharia, at least not in the Tanzanian judicial
system, magistrates have no way of applying customary law when cases of Muslim
family law are brought to them.450 Accordingly, many magistrates report that Muslims in
their communities tend to go to religious officials for questions of family law.451 There is
growing pressure, particularly among the Muslim community of Dar es Salaam, for the
state to create an official means of litigating sharia cases in primary courts, although
there is also resistance to this idea, particularly among those who hope to weaken the role
of customary law overall.452
There is a great deal of reform underway in the Tanzanian judiciary aimed to
remedy problems with the existing system. Currently, only a limited number of Law
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Reports are printed, so most lower courts are left without a record of High Court and
Court of Appeals cases whose precedent should inform their interpretation of the law.453
The Directorate of Local Courts is trying to find a better system, perhaps electronic, to
provide better access to the Reports.454 The project of codifying matrilineal customary
law, on hold since the 1960s, has now been restarted, and there is hope that it will reach
completion in the next calendar year.455 This time, the Tanzania Women Lawyers
Association and other rights groups are advising the process to make sure that
discriminatory processes such as unequal inheritance practices are removed. This will
have the effect of altering local law, but participants in the project are unconcerned. The
Tanzanian constitution is also being examined for the purpose of reform. The
Constitutional Reform Commission, whose members include former high court judges,
law professors and deans, and other government officials, is tasked with updating
Tanzania’s outdated constitution—or, if the task of reconciling old and new becomes too
cumbersome, writing whole sections of it anew. Perhaps necessarily, given the
composition of the Commission, the judiciary is under intense scrutiny, particularly with
regard to the appointment process for judges and the necessity of making sure that all
laws currently on the books conform to human rights standards.456
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Further centralization, the majority of commissioners agree, is inevitable. Not,
however, because Tanzania is too judicially decentralized. On the contrary, there is a
consensus that Tanzania’s judiciary is more centralized than the laws reflect, and it is
now necessary to bring the written laws into line with actual practice.457 The Ethics
Commissioner of Tanzania and the Attorney General both argue that it will be necessary
to slowly curb some of the remaining customary practices that violate human rights, but
both agree that the best way to do so is to improve education about women’s rights and
human rights, and increase the efficiency of the state courts so that they continue to
become more appealing than other, less easy to regulate venues of arbitration.458 They do
not intend to promulgate legislation proscribing the problematic practices. In this regard,
judicial centralization (and court reform, in general) continues very much along the lines
initially established by Nyerere. After all, the Ethics Commissioner pointed out, in an
echo of Nyerere, “Laws follow custom. You can’t impose strange laws, law only works if
they are approximately congruent with what people actually practice.” What began as a
necessary policy to secure elite rural support for other reforms has seemingly become an
ethic of reform in and of itself.

Conclusion
Tanzania’s trajectory of judicial decentralization is long and complicated, but
ultimately it is one of the most interesting case studies. Before the colonial era, each of
Tanzania’s tribes practiced a different form of customary law, although there were some
regional similarities in customs. During the German and British colonial periods, colonial
457
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administrators entirely remade the tribal system and, with it, customary law. The British
also used tribal group elites as their deputies, which, during the independence era, caused
nationalists and non-elites to call for the abolition of the chieftaincy, since it was so
closely linked with colonial rule. The post independence government succeeded in
eliminating the chieftaincy, and this attack on tribal elite power brought former chiefs
together, increasing their capacity to demand recognition for locally distinct customary
law, which was one of their few remaining sources of power. Because Nyerere chose to
pursue a policy of agricultural and local village reforms, he needed the support of these
former chiefs to enact them, since they took place in rural areas far from the state leaders’
center of power. Despite losing their tribal status, former chiefs were able to become
local government officials, and thus still had political saliency. The bargaining between
these group elites and the state, with group elites favoring judicial decentralization to
bolster their fading power, and the state agreeing in return for their support for ujamaa,
resulted in Tanzania adopting a partially decentralized judiciary whose form persists to
the present day.
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Chapter Four: The Incorporation of Personal Status Law in Egypt

“The study of law as a system of social control reveals what a society claims to honor and
tries to protect. The study of judicial administration discloses whether society in fact
protects what it honors, and how.”
--Galal H. El-Nahal, The Judicial Administration of Ottoman Egypt in the
Seventeenth Century.459

Introduction

The idea of one set of laws for all citizens, endorsed by Hayek and Dicey, among
other legal theorists, is only fully possible in a state that is built on John Locke’s premise,
articulated in “A Letter Concerning Toleration,” that “each of them [state and church]
contain itself within its own bounds, the one attending to the worldly welfare of the
commonwealth, the other to the salvation of soul.” In practice, this requires both that a
state’s citizens put aside their commitment to either public, state-authorized religious or
ethnic rituals and practices, and that the state make available a neutral public sphere in
which the institutions of no particular group are privileged over others, and in which
there is a minimum of interference in the commitments citizens hold in their private lives.
In most places and times, at least one of these conditions has been impossible to achieve,
making legal monism a convenient fiction, rather than an accurate descriptor of a
country’s judicial system. In Egypt, citizens remain strongly committed to religious
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identity in both the public and private sphere, and the state privileges the law of one
religion, Sunni Islam, over those of its Christian and other religious minority groups.
Egypt’s history involves, in many ways, a classic trajectory of legal centralization
from the nearly complete decentralization of the Ottoman period to its current state of
partially incorporating minority group law into state courts. Nasser’s state-building
project included eliminating sectarian courts and bringing family law almost entirely
under the state’s control. However, this project never fully succeeded. Egypt left
personal status law matters in the hands of religious authorities, resulting in a somewhat
ambiguous legal state with multiple, overlapping jurisdictions in which it is possible that
a person who has received a court-sanctioned divorce is nonetheless prohibited from
remarrying when the religious officials who govern his religious community refuse to
recognize the divorce.460 This chapter thus considers Egypt’s transition from several
centuries of widespread and institutionalized legal pluralism to a somewhat unstable form
of legal monism. It explains how variations in the relative capacities of the groups and the
state, along with changes in levels of elite coordination, resulted in the judicial
decentralization of the partial incorporation type.

Summary of Legal Pluralism in Egypt

See Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron’s excellent coverage of two recent cases in Egypt where Egyptian state
courts issued and then upheld a divorce ruling for a Copt which the Coptic church refused to recognize,
both of which prompted a lawsuit against Pope Shenouda for recognition of the divorce, without which the
persons in question could not remarry, in Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, “Divorce and Remarriage of
Orthodox Copts in Egypt: The 2008 State Council Ruling and the Amendment of the 1938 Personal Status
Regulations.” Islamic Law and Society, 18(3), 356–386.
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Before proceeding with the argument, it is worth briefly clarifying the somewhat
confusing nature of legal pluralism in contemporary Egypt. Under Ottoman rule, there
were separate personal status (family law) courts for the various non-Muslim
communities in Egypt, including the Copts, Jews, Greek Orthodox, etc. This system
continued through Mohamed Ali’s dynasty (1805-1848) and, although the subsequent
British occupation (from, effectively, 1882 to 1954) changed the court structure, it did not
eliminate separate jurisdictions for different classes of citizens. As such, during this
period Egypt can be classified as a case of full decentralization. As Egypt transitioned
toward full self-rule in the 1940s, various measures of judicial centralization were
adopted, but it wasn’t until after the 1952 revolution that Nasser, as part of his statebuilding measures, brought all courts and judicial bodies under state control by
eliminating religious courts.
In September 1955, the Egyptian government enacted the Sharia Courts and
Community Tribunals Abolition Act, also known as Law No. 462, which eliminated
personal status courts operated by religious communities and instead gave jurisdiction
over family law matters to Egypt’s national courts.461 This act ended the most
unconstrained period of legal pluralism in Egyptian history. But it did not completely end
legal pluralism, as the new law required the national, civil law courts to use codified
confessional law to arrive at rulings in personal law cases. In cases involving the majority

461

J. D. Pennington, “The Copts in modern Egypt,” Middle Eastern Studies, 18(2), 158–179, 165; David
Zeidan, “The Copts — Equal , Protected or Persecuted? The Impact of Islamization on Muslim ‐ Christian
Relations in Modern Egypt,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 10(1), 58; Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron
and Baudoin Dupret, Egypt and Its Laws, 1st ed. Springer (2002), chapter two.

179
population of Muslims, courts applied Hanafi sharia law, whereas cases involving only
Copts or Jews, for example, were decided under the law of their respective community.462

Summary of Causal Argument

How and why did the government come to pass Law No. 462, and why were the
communities that lost judicial control over intra-community disputes unable to prevent its
enactment? Phrased differently, what were the circumstances that led to the abolition of
institutional legal pluralism in Egypt and to its replacement with governmentadministered, centralized normative pluralism, achieved through the use of multiple
codes of law in a single court system? This chapter argues that Egypt transitioned from
being a case of full judicial decentralization to one of partial incorporation (see below) as
the relative capacities of the group and the state shifted in the period following
independence. Specifically, levels of elite coordination (a key capacity for group elites)
among Orthodox Copts declined to levels at which the state had an advantage during
bargaining over judicial decentralization. This same process that led to declines in elite
coordination (the fragmentation of the Coptic Orthodox elite, discussed below) also
weakened the group elites’ other capacities. The decline in group elites’ capacities
resulted in the shift from full centralization to partial incorporation.

Pennington, 165; Yuksel Sezgin “God v Adam & Eve,” Unpublished dissertation manuscript, University
of Washington, as edited 2011, 75.
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Table 5
Trajectory of Judicial (De)centralization in Egypt

Centralization took place in two separate historical periods, both of which will be
discussed in this chapter. The first was the moment of state-building and state
consolidation in Egypt following independence, from 1952-57. The second was a
moment of political crisis following Egypt’s defeat in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. During
the first period, from 1952-57, the relative capacities of the state were higher than that of
the religious groups that opposed centralization, and the level of the group elites’
coordination was low as well. During the second, from 1975-85, the Coptic Orthodox
community (which forms the main unit of analysis here, see below) underwent internal
restructuring which resulted in a higher level of elite coordination, and the political
context gave the group higher capacities than it normally enjoyed. These increased
capacities allowed it to prevent the state from further centralizing personal status law,

181
which had been a state goal at that time. Consistent with the theory advanced in Chapter
1, Egypt was thus able to partially centralize its judicial system during the first period,
but was not able to further centralize after that.
Two interrelated historical processes facilitated the drive for legal centralization
that accompanied Nasser’s early state building. The first is the growth of internecine
Coptic conflict during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which divided
secular and religious elites on the question of who would govern the community, and in
particular, who would administer Coptic personal status law. This hindered elite
coordination during the crucial moment of legal centralization. The second process is the
weakening of the Coptic papacy, which resulted both from the divide between the church
and the lay community, and the political context of Egypt’s independence. This had the
effect of reducing the capacity of the Coptic community to resist state reforms. The long
struggle between the two factions of elites left Copts without a leader or credible
spokesperson to bargain with the Egyptian government on its behalf, denying the
community both agreement between elites on the issue of judicial autonomy and the
ability to signal its preference to the state. The relatively low capacities of the Coptic
Orthodox community did not significantly change until the 1980s, so changes in the level
of judicial decentralization before then are likely associated with shifts in elite
coordination. These two factors allowed the Egyptian government to complete the
judicial portion of a process of centralization and bureaucratization that it pursued
following Nasser’s 1952 revolution.
Even so, not all aspects of Egypt’s long-standing legal pluralism were eliminated,
especially in regard to family law. Beginning in the mid-1970s, Anwar Sadat’s
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administration sought to carry legal centralization to completion. This later effort came,
however, at a time when the leading minority religious group, the Orthodox Copts, was in
a better position to resist. The result was that centralizing efforts came at higher political
costs, and the efforts did not achieve success. As a consequence of this series of
developments, today certain powers often reserved for the state, such as legalizing
marriages, remain shared with minority religious groups. The result is a somewhat
paradoxical legal reality in which there are no judicial forums in which the entirety of a
divorce or remarriage case can be adjudicated. This point will be discussed further at the
end of the chapter.
In attempting to answer questions of this nature, the problem of complexity can
become daunting and overwhelm the researcher’s best efforts to untangle causal
processes. Law No. 462 eliminated all religious and confessional tribunals, not just those
of the largest or most prominent groups. Must a full answer thus incorporate analysis of
each group’s response to the reforms, which in Egypt’s case, includes seventeen different
groups? Jacob Levy, in his analysis of state incorporation of indigenous law, recommends
a more narrow focus. As he rightly points out “most states use elements of more than one
mode of incorporation [essentially, state policy on non-state law]; but there are
differences of emphasis. The self-government mode of incorporation is most important in
the United States, and is also significant in Canada. Customary incorporation plays at
least some part in most states that accord any status to indigenous law, but is relied on
almost exclusively in South Africa. Australia places greater emphasis than other states on
common law incorporation.”463 While Australia uses common law incorporation to
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recognize some provisions of aboriginal tribal law, it generally does not do so with
religious law. In this case, as Levy acknowledges, too much granularity erodes the
researcher’s ability to detect overarching patterns and create larger categorizations.
Following Levy, I suggest that the best strategy for understanding Egyptian legal
reform is to focus on the experience of the country’s largest minority group, the Orthodox
Copts. Orthodox Copts have comprised seven to nine percent of Egypt’s population since
record keeping first began in 1897.464 This is partially true because their experience is
representative of many other communities (including other Christian communities, which
comprise ten of the seventeen recognized religious groups in Egypt) but also because
Egyptian policy was formulated in response to the dominant Sunni majority and the
Copts to a greater extent than other groups. Also, smaller groups have been unsuccessful
in blocking or altering government actions, whereas the majority Muslim population and
the Copts have often been able to influence policy. As such, focusing on the legal
experience of the Copts provides a useful lens for understanding Egyptian legal reform as
a whole.

The Egyptian Legal System Before 1955

It is difficult to follow the trajectory of judicial decentralization in Egypt without
an understanding of the judicial landscape both before and following Egyptian
independence. The following section will highlight the forms of the judiciary during the
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Ottoman and British colonial periods, as well as its effects on sectarian politics in Egypt.
This background will help the reader better understand the process tracing narrative that
is built below to explain shifts in the capacities of interest that led to changes in levels of
judicial decentralization. It also provides a portrait of the legal pluralism that was the
status quo in Egypt before the advent of the post-independence centralizing reforms.
The Ottoman Empire conquered Egypt in 1517 and quickly began to transform it
into an Ottoman province modeled on its other holdings. Most private Egyptian land was
confiscated on the grounds of improper record keeping and given directly to the Sultan.465
By 1525, Ottoman administrators had created three branches of government: military,
financial, and judicial with an accompanying legal structure to govern their function.466
The judiciary was led by an Ottoman qadi askar (functionally, chief justice) who
presided over Egypt’s courts of all types.467 He was a Turkish-speaking Ottoman official
from the capital appointed by the empire’s grand mufti for a period of one, but sometimes
up to three years.468 The civil court system was divided into six levels, but only for the
purpose of promoting judges through the ranks of the Ottoman Empire’s civil service, as
the courts were non-hierarchical and could not hear appeals from lower levels.469
The official Ottoman courts applied two forms of law: qanun, a secular body of
Ottoman law composed of executive decrees and custom, and sharia, Islamic law.470 In
general, sharia law in Egypt was derived from the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, but the
Ottoman judiciary made judges from the Hanbali, Shafi’i, and Maliki schools of fiqh
465
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available as well.471 These judgments were usually rendered from the mosque, although
they were often verified by the district judge.472 There were two types of judges who
heard day to day civil and criminal law disputes: qadis, who headed the judiciary for each
of the thirty-seven Egyptian judicial districts and na’ibs, their deputies who heard most
non-criminal first instance cases. The system was rigidly structured with rules governing
which type of court could hear certain types of dispute, when higher-level judicial
officials must be consulted, and guidelines to preserve the independence of the judiciary.
Every judicial official was appointed by external Ottoman officials.473 This system
governed the vast majority of Egyptians and Ottoman administrators.
There were, however, communities in Egypt who were exempt from this elaborate
Ottoman judicial apparatus. Non-Muslims, known as dhimmis, were not subject to
Ottoman law.474 Instead, religious leaders within each community judged disputes, unless
the dispute occurred across sects, such as between a Muslim and a non-Muslim or a nonMuslim and the government, in which case it was decided under sharia law.475 The local
qadi adjudicated disputes between non-Muslims of different religions.476
The practice of granting intra-community judicial autonomy to dhimmis stems
from several Quranic passages urging limited interaction between Muslims and nonMuslims and from Caliph Umar’s interpretation of these passages, as well as customary
rules governing inter-communal relations during the beginning of his reign.477 According
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to Hoyle, in his analysis of Egyptian legal history “Following the Islamic principle that
Sharia was for believers and not for non-Muslims, the varying jurisdictions of religious
and personal status courts were accepted by the Arab rulers as normal, and foreigners and
Christians encountered no trouble over their legal systems.”478 These rules were
preserved with only slight alteration through the Ummayad and Abbasid Caliphates, and
they were adopted by the Ottoman Empire as a means of administering a highly diverse
empire. Although Egypt’s rulers were inconsistent about certain practices such as the
jizyah (a special tax on dhimmis) and requiring distinctive garb for non-Muslims, they
never attempted to diminish communal judicial autonomy.
The three-year French incursion into Egypt beginning in 1798 changed the
composition of the judiciary but did not fundamentally alter its structure. According to
Stanford Shaw, the French created a General Council composed of local notables,
religious officials, merchants, peasants, farmers, and Bedouin chiefs whose job it was to
formulate policies to govern Egypt.479 The Council “stated its opinion that the Muslim
system of justice and the laws of inheritance should be maintained as they existed under
Ottomans.”480 The only substantive changes were in the composition of the state
judiciary. The French victory over Ottoman troops forced the Ottoman Governor and
bureaucrats into exile, leaving the administrative apparatus virtually empty.481
Accordingly, French administrators appointed Egyptians to these posts, replacing all but
five Ottoman judges with Egyptian religious officials, including the first Egyptian Qadi
“When you conquer Egypt, be kind to the Copts for they are your protégés and kith and kin” (see Carter, 4,
and Tagher, 9).
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Askar.482 Business in the courts, which had often been conducted in Turkish, reverted to
Arabic, a practice that would continue through the end of the French occupation and the
beginning of Muhammad Ali’s dynasty.
The Copts received considerably better treatment after 1805 under Muhammad
Ali’s dynasty, which succeeded the French occupation, than they had under previous
rulers. They were given the freedom to dress as they pleased, to go on pilgrimages, to be
hired by Muslims (previous laws had forbidden Muslims to employ Copts), and perhaps
most importantly, to build as many churches as the community needed.483 Muhammad
Ali’s successors introduced further reforms including the elimination of the jizyah (a tax
on non-Muslims) in 1855, the inclusion of Copts in the national military draft, and the
funding of the first state-sponsored Coptic Orthodox schools.484 Khedive Ismail,
Muhammad Ali’s grandson, welcomed Copts into the civil service at both low and high
levels, appointing them to judgeships in civil courts and permitting them to run as
candidates in the elections for his new Consultative Council.485 In 1892, British forces
invaded Egypt during the Anglo-Egyptian war, resulting in a de facto protectorate that
lasted until 1914, when it became official following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire
following WWI. Egypt remained under full protectorate status until 1922, at which point
it declared unilateral independence, which Britain ultimately recognized in 1936. British
troops, and a strong British presence remained in Egypt until 1956.
The country’s first constitution was drafted after Egypt’s independence from
Britain in 1922 under the direction of Fuad I, the ninth ruler in Muhammad Ali’s dynasty.
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Published in 1923, the constitution stipulated legal equality between Muslims and nonMuslims and guaranteed freedom of religion.486 The advances in general rights and
freedoms, however, did not signal any alternations in Coptic judicial administration. The
community continued to govern intra-communal legal matters without reference to the
outside courts, except in cases where a Muslim was involved.
During this period, another type of court was introduced to Egypt’s already plural
legal system. In 1841, Britain, Austria, Prussia, France, and Russia entered into
negotiations with the Ottoman Empire concerning Egypt’s status. The result was a decree
that gave Egypt greater freedom within the Empire, and particularly judicial freedom, in
return for military assistance.487 During and after the French occupation of Egypt,
European trade with Egypt began to expand, bringing resident foreigners to Egypt in
large numbers. These nationals of England, France, Greece, Austria, and elsewhere were
exempt from the jurisdiction of the Ottoman court system because of a series of
capitulations signed during the early 1800s. As a result, judicial matters involving
foreigners were heard by consular courts, which used the law of their home country. This
arrangement tended to mean that suits brought against foreigners by Egyptians almost
always failed, and disputes between residents of different nationalities brought similar
problems.488
In 1875, Egypt inaugurated a new system of courts called the “Mixed Courts,”
created in response to Egypt’s increasing independence from the Ottoman Empire during
a moment of economic opening and growing trade.489 The Mixed Courts had jurisdiction
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across the entirety of Egypt, although only in particular types of disputes. They formed
one of four types of courts then in existence including administrative courts for
administrative law and infringements of Ottoman general regulations; family law courts
including personal status courts for religious minority groups and consular courts for the
family law cases of foreigners; Sharia courts for all disputes involving Muslim Egyptians;
and mixed courts for disputes concerning persons of multiple jurisdictions including
disputes between Egyptians and foreigners, the Egyptian government and foreigners, and
between foreigners of different nationalities.490 The mixed courts did not, in and of
themselves, constitute legal pluralism. As Hoyle points out in his study of the mixed
courts, “all laws, courts, and codes [in the Mixed courts] were Egyptian, the only mixed
elements were the parties.”491 Legal pluralism instead resided in the multiple different
courts that the Egyptian government administered with jurisdiction dependent on identity
instead of territoriality, which effectively meant that an identical case of divorce, for
example, would wind up in a different court depending on the religion and nationality of
the claimants.
The mixed courts existed for seventy-four years until they were closed in 1949,
and they were effective in centralizing and simplifying the complex jurisdictional
landscape of pre-1875 Egypt. They became the country’s “foremost judicial authority”
and convinced the Egyptian authorities that a comprehensive legal code was superior to
Sharia-based rulings issued by religious officials. Within ten years of their creation,
Egypt created a parallel system of “native courts” that applied similar codes to disputes
between Egyptians, thereby partially supplanting the previously exclusive jurisdiction of
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Muslim courts in this domain.492 By 1937, Farouk I’s administration suggested a move
away from a separate system of mixed and native courts, which applied many of the same
codes, and the creation of a unified national court system. Later that year, at a meeting of
the capitulatory powers, they and Egypt signed the Montreux Convention, which created
a twelve-year plan to end the mixed courts.493
On October 15, 1949 the new Egyptian National Courts took over all cases
pending in the now-closed mixed and native courts.494 Although personal status cases
involving foreigners were still heard by the consular courts, all other non-family law
disputes went to the new National Courts, which centralized all but personal status law
under a single system.495 Thus, the history of the Mixed Courts emphasizes the drive for
centralization that, unimportant under Ottoman rule, became a central concern as
European powers gained influence in Egypt. The Mixed Courts brought the multiple
jurisdictions of the consular courts under a single court reserved for disputes involving
foreigners, and once the efficiency of this model became apparent, they served as a model
for the new Native Courts, which replaced the Ottoman system of local, mosque-run
courts. The abolition of these and their replacement with the Egyptian national court
system nearly completed the process of centralization as it brought all but the personal
status courts under the jurisdiction of a single court system. However, this was not an
instance of an independent state formulating its own policy on legal pluralism. This
episode of legal centralization is provided as background for the reader rather than as a
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case study subjected to causal analysis because it was brought about by the capitulatory
powers and overseen by the British. The case study of centralization under consideration
here is that of Egypt as a newly independent state, able to formulate its own policy
without foreign veto.
One of the most important results of the many invasions of Egypt is a
contemporary legal system that is built on more than one source of law. Sharia law,
Ottoman secular law, French civil law, and even a degree of English common law coexist
in the country’s national courts alongside the family law codes of Egypt’s religious
communities. The mixed courts normalized the concept that a central court system could
adjudicate cases even when litigants came from different jurisdictions. Given the
heterogeneous nature of the Egyptian legal system, it is important to remember that legal
pluralism is defined as a plurality of types of law available in the same situation, not a
plurality of sources of law. In other words, a mixed system of Ottoman law, French civil
law, and Islamic law, if applied equally and in the same manner to all litigants, is not an
instance of legal pluralism. Legal pluralism exists only when different laws apply to
people in the same legal situations. Ottoman Egypt was characterized by a system of full
decentralization in which non-Muslim communities adjudicated all disputes within their
communities, including civil, criminal, and family law. In present-day Egypt, legal
pluralism is restricted to the domain of family law, and exists by virtue of the different
legal codes that are applied to identical situations such as divorce and inheritance
according to the litigants’ religion, which particularly when compared to the cases of
Tanzania and Malawi, is a weak form of legal pluralism.
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Period 1: Legal Centralization during Egyptian State-Building

With a preliminary understanding of Egyptian legal history preceding 1955, it is
possible to turn to the question of why, despite strong opposition from powerful groups in
Egyptian society, Egypt ended up in the category of partial incorporation, which involves
a lesser transfer of judicial power to non-state groups than many of the other types. This
chapter argues that it is a decline in the relative capacities of the Coptic Orthodox elite
that account for this outcome, so the following sections will examine changes in the
capacities of the state leaders (in this case, Nasser and his deputies) and group elites
(Coptic Orthodox elites). It will also examine the interests of both parties—the state
leaders, in centralizing the judiciary, and the Coptic Orthodox elites, in preserving
judicial decentralization.

Interests and Capacities of Egyptian State Leaders

Following his instatement as Egypt’s second president, Nasser adopted a policy of
full judicial centralization. The history of the mixed courts demonstrates that Egypt had
already experienced a certain amount of judicial centralization before the 1952
revolution. It would be wrong, however, to read Nasser’s reforms as an extension of this
earlier tendency. Before the withdrawal of British troops in 1954, Egypt’s policies were
either written by or under the heavy influence of the British, and cannot be counted as
instances of a sovereign state formulating judicial policy. The British occupation
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generated significant opposition, and after the July revolution of 1952 Egyptian
politicians made a point of breaking with colonial policies.
Two interrelated programmatic agendas drove the campaign for judicial
centralization during the Egyptian Republic’s early years. The first was a desire to
bureaucratize and rationalize the Egyptian state, and the second was a movement toward
a secular, Egyptian nationalist identity that would orient Egypt’s citizens towards the
state, rather than the sects, as the appropriate locus of political loyalty. In general, the
reforms were a central component of the period of modernization and bureaucratization
that Nasser and the first president of Egypt, Mohamed Naguib, launched together with
the avowed purpose of making Egypt more administratively efficient and democratic.496
According to Sezgin, Nasser’s “revolutionary government was mainly motivated by such
mechanical concerns as to increase the efficiency of its central administration and
reinstate the sovereignty of the Egyptian state over its territory.”497 The reforms formed
part of the effort to strengthen the state apparatus. These are, of course, typical motives
driving judicial centralization in many standard accounts of state building.
Having dismantled many of the existing political parties and removed officials
from their government positions, the regime hired a whole new cadre of regime loyalists,
expanding the bureaucracy and government payroll rapidly.498 Sezgin characterizes
Nasser’s regime as bureaucratic-authoritarian for its program of top-down bureaucratic
rationalization and its faith “in the value of specialized knowledge, professionalization,

496

Said Aburish, Nasser: The Last Arab. Duckworth & Co (2004), 139-141.
Sezgin, 77.
498
Sezgin, 78, Robert Vitalis, When Capitalists Collide: Business Conflict and the End of Empire in Egypt,
University of California Press (1995), 210-215.
497

194
and uniformity in public administration.”499 A senior official in the central Coptic
patriarchate and a Coptic journalist both agree that Nasser’s centralization efforts were
the driving force behind sectarian law reform.500 Science and progress were the regime’s
watchwords, and anything that appeared to be irrational, unscientific or inefficient was on
the agenda for reform. The regime at least nominally committed itself to the idea that its
citizens should be equal under the law and governed by the same set of rules. Permitting
religious officials, particularly officials from different religions, to adjudicate the disputes
of Egyptian citizens violates these principles. One suspects, too, that perhaps even more,
the regime strengthening character of a centralized judiciary, identified by Shapiro and
Becker, appealed to Nasser during the early days of state formation.
Additionally, unlike his successor, Nasser was an Egyptian nationalist and panArabist in political outlook. Although he was not against religious groups for the most
part, he was suspicious of anything that might undermine ties between the citizen and
state. He frequently worked with the Coptic Pope (explained further below) to aid
church-building projects in return for the Pope’s, and by extension the Coptic
community’s, political support. Prominent Copts had joined Egypt’s Wafd party, the
political force that won independence from Great Britain in 1952. Pennington, Wakin,
and other historians emphasize the extent to which Copts and Muslims worked together
to achieve independence, and they highlight the fierce nationalism of the Copts, which
led them to protest when the British attempted to reserve the right, after independence, to
intervene in Egyptian affairs in matters concerning discrimination against the Coptic
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community.501 In return, Nasser declared himself a friend to Egypt’s Copts, claiming his
childhood upbringing in a Copt-heavy village gave him a good opinion of Egypt’s
Christians.502
Nasser was not in his own view anti-Islam; he had publicly called for a “form of
Islamicized modernity,” but one in which the mosque would be limited, in the tradition of
John Locke, to the private sphere, leaving the state free to govern the public realm.503 He
rarely, if ever used religious vocabulary in public, and he worked hard to diminish the
strength of sectarian feeling, which he saw as an impediment to pan-Arabism. This
stance, especially coming from a Muslim political leader, was unpalatable to Egypt’s
Islamists, who worked to undermine Nasser’s agenda even before he became the head of
state. The Brotherhood had vowed to block the withdrawal of British troops because they
disliked the secular program of the Free Officers. Although their attempt failed, they
collaborated with the British in 1955 to contact exiled King Farouk in Italy, who they
planned to reinstate as ruler of Egypt with Jordanian and Saudi help.504
In addition, Brotherhood members preached against Nasser during Friday
sermons and built resistance to his rule in the countryside. As a result, Nasser began a
series of targeted maneuvers against the Muslim Brotherhood, eliminated Muslim
Brothers from Al Azhar (Egypt’s preeminent Muslim university) and replaced them with
regime loyalists, and ordered secular sciences to be taught at Al Azhar.505 In 1954, a
member of the Brotherhood tried to assassinate Nasser during a speech in Alexandria to
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celebrate the evacuation agreement with England.506 In the following crackdown, seven
hundred members of the Brotherhood were arrested and six condemned to death.507
In his biography of Nasser, Aburish argues, “Nasser’s pragmatism and refusal to
allow religion a direct say in governance showed very early. This time he scored against
the country’s conservative institutionalized Islamic tendencies. He secularized the
religious courts, which used the Koran for legal analogy and guidance, making them part
of the civil courts.”508 Of course, Nasser’s reforms did not secularize Egyptian law.
Family law disputes in the Muslim community, although adjudicated in secular civil law
courts, were decided using a codified version of sharia law. Nevertheless, his reform
shifted judicial authority from priests and imams to state judges, denying the former a
powerful source of intra-community authority and bringing citizens to the state for
adjudication.
Both this episode of judicial centralization and the next, under Sadat, involved the
mobilization of a particular identity repertoire, but they were nevertheless extremely
different. Nasser, although Muslim, advocated a pan-Arabist and Egyptian nationalist
identity, which was equally foreign to all of Egypt’s religious groups. The elimination of
sectarian courts was a byproduct of the more important agenda of centralizing the
Egyptian state and consolidating its authority. It was perhaps inevitable that in this
climate Nasser, who valued bureaucratized structures and rational systems so highly,
would attempt to bring the final area, family law, under the jurisdiction of its courts as
well. Eliminating sectarian courts was thus not part of a strategy to mobilize a particular
identity repertoire to build loyalty with one group at the expense of another, as would
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later prove the case with Sadat. Nevertheless, although their motives were different, as
Nasser upheld an Egyptian nationalism that was equally leery of all sectarian ties,
whereas Sadat embraced Islamism at the expense of non-Muslim rights in Egypt, the
outcome was in one vital respect the same: the elimination of minority group judicial
power.
Under Nasser, legal centralization cannot be considered a punitive measure
directed specifically at the Coptic community, but rather a part of Egypt’s post-colonial
state building. Despite this motive, the Coptic community did not welcome the proposed
abolition of their personal status courts, which allowed them to live under Christian
family law. In other matters, the Coptic community had some success in persuading the
government to abandon reform efforts, and through the 1940s it had been successful in
delaying the abolition of Coptic church courts. Why, in 1955, did its attempt fail?

The Decline of the Coptic Orthodox Elites’ Capacities

Through most of the period outlined above, the Coptic Church had been rigidly
hierarchical. The Patriarch, also called the Pope, was the supreme head of the Coptic
Orthodox Church and he presided over several layers of religious officials including
bishops, priests, and monks. This structure created a small group of elites who were
easily able to coordinate with one another, and gave them the automatic support of the
Coptic laity, which gave the Pope de facto power over 8% of Egypt’s population. The
changes to this structure of authority weakened the capacities of the Coptic Orthodox
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elites in the period leading up to independence, such that they were unable to preserve
full judicial decentralization in the period after 1952.
During the 1700s, the Patriarch and his deputies governed the community without
any competition from secular or lay Coptic organizations. The first substantive changes
in community structure came during Muhammad Ali’s dynasty, when opportunities for
Copts to participate in Egyptian government and upper-level society appeared.509 Peter
VII, Patriarch from 1810-1852, supported a Coptic seminary that the Church Missionary
Society founded in 1833 to provide better training for Coptic clergy.510
Some of these better-educated clergy went on to become reform leaders during
the next Patriarch’s reign. Cyril IV, called “The Father of Reformation,” introduced
further changes into the Coptic community including four secular schools, two for boys
and two for girls, and an Arabic printing press to print Coptic publications.511 This was
done partly to educate members of the clergy, who were “ignorant, and negligent of their
religious duties,” and partly to offer the laity an opportunity to gain some learning.512 He
also pursued structural changes in the administration of the clergy. He ordered fixed
salaries for priests to eliminate the private fundraising many carried out as a side business
to supplement their poor wages, including selling church property and requiring fees for
religious services.513 He also created a registry of the awqaf (religious endowments),
properties whose rents comprised a large share of church income, to prevent their
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misuse.514 The effect of these reforms was a better-educated clergy and the beginnings of
an educated laity.
This period coincided with two external reforms that were important for Coptic
communal life. The first was the emergence of a Coptic upper class, which resulted from
the opening of government jobs and the beginnings of large land ownership. Although
Copts had acted as accountants and tax gatherers since the French occupation of Egypt,
securing them a position in Egypt’s middle classes, they had been banned from high
government office. But as this changed, Copts began to fill these posts, including the first
Coptic foreign minister, Boutros Ghali, in 1893.515 Furthermore, both Abbas II and
Khedive Ismail transferred large tracts of land to the Coptic Church, further enriching it
and its clergy.516 The second reform was a decree issued by the Ottoman Empire in 1856.
The Khatt al Hamayoni (Hatt-i Humayun in Turkish, Jubilant Decree in English)
provided guarantees for “spiritual privileges and tolerance” for the Empire’s Christian
communities.517 It furthermore required that each Christian community elect a special
council to decide on reforms necessary for the community and to share in the
administration of “private suits such as those relating to inheritance.”518 This decree, had
it been implemented as intended at the time, would have removed personal status law
from the sole purview of the Coptic clergy and given elected councils, comprised of both
clergy and laymen, the ability to adjudicate these disputes as well.
In fact, these lay councils were not created in Egypt until 1874 when the Coptic
Papacy was vacant for four years. During this period, Bishop Mark (Marqus), who was
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appointed interim leader, chose select members of the Coptic upper class to help him
govern the community, including two former students of Cyril IV’s schools.519 In 1874,
he petitioned Khedive Ismail to make the position of these advisors permanent with the
creation of an advisory board--in other words to establish a council, called the Majlis
Milli (Community Council), to be composed of clergy and laity. The decree officially
establishing the Council was quickly granted.520 The Council was composed of twelve
lay members and twelve church deputies elected in five-year cycles and it was charged
with overseeing the awqaf (religious endowments) and personal status law.521 This was
the first time that lay members of the community had an opportunity to participate in its
governance. Effectively, the decree ordering lay participation in adjudication and
administration came only shortly after an educated upper class had emerged to fulfill it.
A few months later, the community overcame the disagreements that had
prevented the appointment of a new Patriarch, and Cyril V (born al-Barmus) was
appointed to the position. Almost immediately, a power struggle ensued between the
Patriarch and the Majlis Milli, which resulted in many iterations of the successful
elimination of the Majlis by the Patriarch, followed by its reinstatement by either Egypt’s
ruler or the Coptic community. From this point forward, Copts were divided in opinion as
to the correct source of authority concerning personal status law and the degree of
allegiance due to the Patriarch and (or) the increasingly secular Majlis Milli. As Sana
Hasan summarizes, they “vacillated between two competing modalities of solidarity: the
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religious one offered by the clergy, with the church as the communal meeting place, and
the secular one offered by the Coptic upper class.”522
By 1875, the first Majlis had been dissolved because the Patriarch refused to carry
out its suggestions, and in the face of its increasing irrelevance, the council stopped
meeting.523 In 1883, a group of reformers successfully lobbied Khedive Ismail to
reestablish the Majlis, and it once again began to meet regularly to consider matters of
personal status law and to administrate waqf (endowment) properties. But the Patriarch,
still convinced that the council was a challenge to his authority, refused to attend
meetings. Without his presence, the Majlis was unable to achieve any of its desired
reforms, and it again stopped meeting in 1884.524 A group of upper class laymen
successfully petitioned the government to bring the Majlis Milli back into existence in
1891.525 This time it lasted for two years, until the Patriarch and Bishop of Alexandria, in
a gesture of defiance, excommunicated the Khedive’s choice of President for the new
Majlis. In response, the Khedive sent Cyril V and the John, Bishop of Alexandria, into
exile.526 Although the Majlis was pleased to have won definitive government support, the
exile of the Patriarch left a vacuum in spiritual leadership which, according to Bestavros,
resulted in turmoil for the community: “Churches turned into empty sanctuaries, baptisms
were not celebrated, marriages were not contracted, even the final religious rites for the
dying and the dead were not available.”527 In response, large delegations of Copts
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petitioned the Khedive for the Patriarch’s pardon, and in 1893 the Patriarch returned to
Cairo, where he promptly disbanded the Majlis Milli.528
The Majlis met again from 1906-1909, but was dissolved in 1909 after a bitter
fight over who should have the authority to control church finances, and particularly the
awqaf lands. This Majlis was composed entirely of lawyers who had been elected for
their competence in managing community matters, particularly compared to the illiterate
and often uneducated clergy.529 However, supporters of the Patriarch pointed out that the
clergy were the “defenders of Christianity” and as such had the highest claim to
important administrative duties.530 Bestavros acknowledges the claims of both sides—the
laity were often better administrators and managed complex judicial and financial
arrangements more ably than the clergy, but the clergy had the support of the majority of
the Coptic community and the Patriarch, who was used to governing in a “traditional,
autocratic manner”, was successful at mobilizing the community against the Majlis.531
The 1908-1909 clashes between the Majlis and the Patriarch played out during sermons,
in debates published in Misr, a leading Coptic newspaper, and in private pamphlets
printed by both sides lambasting the other.532 By 1912, the Patriarch had managed to pass
two laws, one that limited the Majlis to twelve members, and the other stipulating that in
the event of his absence, the Council could only meet under the leadership of his
appointed deputy.533 During this period the number of educated Copts continued to rise,
which fueled support for the Majlis.534 The net effect was a community divided between
528
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supporters of the Majlis and supporters of the Patriarch, and an extremely weak
administrative structure.
In 1927, the Majlis Milli was revived yet again according to its 1883 mandate, and
this time managed to reach a compromise with the Patriarch over financial control of the
awqaf.535 A sub-committee headed by the Patriarch and composed of four members of the
Majlis and two Bishops administrated the awqaf for the next decade, until the Majlis
again seized full control in 1937.536 By this point, the debate over waqf control was so
salient that it became an issue in the election of the next two Patriarchs, Macarius III and
Joseph II. In his single year as Patriarch, Macarius failed to negotiate a settlement over
waqf control, and Joseph II was in 1946 elected on a platform of supporting laical control
over the awqaf.537 However, Joseph II’s reign brought new conflict to the community.
Having promised the awqaf to the laity, he reneged on the deal and supported the clergy’s
bid to attain control over them. More seriously, by the early 1950s he faced charges of
corruption for selling Bishoprics. Pennington describes him as “a feeble old man
allegedly dominated by a manservant who did a roaring trade in the sale of ecclesiastical
appointments.”538 During his reign and just following the Egyptian revolution, Ibrahim
Fahmi Hilal, a young lawyer, established a reform movement, “The Coptic Nation,” to
promote Coptic identity.539 Angered by the Patriarch’s corruption and the community’s
inaction, Hilal and members of the Coptic Nation (which the regime had officially
disbanded three months before) kidnapped Joseph II in July 1954 and forced him to sign
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papers authorizing his abdication.540 Although the government arrested the kidnappers
and reinstated the Patriarch, he was never effectively community leader again, as a
committee of Bishops was appointed to supervise him.541 In 1955, Joseph II made one
last attempt to gain control by exiling a Bishop, which resulted in the Synod of Bishops
and Majlis Milli together petitioning the government for his removal, which was effected
(he retired to a monastery) in 1955.542 Thus, during the crucial period of late 1954-1956,
the Coptic community was effectively leaderless.
The result of the internecine struggle between the Patriarch and the Majlis Milli
was the deinstitutionalization of intra-communal adjudication mechanisms that dated
back to before the Arab invasion of Egypt. A fractured community was left without a
leader or spokesperson during the judicial reforms of 1955. By the time the responsibility
for adjudicating family law disputes had been passed back and forth between the clergy
and the Majlis Milli several times, there was some confusion in the community as to who
had, or ought to have, the authority to adjudicate these disputes. The laity seemed not to
highly prioritize this issue, as adjudication became less about dispute resolution and more
about the power struggle between the clergy and Majlis Milli. Thus, by the time the
British were in negotiations to leave Egypt, Coptic activists and reformers were the only
members of their community who attempted to forestall government reforms that would
have ended Coptic control over family law disputes. Family law was no longer the
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exclusive domain of the Coptic Orthodox Church; its dispute resolution mechanisms had
become deinstitutionalized. As a result, it was no longer a salient issue that could
mobilize community action.
Perhaps more importantly, the events leading up to 1955 had robbed the Coptic
community of an authoritative leader or group that could advocate on its behalf during
negotiations with the government. Previously, strong community leadership had been
able to forestall government reforms. Law No. 462 was not the first effort by the
Egyptian government to bring confessional courts under the control of the state. In 1927,
the Minister of Justice was asked to come up with a comprehensive plan to unify the
confessional family law courts, but when the Ministry of Justice asked for input from
Egypt’s non-Muslim communities, he received overwhelming opposition from the Coptic
community, leading him to conclude that only community clergy could change the law.543
In 1931, the government again attempted to discern whether it would be possible to
create a single personal status code for non-Muslims, but Misr and other Coptic
newspapers spread opposition to the plan, and it was never moved out of the Ministry of
Justice.544 In 1936, the Ministry of Finance tried to move the Ministry of Justice plans to
a Cabinet vote, and succeeded in galvanizing some support, only to have the Cabinet,
composed mainly of Wafd party members (who were at the time allied closely with the
Copts) declare the reforms beyond their jurisdiction.545 In 1944, the government
attempted to pass a bill that would require all Egyptians, Muslim and non-Muslim alike,
to use Muslim inheritance laws, but Coptic representatives in the Chamber of Deputies
protested and the Patriarch withdrew into seclusion to protest the reforms, and they were
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never passed.546 In 1945, another attempt failed. In 1955, however, without a strong
Pope, the only group to protest the reforms was a delegation of three bishops.547 Their
objections were not successful because it was unclear to Nasser whether they truly
represented the Coptic community or could mobilize the community on behalf of the
regime.
Later, in the years after his 1959 election as Pope, Patriarch Cyril VI and
President Nasser became good friends and political allies. As a consequence, the Coptic
community was granted permission to build a number of new churches and rebuild
churches that had fallen into disrepair.548 The personal friendship and political alliance
between Cyril VI and Nasser proved to be of immense benefit to the Copts.549 This
further illustrates the disastrous consequences of not having a spokesperson during the
1955 reform period. If one engages in counterfactual thinking, it is likely that had Cyril
VI been Patriarch during the 1950s, the reforms might have been circumvented. In fact,
Cyril VI and Nasser forged an understanding that both solved the waqf crisis in the
Coptic community and secured Nasser’s support for the community. At the Patriarch’s
request, in 1962 the Majlis Milli was disbanded, leaving control of the Coptic community
to the Patriarch and his selected clergy.550 In return, Cyril VI pledged the support of the
Coptic community to Nasser and publicly gave his blessing to many of Nasser’s projects.
In particular, when Nasser attempted to resign his presidency followed the 1967 debacle
with Israel, the Patriarch visited him at home to declare “the Copts’ insistence on his
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leadership.”551 During this period, Nasser granted the Coptic community sufficient funds
to build a cathedral in Cairo and to construct a new monastery.552 Nasser even attended
the ceremony where the cornerstone of the new cathedral was laid.553 In essence, what
Tadros describes as the first “entente” between the Egyptian state and the Coptic
community, an alliance that gave Nasser the unconditional political support of the Coptic
community in return for advancing the Pope’s agenda, was materially profitable for both
sides.554 But it came too late to stand in the way of the administrative reforms that
removed Coptic law from communal adjudication and made it a part of the Egyptian
court system.

Summary of the Argument

By the end of this period, then, Coptic Orthodox elite capacities had declined
dramatically. The issue of preserving judicial decentralization no longer mobilized
popular support for Coptic church leaders, so they had lost a large proportion of popular
support. The community disagreed over whether the church or secular elites should
govern, which caused a strong decline in elite coordination, since one half of the elites
was bitterly opposed to the agenda against the other half. Finally, this dysfunction caused
a vacuum in key leadership positions during the period of bargaining over the new level
of judicial decentralization that post independence Egypt would adopt. By contrast,
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Nasser came to power with a strong mandate to reform the governmental structure of the
newly independent country. In sum, the fragmentation of the Coptic community that
made it unable to bargain effectively with the Egyptian state in the 1950s proved key to
Nasser’s largely successful effort at judicial centralization, driven by the kinds of
concerns that have fostered judicial centralization in many settings.

Period 2: Further Attempts at Judicial Centralization under Sadat

The elimination of sectarian courts marks the end of formal judicial
decentralization in Egypt. Constitutional reforms in the late 1970s and early 1980s further
centralized Egypt’s legal code, but did so via a contentious process that produced less
sweeping changes in practice than the state desired. This second period of reform
demonstrates the importance of the relative contextual capacities of the state leaders and
Coptic Orthodox elites, particularly the increase in elite coordination on judicial
autonomy in minority communities, theorized here as necessary to constrain state
centralization initiatives.
In 1970, Anwar Sadat succeeded Nasser as president of Egypt, and in 1971 he
amended the constitution to list sharia law as “a” major source of legislation, thereby
acknowledging the primacy of Islam in Egypt’s political life, but without mandating its
use in drafting any particular legislation. In 1977, following bread riots and criticism of
the ongoing peace efforts with Israel, Sadat proposed to amend the constitution to make
sharia “the” primary source of law, which would make any civil laws on the books that
clashed with sharia law candidates for nullification, and would preclude the introduction
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of sharia-incompatible laws. This law represented a disaster for Egypt’s non-Muslim
citizens.555 Although the move can be read as a populist measure to appease Egypt’s
Islamists, who had become steadily more powerful through the 1970s, it was also timed
to draw attention away from the peace process with Israel and economic problems.
However, the Coptic church was able to delay the reforms until a complete breakdown in
relations between the President and Pope led to the exile of the latter.556
Pope Shenouda succeeded Cyril VI in 1971, the year after Anwar Sadat assumed
the presidency of Egypt following Nasser’s death. Cyril VI maintained friendly relations
with Nasser’s successor for the year that they overlapped, but Shenouda’s relationship
with Sadat was strained from the beginning, and became outright hostile with time.557
Although Pope Shenouda was not the government’s least favored choice in the
nomination process for Pope, Sadat preferred Anba Samuel, who was considered more
“cautious and politically reliable.”558 Shenouda was viewed as too political for assuming
the role of Bishop responsible for educational affairs and for the weekly question and
answer sessions that he delivered at St. Mark’s Cathedral in Cairo, which routinely gave
him an audience of thousands.559 Whereas Cyril VI quietly centralized church power
through his friendship with Nasser by eliminating the Majlis Milli, he never challenged
the 1938 marriage law promulgated by the Majlis Milli that served as the government’s
legal code for Coptic family law cases in government courts. Pope Shenouda’s first act as
Pope was to challenge the 1938 code by issuing a decree banning divorcees from
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remarrying in cases where the divorce had been issued on any grounds other than
adultery.560
As this only affected a small number of Copts, the government did not
immediately react, and during the first months after Shenouda’s consecration, both he and
Sadat took a series of public steps to maintain an at least outwardly friendly relationship.
Sadat sent high-level representatives to the consecration including Prime Minister Fawzy
and Salah al Shahad, the Chief Presidential Chamberlain.561 Front-page pictures in
newspapers the next day showed a smiling delegate from Al Azhar, the country’s
preeminent Islamic religious institution, shaking hands with Shenouda.562 A few days
later, Shenouda visited Vice Prime Minister Shafei on the occasion of Ramadan Bairam,
a Muslim holiday, and the next day he called on Hafez Badawy, Speaker for the People’s
Assembly, and Dr. Abdel Kader Hatem, the Deputy Prime Minister, to thank them for
their role in his consecration.563 The Grand Sheikh of Al Azhar and Pope Shenouda were
both invited to attend the Cairo National Congress at the end of November, and a few
days later Pope Shenouda issued a statement supporting Sadat’s position on Israeli
settlement in Palestine and called for national unity under Sadat’s leadership.564 At least
to begin with, both leaders attempted to preserve the state-church relationship that gave
560
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the President the political support of the Coptic community in exchange for various
public concessions.
By the mid-1970s, however, their relationship was becoming strained. Sadat had
loosened restrictions on the Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamists had become increasingly
powerful in major campus and professional organizations across Egypt.565 Sadat began to
publicly demonstrate his piety, attempting to signal solidarity with the rising Islamist
trend.566 According to Hasan “When Sadat
began positioning himself as the as-Rais al-Mu’min (the devout president),
seated cross-legged on the prayer rug for photographers, he was not introducing
anything new: he was merely riding the crest of a wave of popular enthusiasm
for Islam that had been latent during the last years of Nasser’s life. Once
Nasser’s massive reassuring presence, which had managed in the aftermath of
the defeat to hold together the conflicting elements within Egyptian society and
to make them keep to the old beaten track of Arab socialism, was removed
political Islam burst forth and filled [sic] the vacuum. In an attempt to
consolidate his rule, Sadat began to lend state support to the Islamic groups both
within and without the universities…”

Sadat, faced with rising opposition to his rule, sought a way to boost his popularity, and
given that the most powerful members of Egyptian society were increasingly members of
the Islamist opposition, appropriating the language and symbolism of Islam helped make
his political agenda more palatable to the majority of Egyptians. Pan-Arabism was in
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decline and secularism unpopular, so Sadat mobilized his Islamic identity for political
purposes, having himself photographed at prayer, meeting with the Sheikh of al-Azhar,
and referring to himself as the Muslim president of a Muslim country.
As Sadat became less interested in representing Christian interests in Egypt,
Shenouda became an increasingly political leader who mobilized his constituency to
attain greater bargaining leverage with the Egyptian state. His greatest success was in
centralizing the Coptic religious establishment and binding the Coptic community to it in
such a way that the Coptic church became a corporate political entity, rather than a set of
individuals bound together by a common faith. Centralization had begun under Cyril VI,
who in 1960 changed the requirements for attaining priesthood to include graduation
from the Coptic Clerical College, so that all priests would share a certain basic education
directed by the central Patriarchate.567 Shenouda continued this trend, and one of his first
moves was to ensure that the Majlis Milli, which still performed an administrative role
even after losing its judicial role, was strictly loyal to him. During elections, he took to
publishing his list of favored candidates in the Papal newspaper, and these candidates
always won.568 He also brought the powerful institution of the bishopric under his control
by subdividing existing dioceses and appointing young reformers who agreed with his
campaign of reforms, in total quadrupling the number of bishops.569 Additionally, he
recruited thousands of extra church servants to create another bond between the church

567

Nelly Van Doorn-Harder, “Kyrillos VI (1902-1971): Planner, Patriarch, and Saint” in Doorn-Harder
and Vogt, 236.
568
Hasan, 135.
569
Ibid., 124-125.

213
and its lay congregation and strengthened local church councils, which implemented his
reforms at the local level.570
These measures expanded the church’s reach, and Shenouda, along with some of
his senior Bishops, used the extra manpower to extend the church’s influence in the daily
lives of its congregation. Essentially, having eliminated opposition from within the
community, Shenouda and his followers sought to reinstitutionalize the church as the
central political authority for Copts, surpassing even the Egyptian state. To do so, they
created new volunteer and social work programs for ordinary Copts and appointed a
Bishop of Youth, tasked with involving young Copts in the life of the church.571 The new
Bishop, Moses, used tactics such as engaging in topics like “drugs, sex, emigration, and
job anxiety” that would appeal to youth and printing out “schedules of church meetings
on the back of pictures of saints, so that the recipient of these schedules would be reticent
to toss them into the wastepaper basket.”572 According to church workers at the Hanging
Church, Cairo’s most famous Coptic place of worship, youth attendance at services
increased from the 1980s onwards.573
Shenouda revived the study of Coptic language and liturgy, and sponsored the
recording of Coptic sacred music.574 In addition, innovations such as collective prayers, a
weekly live address from the Pope during mass, excursions to monasteries, and
community activities helped general church attendance to climb dramatically through the
1970s and 80s and to turn the church into “a rallying place for Copts, where they can
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reaffirm their collective identity.”575 Shenouda’s motives for these wide ranging reforms
appears to have been a desire to increase the power of the Coptic church and to increase
the ties of personal loyalty between his congregation and himself. He succeeded at both
objectives; most Orthodox Copts today, even among the more educated youth who are
often critical of the political turn that the church has taken, are hesitant to criticize
Shenouda openly. Josephine, a young professional, spoke of “discontent among Coptic
youth and quiet talk of a revolution within the church” but was scandalized that a group
of Copts had dared to file a lawsuit against the Pope.576 Michael, a business executive,
said that young Copts “resent the Church’s rigidity on certain issues like divorce and how
hierarchical and authoritarian it all is,” but he supports Shenouda’s political leadership of
the community.577 The vast majority of Copts are unwilling to express any disapproval of
the Church or its leadership to outsiders, and the administrators of the central Patriarchate
offices in Cairo display tremendous personal loyalty to Shenouda. The Coptic community
thus entered the next period of attempted judicial centralization with a greater degree of
elite coordination than it had during the first.
According to Hasan, “the unintended consequence [of the reforms] was to
increase the weight of the church vis-à-vis the state. The head of the state no longer had
to deal merely with one of Egypt’s spiritual dignitaries, but with the institutional
representative of a large, well-organized and unified religious community.”578 As long as
Shenouda was unequivocal in his support of the state, Sadat mostly left the Coptic
community to its own devices, particularly as Shenouda could order the Coptic
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community to vote for Sadat’s preferred slate of candidates during national elections.
Occasionally, though conflicts did flare up.
Not content with banning remarriage in the case of biblically unsanctioned
divorces, Shenouda wanted to change the 1938 Coptic law used by the state courts to
reflect the new divorce rules. He also lobbied to give Copts the right to use Coptic
inheritance law to govern the transfer of property in inheritance cases, rather than the
sharia-based inheritance law that is standard for all Egyptians.579 The Pope’s multiple
requests to change the law, however, resulted in refusals--the President requested that
Parliament not take the matter up, as it could not be allowed to pass.580 Additionally, the
level of violence between Muslims and Christians rose steadily through the 1970s,
beginning in 1972 with the November 6 and 7 burning of a church and subsequent
sectarian riots in Al-Khanka, Egypt.581 This incident gave Pope Shenouda his first
opportunity for open confrontation with the government on the matter of protecting Copts
from armed attacks, a matter on which he intended to be more aggressive than his
predecessor. He accordingly sent one hundred priests from Cairo to Al Khanka to march
through the streets in protest.582 To defuse the incident, Sadat promised Pope Shenouda
that he would authorize the building of fifty churches. Sadat also commissioned a
parliamentary committee of inquiry led by the Deputy Speaker Gamal al-Otaifi. The
commission issued two recommendations: that the government loosen its restrictions on
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the building of churches and that the Coptic church reinstate the Majlis Milli, canceled by
Nasser.583 Although the law on church building was never reformed, the Pope did accept
elections for a new Majlis Milli, albeit one that he tightly controlled.584
The next few years were relatively peaceful, featuring visits and addresses
between the Pope and Sheikh of Al Azhar, and between government members and the
Pope that marked their at least ceremonial cordiality to one another.585 As a consequence
of this improved relationship and, perhaps more fundamentally, his strengthened position
as leader of a more united Coptic community, Pope Shenouda regained some of the
bargaining power he initially lost due to his early conflicts with Sadat. He was able to
forestall Sadat’s proposal that the Constitution be amended to change Islamic sharia from
being “a” source of legislation to being “the” source of legislation.586 The proposed
change would have meant that in places where the Egyptian state had not yet made law,
new legislation would have to originate from or at least be compatible with sharia law.
At least in theory, it also meant that judges could “dismiss civil law deemed incompatible
with the Sharia.”587
In protest, Pope Shenouda called a meeting of the Holy Synod, which concluded
that sharia could only ever apply to Muslims, and when that failed to persuade the
legislature, he ordered the Coptic community to fast for five days at the end of the
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summer.588 This was Shenouda’s first use of a collective fast to serve a political cause,
and it was tremendously successful in mobilizing the Coptic community against the
law.589 In response, Prime Minister Salem visited the Pope to notify him that the
proposed legislation had been tabled, and a few days later the Pope met with President
Sadat and the Grand Sheikh of Al Azhar to pray together to reaffirm their good
relations.590 In this instance, the Pope’s protest was successful in averting legislation that
would have brought the Coptic community under the jurisdiction of sharia law.
This victory turned out to be temporary, however, as in 1979, coinciding with the
deeply unpopular peace treaty with Israel, Sadat again proposed a national referendum to
approve an amendment to Article II of the Constitution to make sharia “the” source of
national legislation, and by 1980 a full draft was sent to the Cabinet.591 By this time,
relations between Pope and President Shenouda were significantly worse than they had
been. In 1978, 1979, and 1980 there had been sectarian conflicts in Assiut and Minya,
two towns in Upper Egypt with the highest concentrations of Copts in Egypt, and in
Alexandria and Cairo as well. In 1979, an ancient Coptic church in Cairo was burned, and
in Alexandria in the spring of 1980, as Parliament debated the proposed amendment,
large-scale clashes broke out between Muslim and Christian students at the University of
Alexandria.592 As Hasan points out, the Sadat’s politicization of Islamic identity involved
portraying Copts as the “other” within Egypt. In response, Shenouda too emphasized the
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separateness of Coptic identity, which led both sides to overstate the threat that each
posed to the other, heightening sectarian conflict during this period.593
Faced with both attacks on Copts and the advancement of the sharia legislation,
the Pope canceled Easter and went into retreat in protest.594 These actions had a much
larger effect than the previous order to fast because Pope Shenouda refused to receive the
usual Easter greetings from the President and, in canceling Easter, he drew the attention
of the expatriate Coptic community, who could not watch the usual broadcast of the
Pope’s Easter sermon. As a result, a large group of Copts protested in the United States
during Sadat’s visit to discuss with President Carter the terms of Egypt’s peace treaty
with Israel.595
These events represented the first irrevocable breakdown in bargaining between
Sadat and Shenouda who, if not happy with one another’s political activities most of the
time, were at least able to exchange key goods such as permits to build churches, political
appointments, and a certain degree of influence over the legislative agenda for political
support and votes. Up to this point, their dependence on one another’s support meant that
they were able to recover from setbacks in their political relationship. In addition to the
rising sectarian violence, there are two particular incidents in the preceding three years
that made it impossible for their political relationship to continue. The first was related to
Sadat’s peace process with Israel. As part of the normalization of relations between the
two states, Sadat asked Shenouda to send a delegation of priests and Bishops to
Jerusalem on a symbolic pilgrimage. Shenouda refused, allegedly to prevent Egypt’s
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Muslim population, the majority of whom were opposed to peace with Israel, from
perpetrating further violence on the Coptic community, which would be seen as
collaborating with Israel.596 This angered Sadat, who was particularly sensitive to
anything that might get in the way of the peace process.597 In this particular context,
because the state needed a particular good from the Coptic community, the latter’s
relative capacity to bargain successfully increased beyond levels obtainable in most
spheres of domestic politics.
The second episode was the Pope’s demand that Copts boycott the referendum to
approve the Constitutional amendment that would alter the status of sharia law. This was
the first time that the Pope asked his followers not to vote for one of Sadat’s policies, and
it demonstrated danger of a potential Coptic opposition to the regime. This time, instead
of withdrawing the legislation, President Sadat gave a national address in which he
criticized Pope Shenouda for canceling Easter, spreading sedition, inflaming American
Copts against him, and for failing to live up to the high standard set by his predecessor’s
cooperation with President Nasser.598 Coptic demonstrations made American Christians
question Carter about his support for Sadat, potentially imperiling the peace negotiations.
Also, signs held during Pope Shenouda’s first post-Easter speech saying “Shenouda is
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our President” seem to have angered Sadat for their challenge to his authority. On
September 5, 1981, having passed the constitutional amendment, Sadat responded to the
next widespread sectarian violence by revoking the decree that confirmed Shenouda as
Pope and exiled him to Wadi Natroun, a monastery outside Cairo.599

Summary of the Argument

While the judicial reforms of the 1950s were more wide reaching in their extent in
terms of abolishing sectarian judicial institutions, the amendment of Article II of the
Egyptian constitution served to further marginalize non-Muslim, minority law in Egypt.
Whereas a law reforming Coptic Orthodox family law to permit adoption and non shariabased inheritance might have been possible before 1980, the amendment of Article II
made this kind of reform, and any law not in accord with sharia law, impossible. Whole
segments of Christian sectarian family law are, at least for now, precluded under
Egyptian civil law. Nonetheless, the state still recognizes or indeed requires sectarian
authorizations in some areas of family law, particularly marriages. Complete abolition of
legal pluralism has yet to occur, in significant measure due to coordinated Coptic
opposition under Shenouda. Still, minority power is only minority power. Although the
deinstitutionalization of Coptic legal tribunals and the breakdown of elite coordination
created space for state judicial centralization during the 1950s, the 1970s and 80s initially
offered the Coptic church an opportunity to reassert itself and prevent further
centralization. However, when Pope Shenouda demanded too much from Sadat,
extending his demands beyond those realizable even with the relatively expanded
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capacity that the Coptic church enjoyed during the peace process with Israel, bargaining
broke down and some significant further centralization took place.

Recent Developments

The result of increased legal centralization in Egypt through these two eras of
reforms is a somewhat confusing tangle of jurisdictions and competencies that overlap in
some areas but not in others. For example, as noted, today jurisdiction over marriage
remains shared between the state and Egypt’s various religious sects. An Egyptian
wishing to marry must obtain a certificate of marriage from the relevant religious
authority, and then, after the religious ceremony, register the marriage with the state. The
state will not register marriages that are not accompanied by a religious certificate of
marriage, and marriages are not considered valid until they are registered with the state.
Centralization thus has now stopped at an awkward partway point, leaving religious sects
with an almost token control over marriage but without power over divorce or forums in
which to adjudicate marital disputes.
The case of legal centralization in France forms an interesting counterpoint to the
case study of Egypt. Modern day France, like Egypt, was made up of multiple different
territories and identity groups who were brought under a central authority via strategic
alliances and conquest. 600Egypt’s Ottoman period left it with a legacy of legal
accommodation for different religious norms which contrasts starkly with France, where
Catholic-Protestant conflicts in the second half of the sixteenth century left millions dead
and a long-term suspicion of religious identity. Even today, French politicians, asked why
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they choose not to accommodate aspects of Catholic, Muslim, or Jewish cultural practice
or law (such as wearing a cross or headscarf, wedding via religious ceremony, etc.) bring
up the siege of La Rochelle, where Catholics besieged and killed thousands of Huguenots
in 1572-3.601 They argue, in an interestingly uniform narrative, that La Rochelle formed a
turning point for religious identity in France, and that having once seen the violence
unleashed by religious hatred, French officials would never again allow policies that
support the mobilization of religious identity in French politics.602 While England ignores
the presence of non-state mediation bodies such as the Sharia councils, and Egypt
centralizes by bringing group law under extensive state control, France defines group law
out of existence by eliminating the category of religion entirely from public life.
Egypt, in contrast, retains significant legal pluralism, even though centralization
efforts have not disappeared after the two main initiatives discussed here. In 2000, Egypt
further reformed its judiciary to introduce specific family law courts, effectively
removing family law jurisdiction from the more general first instance courts. This change
was entirely structural; the underlying laws remained the same. In practice, this had very
little effect on minority law in Egypt, but it did offer the hope that the judges might
possess some degree of specialization in the area of family law, including the family law
of different religious denominations, as opposed to the generalist Muslim judges who had
heard these disputes previously.
In Egypt today, all matrimonial law is governed under sharia law unless two comembers of a particular religion marry one another. If two Orthodox Copts wed, for
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example, their union is governed by Coptic Orthodox law, although the marriage must be
legalized by the state through filing the appropriate, church-generated paperwork. This is
true as well for Catholics, Protestants, and the various other Orthodox sects such as Greek
and Syrian Orthodox Egyptians. When a Catholic marries a Protestant, or an Orthodox
Copt marries a Muslim, these unions are solemnized under sharia law, which governs all
“mixed” marriages as well as marriages between Muslims. In effect, Egyptians are
governed according to religious identity, with Islam and its associated sharia law
operating as a sort of trump card that operates when it is unclear whose law should
prevail.
Divorce, on the other hand, is governed entirely by the state. Civil divorce is
permitted as long as it is authorized by the legal code of at least one spouse, so that a
Muslim may divorce a Catholic whose legal code would otherwise ban divorce. Because
the courts rely on the relatively liberal 1938 Coptic Orthodox family law written by the
secular Majlis Milli, divorce is legal for Orthodox Copts on nine separate grounds, which
gives litigants a sufficiently wide range of options that most divorces go through. The
Patriarchate, however, refuses to recognize the 1938 law because it was written by a
secular body, and instead claims to follow the laws of the Bible, as codified by the
Church in 1955. These codes allow divorce only in the case of adultery.603 This means
that an Orthodox Copt can only divorce by proving adultery (and the guilty spouse loses
custody of the children), or by converting to a different religion. Conversion is easier for
men than women because they are less subject to sanction by the community, but it
means that the couple’s children are automatically converted to that religion as well,
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which is not the case if the woman converts.604 The disparity in divorce law between the
Egyptian civil courts and Patriarchate has led to the filing of several lawsuits against the
Pope on behalf of litigants who possess a civil divorce but are unable to remarry because
the Patriarchate, which issues marriage licenses, refuses to recognize their divorce.605
The lawsuits pit two different views of Egyptian law against one another. The
Pope’s lawyers argue that Egyptian civil courts, including the Supreme Administrative
Court, which heard some of the cases on appeal, lack jurisdiction over religious law and
thus cannot hear the case. They contend further that even if the civil courts had
jurisdiction, the 1938 Coptic family laws that the court used in its decision are no longer
valid, because the Coptic community now follows the law as written in the Bible.606
The Supreme Administrative Court’s decision argues, in contrast, that it does
have jurisdiction, because it views the Coptic Orthodox Patriarchate as a “public law
corporate person” and that the 1938 laws have customary law status, and thus hold
force.607 Furthermore, it notes that the Egyptian Constitution includes the right to form a
family, and that Coptic religious officials only have the right to exercise jurisdiction over
marital law to the extent that they do so within the bounds of Egyptian civil law,
including the Constitution, and subject to judicial oversight.608 This decision, issued in
2008, comes closer than any other recent judgment to clarifying the relationship between
sectarian law and Egyptian civil law. It makes clear that sectarian law holds a subordinate
position to both the Egyptian Constitution and subsequent statute-based laws, and it
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effectively rules that sectarian groups may not unilaterally change the content of their
personal status laws.
In response, Shenouda ordered the Majlis Milli to pass a formal amendment to the
1938 Coptic Orthodox Personal Law Code to eliminate articles 52 through 58, leaving in
place only articles 50 and 51, which authorize divorce in the case of proven adultery or
conversion to another religion, respectively.609 This seems to have had little effect,
however, because in 2010, the Supreme Administrative Court again ordered Pope
Shenouda to allow a member of his congregation to remarry within the Coptic church
after his former wife, the actress Hala Sidqi, converted to Syrian Orthodox Christianity to
nullify their marriage.610 Shenouda refused to recognize the divorce because Sidqi had
converted to another denomination of Orthodox Christianity, which meant that her
divorce should still fall under Orthodox jurisdiction. The Supreme Administrative Court
ordered the divorce to go through because denominational difference is sufficient for the
Egyptian state to apply sharia law, which allows divorce, and because the Egyptian
Constitution guarantees the “right to marry and form a family.”611
In this case, as with the previous cases, Shenouda refused to acknowledge the
court’s order and did not issue a remarriage license. His decision sparked days of
widespread Coptic demonstrations in his support, and in favor of the Pope’s suggestion
that the Egyptian state reestablish sectarian family courts to resolve this type of
jurisdictional dispute. In response, then-President Hosni Mubarak ordered the Ministry of
Justice to look into authorizing a unified personal status law for the various Christian
sects of Egypt, something these sects had advocated since the 1950s. This initiative
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would have allowed Christian rather than Muslim personal law to apply in cases of
denominational difference. That Mubarak seriously considered allowing the domain of
sharia law to shrink in favor of Christian law is astonishing. Before he could decide
whether to follow through or not, he was forced out of the presidency in January, 2011. It
remains to be seen how Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s government will address the ongoing
demand of the Orthodox Copts to adjudicate their own family law disputes once again, or
at least to place Egypt’s Christians beyond the jurisdiction of Islamic family law.

Conclusion

The case study of Egypt reveals two causal pathways to legal centralization. In the
first, a bureaucratizing state sought to rationalize its administrative structure and thus
attempted to eliminate non-state courts, succeeding in doing so only when the push for
centralization coincided with a weakening in group capacity. It was only once the group
in question, the Copts, became so internally disorganized and without leadership as to
have relatively low capacity in comparison to that of the state, as well as low elite
coordination within the group, that centralization largely succeeded. In the second, a
regime in crisis looked to further legal centralization as a tool to strengthen its position
against its Muslim opposition. Despite initial resistance from Coptic elites, abetted by
greater unification within the Orthodox Coptic community, the regime eventually
succeeded in centralizing to a significant extent when the regime replaced the recalcitrant
minority group leader with more accommodating community representatives. The state
thereby reduced Coptic elite coordination by depriving the community of a leader who
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could successfully mobilize opposition to the reforms and bargain on its behalf. Since
2012, the Coptic community has been led by Shenouda’s successor, Pope Tawadros II,
while Egypt has been led since 2014 by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The issues of whether the
community will attain a unified Christian personal status law or regain the ability to
adjudicate intra-community family law disputes remains unsettled. Their fate is likely to
depend on how far Egypt’s current and future leaders rely on their Islamic identity to
retain power and the political strength, as well as the savvy of the Orthodox Coptic
Popes.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion
Summary of the Overall Argument
One of the most pressing and under-researched issues in comparative politics is
the delegation of the state’s coercive function to non-state groups such as military
contractors, private jails, surveillance firms, and religious or ethnic courts. Many
developed, democratic states hire private firms to enact force against international
opponents and domestic law-breakers, but few are willing to permit the existence of
separate, group-based courts and legal systems. Whereas contractors carry out the state’s
mandate, courts make, revise, and implement laws, and, as such, are bound up with the
governing authority of the state, as well as its coercive apparatus and its tax-generating
property rights regime. Nevertheless, more than half of the world’s states do decentralize
judicial power.
This project theorizes the phenomenon of legal pluralism resulting from judicial
decentralization. It argues that while many different pathways lead to various levels of
judicial decentralization, they involve some sort of bargaining process between the state
and societal groups, usually tribal or religious, which are bound together by norms not
shared by the state. In this bargaining process, the relative capacities of minority group
elites and the state, and of these, levels of elite coordination within these identity groups
determine the level of decentralization that result. Observations from the case studies of
Egypt, Lebanon, and Tanzania lend support to this contention and further demonstrate the
mechanisms of bargaining. In all three cases, elite members of groups whose support the
state needed to enact a particular agenda were able to use their power to preserve varying
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amounts of autonomy from the state vis-à-vis inheritance law, marriage and divorce law,
and other areas of the law. The Tanzanian state’s need for support from former chiefs for
post-independence state building projects, the Egyptian state’s need for support from
Coptic authorities during state building and subsequent international conflicts, and the
Lebanese state’s need for support from religious leaders in holding together a fragile pact
that allowed the Lebanese state to cohere, all gave these minority group elites sufficient
leverage to press for partial judicial autonomy.
Having examined judicial decentralization in three full case studies and three
shadow cases, it becomes clear that while contestation whose outcome is determined by
the above bargaining matrix is causally important, it is not the only important causal
factor. In tracing state leaders’ and group elites’ capacities, I necessarily invoke the
colonial period before independence and state building as a vital moment during which
capacities took shape. As such, I begin to suspect that colonial legacies may be more
decisively constitutive of subsequent bargaining positions and paths of development than
my theory initially recognized. Comparativists have for similar reasons utilized colonial
legacies to great effect in explaining outcomes in fields such as trade and finance
(Mahoney 2001, Beck et al. 2003, La Porta et al. 2007), human rights (Cross 1999, Carey
et al 2002, Mitchell et al. 2013), ethnic conflict (Blanton et al. 2001) and the rule of law
(Joireman 2001, Helmke and Rosenbluth 2009). Judicial decentralization, as a process
rooted in the state’s post independence trajectory, could also benefit from a greater
emphasis on the constitutive role of colonial legacies.
In the context of this study, I imagine that several separate components of colonial
legacies would be immensely helpful in further understanding relative capacities. For
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example, what form did colonial governance take? States with systems of indirect rule
would be more likely to have strong group elites, whereas those that were centrally
governed might have a stronger state at the moment of independence. It would also be
interesting to consider whether the colonial power had attempted to centralize or reform
the judiciary before independence. This analysis could help explain the first period of
contestation following independence, in particular, when the state and groups negotiate
for the level of judicial decentralization for the first time.
However, colonial legacies alone cannot explain the full variation of types of
judicial decentralization, and states’ trajectories in moving from one type to another.
Because colonial legacies do not change after the end of the colonial period, they cannot
explain later changes in levels of judicial decentralization. In Egypt, for example, Sadat
accomplished further centralization in the 1980s. In Malawi, the state has reversed course
on judicial decentralization policy three separate times. Colonial legacies also cannot
explain judicial decentralization in states that were not former colonies. Nevertheless,
emphasizing and exploring more fully the constitutive roles of colonial legacies is an
important next step for this project, particularly since the first period of bargaining in all
states that I have examined takes place either under colonial rule or in its immediate
aftermath.

Possible Directions for Further Research

Given that the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor deliberately
set up a legally pluralistic framework for the new government, under which separate
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identity groups would be governed by separate laws, and similar arrangements have been
proposed for Iraq and Afghanistan, legal pluralism is becoming of more than theoretical
interest. Aside from its origins and structure, there are many aspects of legal pluralism
that warrant further scholarly attention. Do particular types of litigants fare better in state
or non-state courts? More concretely, in which venue do women fare better? Does the
state’s commitment to its lower level courts in rural areas suffer when there are also nonstate courts in these areas? How does long term reliance on or exposure to one type of
venue or another alter citizens’ perception of the state or their participation in civic life?
When states devolve judicial power to win support for their judicial projects, do they
favor group rights at the expense of individual rights? These questions are yet to be
answered, but I hope that a preliminary analysis of the types of legal pluralism and their
origins will help to provide a foundation for these, and other similar inquiries. By
understanding the political forces that give rise to differing levels of judicial
decentralization and legal pluralism, we can not only recognize that legal pluralism
represents a range of highly consequential political phenomena that are not likely to
disappear any time soon, as accounts stressing the reasons for centralization and legal
uniformity may seem to suggest. We can also begin to consider who benefits and who
suffers, as well as which public goals are better advanced and which are not, by different
forms of legal pluralism; and so we may be able to discern the prospects for constructing
legal systems in many places that are more broadly beneficial for all they govern.
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Appendix A

Anecdotes and Sample Court Cases from Each Country

The preceding analysis of the conditions that beget various iterations of legal
pluralism primarily focuses on macro social forces, and by necessity abstracts elements
of the available data to draw more general causal conclusions. It does not, however, give
a good sense of what it is actually like to witness proceedings in the courts and judicial
tribunals that result from legal pluralism. This project drew on primary observations of
these court sessions, so I will describe them here to give the reader a better sense of the
lived experience underpinning the above analysis. Because I devoted less space to them
above, I will begin with the three shadow cases.

England

England’s Sharia councils have gained a degree of notoriety over the last decade.
Newspaper and magazine articles have discussed, with varying degrees of hysteria and
accuracy, the fact that some British Muslims choose to avail themselves of non-state,
religious arbitration. I visited and witnessed proceedings in four different councils, and
spoke with arbitrators from another two. What struck me, again and again, was the extent
to which litigants in these councils needed their services. On the day I visited, the Islamic
Sharia Council heard two divorce proceedings from women whose husbands had either
abandoned or abused them, and so met the Islamic legal requirements for divorce.
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Neither woman had had a civil marriage, and one of the women was confused that the
lawyer she had spoken with had advised her that she did not need a divorce since she was
never married. In both cases, the litigants needed a religious divorce so that they could
remarry. That such a thing wasn’t required by civil law meant nothing to them—the
religious laws that governed their behavior required a divorce before remarriage, and they
had come to the only authority that they knew could provide them with one. Both women
were successful in their suit, although a third was denied a divorce for failing to attempt
to reconcile with her spouse before asking that their marriage end. The Islamic Sharia
Council appears to attract litigants who are either recent immigrants to Britain, or are less
aware of British civil law. In cases where a civil divorce was required, the arbitrator
usually granted an Islamic divorce but advised the litigant(s) to seek a civil divorce as
well.612
The Birmingham Sharia Council, by contrast, worked closely with local civil
courts. In all of the divorce proceedings I witnessed, the Council refused to issue an
Islamic divorce until the couple had obtained a civil divorce first. They did so both
because they wanted to make sure that their litigants truly obtained the full outcome they
desired, but also because they recognized that rulings in British courts were fully binding
when it came to things like filing tax returns, establishing guardianship of children, and
other matters. Although they saw their role as important in advising the proper outcome
or giving religious support to the court’s decision, they did not see themselves as
substitutes for British law. They were particularly exasperated with a male litigant who
had two separate religious marriages to two women, and knew that he was married in a
civil marriage to one of them, but couldn’t remember which since he had been filing
612

Author interview and observation, London Sharia Council (Sheikh Suhaib Hasan), April 16, 2012.
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single tax returns. Both women wanted to leave their marriage to the litigant, so the court
interviewed both women, discovered which one had been involved in a civil marriage,
granted the other a religious divorce, and sent the civilly married couple to the British
courts for a divorce that they could then bring back to the Council for a religious one. The
court advised the man not to seek guardianship of the children, even though they were of
an age to be under his care according to Islamic law. When I asked them about this
seeming contravention of the religious law that they purportedly used to arbitrate, they
argued persuasively that they saw their role as helping members of their community to
live according to their shared religious dictates to the best of their ability, but that they
recognized that British laws and values were now an important part of that community.
They also were sure that the children in this case would be better off with their mother.613
In cases that I witnessed at all four Councils, some litigants attempted to use the
religious authority of the forum to help them get what they wanted in a civil divorce. In
one case, a woman forced her husband to testify in front of her relatives that he had been
unfaithful to her. By doing this, she gained their support in pressuring her husband to
willingly participate in a civil divorce.614 In another case, a man had attempted to
unilaterally divorce his wife while drunk. The woman used the resulting divorce hearing
to reveal that her husband drank alcohol, and to ask for the Council’s intervention in
helping him stop drinking, and to invalidate the divorce.615 The Council agreed to
invalidate the divorce and referred the husband to a support group for alcohol addiction,
but asked the couple to return in six months to establish whether the husband still wanted
a divorce. I also witnessed cases where these Councils (and, in particular, the London
613
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615
Author observation, Birmingham Sharia Council, May 9, 2012.
614

235
Sharia Council) directly contravened British law, for example by allocating all property
of a divorced couple to the husband, or granting custody of the couple’s children to the
husband’s mother, rather than the children’s mother. I would have loved to have been
able to find out whether these rulings ultimately proved binding, or whether the woman
in either case sought redress in civil court.

France

Coming from England, where Sharia Councils were widespread and easy for a
researcher to access, it was somewhat jarring to find how closed the more observant
sectors of French Muslim society were to outsiders. In interviews and conversations with
French Muslims in the courtyards of mosques, bakeries, Arabic book shops, and cafes, it
was easy to discern that French Muslims did not seem to approach their commitment to
religious law with any greater or lesser degree of seriousness than their British
counterparts. However, French law outright bans religious involvement in public life, so
French Sharia Councils were an impossibility. Instead, I found that French imams quietly
offered marriage and divorce services inside mosques on an as-needed basis. Support
staff at the Union of Islamic Organizations in France spoke of visiting a mosque after
their civil union to have a brief religious ceremony.616 This practice in no way
contravenes French law, but it appears to be kept out of the public eye. More
controversially, an imam at the Paris Central Mosque advised a woman who had just
procured a divorce to ignore the French court’s allocation of the couple’s assets, and to
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return as a couple for a proper allocation that evening.617 The woman expressed concern
that she would lose her ex-husband’s financial support, but the imam argued that it was
now her responsibility, and the responsibility of her parents, to support her. Interestingly,
a large sign on the wall behind the imam’s desk announced that no religious marriage or
divorce proceedings could occur unless the couple in question brought proof of civil
marriage or divorce with them. That said, proof of the involvement of French law did not
prohibit its contravention by at least one religious authority. As he told me, the law was
the law, but what people chose to do in their own homes was up to them, since God could
see everywhere, but the French authorities could not.618

Malawi

In Malawi, courts governed according to local customary law and using chiefs, in
Malawi termed Traditional Authorities, as judges were outlawed as part of the transition
to multiparty democracy in 1994. However, many Malawians continued to use these
courts, which were often never actually disbanded, and a law passed in 2011 reinstated
these courts, although the Minister for Justice has never officially followed the law to
recognize these courts.619 Whether cases end up in the courts of Traditional Authorities
(henceforth referred to as TA courts) or state magistrates seems mostly to depend on
questions of geography, family ties and social networks. In urban areas, where there is a
greater concentration of magistrate courts and greater access to public transit, there is less
reliance on TA courts. In more rural areas, a greater number of cases are decided in TA
617
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courts, although the magistrate courts still have a heavy caseload. In the most rural
districts, however, magistrates presiding over courts do not always have copies of the
laws they are meant to uphold, and have not received dispatches outlining changes to the
law in several years. For this reason, they appear to rely on a patchwork of whichever law
books they possess, notes from their training, and local custom. In one court near the
border of Zambia, a magistrate had a copy of the United States Constitution but not that
of Malawi.
Because there is less ability to forum shop in rural areas, litigants are often left
with no recourse when TA courts reach decisions they disagree with, even when they
violate Malawian law. In a court in a rural district in the South of Malawi, I witnessed the
fourth and final section of a longstanding case involving a land dispute between two
neighbors. At issue was a parcel of land that both had planted on, and each claimed
belonged to their now-deceased parents. The Traditional Authority had asked the litigants
to return on three occasions to answer more questions and to allow her to pursue her own
research into the question. In this final session, she ruled that neither person could legally
plant on the land because it formed part of a national forest preserve. Both litigants were
furious—they suspected (and one of the Traditional Authority’s aides later verified) that
the TA in question had a history of requiring disputants to make multiple appearances so
that she could justify charging a higher fee.620 The nearest magistrate court they could
approach was in the city of Zomba, which was too far away to allow the multiple visits
that would be required to settle the dispute. In other disputes, however, TA courts had
been able to peacefully adjudicate disputes over chieftaincy succession, land rights, sales
contracts, and petty crime.
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Author interviews and court observation, TA Court, Zomba rural district, June 13, 2013.

238
In most districts, I found an unofficial but strong collaboration between magistrate
and TA courts. They often referred cases back and forth—TA courts sent complicated
cases, or those whose outcomes could jeopardize their legitimacy, to the local
magistrates, and magistrates sent petty cases or those whose backgrounds they were
having difficulty discovering to TA courts, which often had better access to family
testimony.621 The confusion governing national level recognition of TA courts was in no
way reflected at the local level. There, officials in different venues proved capable of
collaborating effectively, and using components of the different laws and norms when
they best suited the case at hand. Perhaps the best example of this was an attempted
murder case from a court near Lake Malawi. A woman had accused her neighbor of
attempting to poison her children, but the magistrate suspected it wasn’t really an
attempted murder. However, he wanted the case to be followed up, so he passed it along
to the local TA court. The TA determined that the man had put poisoned fish outside his
house in an attempt to poison some neighboring dogs that had been stealing some of the
fish that he left outside in the sun to preserve with salt, and he had not imagined that
neighboring children might attempt to eat the poisoned fish. Fortunately, no one was hurt,
but the TA fined the man and asked him not to repeat the practice.622

Tanzania
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Like Malawi, Tanzania’s court system is under resourced and has a long backlog
of cases. In urban areas, this results in sometimes years-long waits for simple cases. A
week of observing one of Dar es Salaam’s magistrate courts showed me that a large part
of the problem was the assessors, whose presence in the courts leaves the possibility for
the introduction of customary law into civil law courts. The post of assessor, it turns out,
is not lucrative, and most of the people who have both sufficient knowledge of local
custom and the time to spend in a less high earning position are too old to take other jobs.
As a result, there is a high rate of absenteeism among assessors. During the week I
attempted to observe court sessions, two full days had to be entirely canceled (a court
cannot operate without the presence of two assessors) and one day’s session began three
hours late. The assessors often fell asleep and had to be awakened to waive their right to
question witnesses. The cases at the court that I witnesses were mostly petty criminal
cases involving theft, bar fights, and non-payment of previous court fines. The issues
were mostly handled through the imposition of fines or brief, 24-48 hour long stints in
jail.
At a magistrate court in Iringa, a city in the south of Tanzania, the magistrate
seemed to work much better with the assessors. He asked their opinion on all of the cases,
and listened when they weighed in on histories of local property disputes and
longstanding family feuds. In one case, an elderly man and woman were in court because
the man’s chickens kept going into the woman’s garden and eating seeds. The session
turned surprisingly acrimonious until one of the assessors got involved, at which point
everyone began to laugh, including the litigants. The assessor, a friend of both parties,
had called them both old chickens (apparently a hilarious insult) and asked them to
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propose their own solution. They agreed that the two would share the cost of an improved
chicken pen. Although Tanzanian law would have called for fines or damages, the
magistrate went along with the assessor’s collaborative solution.623
In Mtae, a small village in Lushoto district that is cut off from main roads during
the rainy season, local elders held informal adjudication sessions in Mr. Pochi’s
restaurant, the town’s main gathering place. Mr. Pochi, the main adjudicator, had served
as an assessor, but found he preferred to run his business full time. Knowledge of his
experience as an assessor brought locals to him for dispute resolution, which he did in
return for a small fee. In one of the two cases I observed, he spoke with the families of
two young men who had been in a fight. One of the families threatened to take the case to
the magistrate’s court in Lushoto, but Mr. Pochi talked them out of it. Instead, he helped
the families negotiate a solution. The aggressor’s family agreed to pay the medical costs
of the injured party, and both families agreed to keep the boys out of one another’s way
until their tempers had cooled.624 Normatively speaking, it was difficult to determine
whether the litigants were intentionally avoiding state court in favor of a venue where
they thought the result would favor reconciliation over restitution, or whether it was
simply more convenient or less costly to do things this way. At the end of the day, both
families were pleased—one had avoided the risk of having their son imprisoned, which
would have deprived them of his labor, and the other had a small monetary settlement.

Egypt
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Arriving in post-revolution Egypt during the period when Mohamed Tantawi and
a coalition of military authorities governed the country, before the election of Mohamed
Morsi, and only a week after 79 people were killed in a revolution-related incident in Port
Said, it became clear that it was going to be difficult to sit in on sessions in state courts.
This proved to be the case, since not all courts were in session, and those that were
operated under instructions to be wary of journalists. However, I was able to obtain
firsthand accounts of proceedings in these courts from former litigants. By far the most
common scenario I heard was that of a divorced Coptic couple attempting to remarry.
The marriage law put into place by secular Copts in 1938 permits divorce, while the
Coptic Orthodox church does not, so while Copts can receive a divorce under Coptic law
in Egyptian state court, they cannot remarry, since marriages are still conducted by the
church itself. One woman I spoke with was in a relationship with a man she intended to
marry, but she was deciding whether her best bet would be for the man to convert to
Islam, in which case they could be married under Muslim law, giving them a legitimate
marriage in the eyes of the state but not their community, or whether they should marry
overseas.625 Another woman had gone to court to ask for a divorce, but had changed her
mind when she realized that her court-issued divorce would not be recognized by her
family.626
There was a lot of discussion among young, reform-minded Copts, particularly
men, about pushing the church to recognize divorce as part of the newly forming alliance
between the Coptic church and the transitional government.627 These hopes seemed to be
on the verge of being realized after the death of Coptic Orthodox Pope Shenouda III, who
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had been one of the church’s staunchest opponents of divorce, and his replacement with
Pope Tawadros II, who was seen as being more pro reform, and the election of Egypt’s
first post-revolution president, Mohamed Morsi. However, Tawadros II’s participation in
the coup replacing Morsi with General el-Sisi seemingly reestablished the traditional
dynamic of the regime granting the Coptic Orthodox Church wide latitude in regulating
its internal affairs without state interference in exchange for Church support for the ruling
regime.

Lebanon

In Lebanon, I witnessed religious courts legally determine matters of post-divorce
property allocation and guardianship, among many other matters. Having seen these
types of decisions rendered before, but either unofficially, outside the domain of state
law, or according to codes of law that didn’t necessarily reflect the community’s current
understanding, it was somewhat jarring to realize that litigants in these venues did not
have a backup option of appealing to civil law if they disagreed with the outcome. In a
court near the border of Syria, a Sunni judge gave sole custody of a couple’s children to
the husband, with only visitation rights for the wife.628 In another case, the court granted
a man a divorce from a man and his wife, who although present, was represented by her
father and not allowed to say anything except that she opposed the divorce. After the
judge issued the divorce, he required the husband to repay his former wife the dowry she
had brought to the marriage, but the wife’s father took the money instead. The court

628

Author interview and observation, Sunni Sharia Court, Chtoura, Bekaa valley, Lebanon
November 17, 2012, with Judge Mohamed Nokkari.

243
reporter, a local, suspected that the father had forced the issue of the divorce.629 In
another instance, the court issued a divorce to a woman whose husband had abused her,
but in the following case, the judge denied a divorce in a similar situation until the couple
had attempted to reconcile.
In a Maronite court, I witnessed an appeal from a couple that wanted to marry, but
had been denied permission to do so. Although the couple was both Maronite Christians,
the man had never been baptized, so the church did not recognize him as a suitable
spouse.630 The church offered two choices—either the man could be baptized, or they
could appeal to the Bishop for an exception. The couple chose the baptism option. In
another case, a Maronite couple that had chosen to obtain a civil marriage in Cyprus
requested a religious divorce so that the woman would be free to remarry. The judge
explained that there was no concept of divorce in the Maronite church, and that their best
recourse was to return to Cyprus to seek a divorce.631 Another case involved an interfaith
couple where a Maronite man and Muslim woman were seeking to marry one another.
They could not marry under Sunni Muslim law because Muslim women, according to
some interpretations, are prohibited from marrying non-Muslims, so they were hoping
that the Maronite court could help them. They, too, were referred to Cyprus.632 While
many of the cases were resolved in a manner that appeared to be satisfactory to both
parties, others did not. In these cases, the structure of appeal led up through the church
hierarchy, ending with the Patriarch of the Maronite Church. Although the church did not
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condone it, litigants in the waiting room quietly traded tips about which religions they
could convert to that might have laws more favorable to their hoped for outcome.
These observations, far from making it clear whether non-state courts are
normatively desirable or not, serve to show how complicated the law is when people find
themselves bound by multiple, sometimes conflicting sets of law, or when state law fails
to reach all of its citizens in its intended form. Neither is it clear whether some forms of
legal pluralism result in better outcomes for ordinary citizens than others. Even in places
where pluralism is hidden from the state, such as France, citizens who find themselves in
need of religious law are clearly able to access it, albeit discreetly. In England, the open
nature of the Sharia Councils lends them greater visibility. This seems to help in most
cases, as Council judges work more fluidly with state law, but it has also created a large
backlash against Sharia councils and greater stereotyping of Sharia law. Whether or not
the state brings minority group law into state courts, as in Egypt and Tanzania, or
recognizes its use in other types of tribunals, as in Lebanon and Malawi, it is clear that
legal pluralism is an integral part of the legal landscape of many countries.
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